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Abstract
The purpose of this research is to gain additional insight concerning the highly 
efficient market outcomes generated under the rules o f trade o f the double auction, in 
which traders have the dual role o f both buyer and seller and can simultaneously call 
out offers to buy and sell. It is conjectured that the experimental literature’s robust 
results detailing the efficiency of the double auction institution may be a product of 
the constant and known duration o f trade incorporated in previous experimental 
designs. In one o f the few relevant theoretical discussions Friedman (1984, p.71) 
suggests that the predetermined, known time at which trade will cease is one of a 
number o f institutional features of experimental double auction markets that enhance 
the efficiency of observed market outcomes. Known trading duration may well be a 
key variable in the determination of the price formation process and the convergence 
to competitive equilibrium in the double auction institution. This study extends 
previous work by conducting a series o f experiments designed to determine the 
importance o f trading duration on the convergence tendencies of experimental asset 
markets governed by the rules o f the double auction institution. The issue is of 
substantive theoretical and practical interest.
The results of this study offer a number of conclusions. Aggregated across the 
eighteen experimental asset markets studied, transaction prices tend to exhibit 
convergence to competitive outcomes. Importantly, the etlect of known period 
duration on observed market behaviour is significant. Experimental asset markets that 
incorporate uncertain trading durations display more aggressive trading strategies. 
This is evidenced by an increase in the rate of trade relative to markets where the 
duration of trade varies but is known. The markets with uncertain trading durations 
also exhibit reduced levels of market efficiency relative to the other markets studied. 
The implication is clear, any future refinement of either theoretical models or 
institutions of exchange must explicitly recognise the effect o f uncertain trading 
duration on market behaviour in double auctions.
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Chapter One
1 In t r o d u c t i o n
A t the heart o f  economics is a scientific mystery: How is it 
that the pricing system accomplishes the w orld’s work without 
anyone being in charge?
Smith (1982a, p. 283)
'The mystery remains unresolved to this day, despite the
central importance o f  the issues it ra ise s .....
Friedman (1993, p. 4)
21.1 Introduction
In the theoretical world of microeconomics the price at which a particular 
commodity is exchanged is determined by the intersection of the supply and demand 
schedules for that particular commodity. The equilibrium price is the market-clearing 
price at which there exists no excess supply or demand for the commodity. The 
market arrives at the equilibrium price through the actions of a Walrasian auctioneer 
that co-ordinates the exchange process. In the market places ol the real world, 
however, there exists no overseeing auctioneer or intermediate market maker to 
guarantee that the price is set at the market-clearing price. The objective 
research is to shed light on the price formation process at play in the world’s market
places.
Auctions (or markets) are of obvious practical and theoretical importance. 
The volume of trade on the world’s markets is phenomenal, whilst auction theory 
offers an interpretation of the price formation process in the absence o f a co­
ordinating body or individual. The rules of exchange differ from market to market. 
For example, many antique auctions follow the rules of English auctions in which 
buyers submit progressively higher and higher bids, with the winner being the 
individual submitting the highest bid. In contrast the Dutch auction, which originated 
in the Dutch tulip markets, incorporates a price clock that ticks down until a buyer 
stops the clock at the price they are willing to pay. The institutional rules of exchange 
that govern a particular auction will have implications for both the price formation 
process and level o f gains from trade exhausted. It is not the intention here, however, 
to undertake a comparative analysis of the impact of disparate institutional rules on 
the characteristics of observed market performance. Indeed, much experimental and 
theoretical work has already been carried out in this area (see Kagel, 1995, for a 
review). Instead the intention here is to focus on one particular institution of 
exchange and investigate the impact on the observed price and allocation behaviour of 
uncertainty concerning the end o f trade. The institution under consideration is the 
two-sided double auction (DA) in which buyers and sellers can simultaneously call 
out offers to buy and sell. The trade o f securities on many of the world’s financial 
markets is governed by one form or another of the double auction and it is for this
reason that the DA is the chosen institution.
This chapter is intended as an introduction to the research agenda at the heart
3of this thesis and discusses the issues o f interest that motivated this research. Also, 
introduced are the proposed research agenda and the research method adopted. I he 
structure of the chapter is as follows. The subsequent section discusses the role of the 
financial markets that is central to the functioning o f economic systems. Section 1.3 
offers a brief historical development of the experimental method utilised in this 
research programme. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 discuss the motivation for the current 
research and the proposed research agenda, respectively. The rapid development of 
on-line electronic networks has provided a new channel for trade that is growing 
rapidly. Section 1.6 discusses how these recent developments are changing the way 
that markets are conducted, highlighting the practical importance of this research. The 
concluding section introduces the structure of the thesis on a chapter by chapter basis.
1.2 Role of Financial Markets
Markets, as institutions of exchange, are central to the functioning of 
economic systems, in which individuals’ activities require co-ordinating to ensure that 
scarce resources are put to best use. The co-ordination of activities is hampered by 
the existence o f uncertainty concerning the opportunities available to society and by 
the dissemination of information concerning these activities across society as a whole.
It is the pricing system that provides the means of guiding resource allocation and 
economic activity. In the highly developed economies of the world today, it is the 
financial asset markets that constitute the highest level at which this co-ordination 
takes place. The efficiency with which the world’s financial markets allocate scarce 
capital among competing investment opportunities and promote the generation of 
economic wealth via gains from exchange is of paramount importance. Such is the 
importance of this issue that the question of just how efficient the financial markets 
are has been the focus of a long standing academic debate and has dominated the
finance literature for a number o f decades.
Whilst there does not appear to be a general consensus on the issue of market 
efficiency it is clear that the institutional rules governing trade play a key role in the 
price formation process and consequently overall efficiency. The market institution 
specifies the rules that govern the economic interaction of individuals, thus 
determining not only the nature and timing of messages and decisions, but how these 
map into monetary outcomes. The trading rules o f the market institution clearly have 
behavioural implications. The double auction (DA) is a trading institution used the
4world over, from the London Stock Exchange to the New York Stock Exchange. 
Briefly, the rules o f the DA allow buyers and sellers to simultaneously call out offers 
to buy (bids) and offers to sell (asks) at any point in the trading process. A transaction 
occurs when the outstanding bid is equal to the outstanding ask, after which the 
bidding process begins again. Thus the market is two-sided and continuous. I his is 
in contrast to, for example, single-sided markets such as the posted-offer market as 
adopted in retail markets where the seller offers a single price on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis. It is also in contrast to discrete markets such as the call market in which bids 
and asks are accumulated and all transactions take place simultaneously at a single
market clearing price.
Given the influence of trading rules on market behaviour it is vitally important
to be able to compare market performance (both price and allocation) under various 
institutional designs in order to determine their relative efficiencies. Unfortunately 
this is not strictly achievable by comparison of outcomes in naturally occurring 
markets due to the disparate environments in which they operate. It is not possible to 
ensure that relative performances are evaluated on a level playing field, because of a 
lack o f control over the naturally occurring environment in which the institutions 
exist. However, this strict control is possible with the adoption of a different 
methodological approach. Experimental methods provide the ability to strictly 
control relevant variables, as determined by either theory (numbers of buyers and 
sellers, information structures) or intuition. It is to a brief introduction ot the adoption 
of experimental methods in economics that the discussion now turns.
1.3 Experimental Economics: A Brief Introduction
The experimental economics literature has developed in three broad areas 
(Davis and Holt, 1993, p.5): market experiments, game experiments and individual 
choice experiments. Given that this research programme is centred upon the study of 
financial asset markets, it is experiments in the first ot these areas that provide the 
topic for the following introduction. Roth (1995) provides an excellent introduction 
to all the facets of experiments in economics, illustrating how the discipline began 
with the pioneering experiments of the 1930s to become transformed into an accepted
mainstream subject by the early 1990s.
The first market experiments were conducted by Chamberlin (1948) in an 
attempt to investigate whether markets were able to attain predicted competitive price
5and quantity equilibrium levels. The experimental outcomes reported deviated 
systematically from predicted values. Smith (1962, 1964) believed these findings 
were the result o f the decentralised trading in Chamberlin’s markets, and so 
implemented an alternative trading institution, the double auction , the rules of which 
require the public availability of bids, asks and transaction prices. The subsequent 
results provided support for the predictions o f competitive price theory. The above 
illustrates how experimental progress occurs, with initial experiments serving to focus 
the investigation while subsequent experiments aim to identify potentially critical 
variables (Roth, 1988, p.975). These two pioneering experiments are the basis from 
which the experimental literature developed to investigate the impact on market 
behaviour o f institutional rules of trade and an analysis o f efficiency in financial asset
markets.
The experimental economics literature has witnessed a proliferation ot articles 
investigating various institutional rules of exchange and their comparative efficiencies 
(see Kagel, 1995, for a review o f the research results). The overwhelming evidence 
concerns the rapid convergence of transaction prices to close approximations ot the 
competitive price equilibrium and the high percentage of gains from trade exhausted 
when markets are governed by the trading rules of the double auction institution. 
Similarities between the double auction and the rules governing the trade of securities 
on a number o f the world’s stock exchanges prompted a series of experimental studies
focusing on financial asset markets.
Since the beginning of the 1980s the volume of literature on the market
behaviour observed in experimental financial asset markets has grown steadily. One 
of the earliest studies by Plott and Sunder (1982) incorporated a simple experimental 
design in which a market was created where traders were able to both buy and sell 
‘shares’ with uncertain values. Some traders knew the value of the shares, whilst 
others did not. The competitive nature of the market meant that the price at which the 
shares changed hands converged to the true (fundamental) value of the shares. This 
result was replicated by Banks (1985), amongst others. In a later study Plott and 
Sunder (1988) increased the complexity of their earlier experimental design by 
removing the certain knowledge of some traders as to the value of the traded shares. 
Instead, some traders faced reduced uncertainty concerning the value of the shares, 
relative to other traders. The increased uncertainty resulted in a failure of prices to 
converge to the true value of the shares.
6Duxbury (1995) surveys the results reported from numerous experimental 
financial asset markets. In conclusion, for the simple experimental designs of early 
studies, the price at which shares are traded generally converges to the true value of 
the shares and those traders for whom the shares represent the greatest value generally 
hold the shares. However, the results o f later studies (see for example, Forsythe and 
Lundholm, 1990 and Lundholm, 1991), in which the complexity and uncertainty ot 
the trading environment is increased, do not offer evidence in support of this 
conclusion. Sunder (1995) also provides a detailed survey of experimental asset 
markets. The major findings in the experimental asset market literature to date will be
discussed in detail in Chapter Three.
The fundamental objective of laboratory experiments is the creation of an 
environment that can be controlled, manipulated as desired and which allows accurate 
measurement o f all relevant variables (Wilde, 1980). A carefully designed laboratory 
experiment can achieve greater precision than is possible with empirical research. 
Thus, in the context of financial asset market experiments a major benefit provided by 
an experimental methodology is the ability to control relevant variables so as to 
maintain the ceteris paribus conditions specified by the theory under consideration. It 
is this potential that enables the investigation of static equilibrium theories, which is 
not conventionally possible if one or more variables fluctuate rapidly. Individuals 
private information and the arrival of new information can be specified and 
controlled. Furthermore, the complete knowledge of all parameters by the experiment 
designer allows a theoretically optimal allocation to be calculated. This is 
problematic in field studies as one can never be sure the observed outcome is optimal. 
Control is the substance of experimental economics. A more detailed discussion of the 
experimental economics methodology will be given in Chapter Four.
The purpose of experimentation within the financial asset market literature has 
shifted and developed. Initial experiments were double focused, providing both a 
means o f testing and discriminating between competing theories (which Smith, 1982a, 
terms nomotheoretical experiments) and documenting generalised, replicable 
empirical Taws’ (nomoempirical experiments). Later experiments became vehicles 
for the ‘stress testing’ o f specific theories, allowing the determination of important 
variables and the limitations of a theory’s domain. With this in mind the motivation 
behind the current research programme will now be introduced.
71.4 Research Motivation
Despite the wide ranging evidence documenting the rapid and relatively robust 
convergence tendencies of the double auction, no general consensus has emerged on 
why the double auction institution performs so efficiently. The lack ot consensus is 
not surprising. The theoretical literature has failed to produce a generally accepted 
model o f the double auction that can be subjected to stringent empirical testing. Only 
a few theoretical papers attempt to model the efficiency of the double auction 
institution (examples include Friedman, 1984, 1991). To better comprehend the 
convergence tendencies o f the double auction the development of a model of the price 
adjustment process is of paramount importance. As Davis and Holt (1993, p.167) 
conclude, the derivation o f an accurate model based on logical reasoning may well be 
beyond (game) theorists, because of the ‘rich message and action spaces’ that 
characterise the double auction. Instead they advocate the development o f models 
based on behavioural assumptions that derive from observations. These observations 
can be obtained by conducting series of ‘boundary’ experiments, designed to provide 
rigorous tests o f a theory. Exploring the causes of a theory’s failure allows the 
determination o f the key variables and the range o f parameters applicable. The role to 
be played by ‘boundary’ experiments in promoting advancement is clear. Guidance is 
given with respect to specific areas requiring additional theoretical refinement.
1.5 Proposed Research Programme
Previous experimental studies have incorporated trading period durations 
remaining constant for a given experiment. In addition, subjects have been 
knowledgeable of the duration. In a number o f studies the time remaining in a period 
has been information readily available to subjects via computer screens, whilst in 
others subjects are actually warned when the trading period nears completion (for 
example, Ang and Schwarz, 1985). It is conjectured that the robust results detailing 
the efficiency of the double auction institution may be a product o f such knowledge. 
In one of the few relevant theoretical discussions Friedman (1984, p.71) suggests that 
the predetermined, known time at which trade will cease is one of a number of 
institutional features o f experimental double auction markets that enhance the 
informational and competitive efficiency of outcomes. The closer the end of a trading 
period becomes the more myopic a trader’s behaviour will become if they wish to 
realise any remaining gains from exchange. Indeed, many of the previous studies of
8experimental double auction markets indicate an increase in the rate of trade in the 
closing stages of trading periods (see for example Plott and Sunder 1982, p.680 
Figure 4).
Period duration may well be a key variable in the determination of the price 
adjustment process and the convergence to competitive equilibrium in the double 
auction institution. The intention is to extend previous work by conducting a series ot 
experiments designed to determine the importance o f trading period duration on 
observed market performance in experimental financial asset markets conducted 
under the rules of the double auction. The few theoretical models of bid, ask and 
transaction price behaviour in experimental double auction markets developed to date 
rely on assumptions concerning the time remaining until the end of trade. Indication 
of the importance of these assumptions for the convergence behaviour advocated by 
these theoretical models is necessary for future theoretical development. If proven to 
be a significant treatment variable then period duration, and knowledge of it, requires 
inclusion as an important variable in any theoretical model. A series of experiments 
have been conducted to directly evaluate the impact of period duration, amongst other 
things, on market performance, the results of which are reported and discussed in 
Chapters Five to Eight inclusive. The issue is clearly of substantive theoretical 
interest. The following section will explain why it is also o f substantive practical
interest.
1.6 Recent Developments in Electronic Networks
Recent years have witnessed the growth ot virtual communities across 
electronic networks, o f which the Internet is the best known network. Virtual 
communities constitute a body of members that share a common interest, such as real 
ale, mountain bikes or a particular musical taste. As such virtual communities 
represent both a communication channel between similarly interested and experienced 
customers and an aggregation of purchasing power tor a specific product type or 
service. The emergence of virtual communities has resulted in a growth in trade 
across multi-media enabled electronic networks. Many businesses now offer services 
or the opportunity to buy products across electronic networks. Internet sites are being 
developed as virtual mega-stores, with sites such as CDNow and Amazon.com 
offering access to a wider range of music and literature than is conventionally
possible.
9Hagel and Armstrong (1997) argue that the emergence of virtual communities 
is the catalyst for a fundamentally new business model that will alter the way in which 
business has traditionally been conducted. The shift will be from a business model in 
which firms have traditionally ‘pushed’ products on target customers, to one in which 
customers actively seek out multiple vendors to elicit the best offer available. Hagel 
and Armstrong (1997) suggest that virtual communities will play a central role in the 
shift of economic value from the vendor to the customer and will result in the 
emergence of ‘reverse markets’ in which customers hold the power. Virtual 
communities bring together members with strong interests in specific products or 
services, allowing them to exchange information and purchasing experience. 
Customers, therefore, will have greater access to information relevant to their 
particular purchase interests. In addition, virtual communities bring together 
individuals with common purchase profiles, resulting in an aggregation of purchasing 
power and collective bargaining power. It is this increased information and 
purchasing power that Hagel and Armstrong (1997) suggest will result in the reversal 
of markets. Customers will make public their needs and invite competing firms to 
make tenders, thus creating a bidding war in which the customer obtains the best 
price. The classic microeconomic model in which the intersection ot supply and 
demand determines the market-clearing price will no longer be applicable. The 
reversal of markets will result in the price more closely following the supply curve. 
The bidding process will result in each transaction effectively creating a mini-market. 
The trading environment will come to increasingly resemble on auction, requiring
new business models to be developed.
The move to an auction like, on-line trading environment is already in process. 
There already exist a plethora of sites offering live interactive auctions (for example, 
eBay, Bid.com. and Yahoo! Auctions) with diverse items for sale ranging from 
celebrity memorabilia to computer software and hardware to cargo containers. Whilst 
not yet the trading environment that Hagel and Armstrong (1997) envisage, the 
fundamental change in the business model is well under way and gathering 
momentum. As the trade o f products and services becomes more and more auction 
like, so the need to understand the price formation process and gams from exchange 
generated by specific institutional rules becomes more important. Also imperative is 
the ability to identify the importance of specific treatment variables on the price 
formation process. Thus the importance of trading period duration on the
convergence tendencies of the double auction (and other forms of auction) is of
substantive practical interest.
There are a ‘... myriad business models emerging in the primordial brew 
known as cyberspace’ (Hagel and Armstrong 1997, p.xi). These markets are in their 
infancy and are just beginning to evolve. There is no singularly accepted business 
model that has proven to be superior to all others. In particular, the various sites that 
provide on-line auctions adopt different institutional rules. For example, eBay adopts 
the rules o f an English auction where the bids rise until only one bidder is left, 
whereas Klik-Klok Productions adopt a Dutch auction in which the price falls until it 
is accepted by a bidder. Hybrids of conventional auctions will also become common 
place. It is essential that during these formative years guidance over the choice of a 
particular business model is available. The disparate price formation and gains from 
exchange characteristics of the different institutional rules, and their hybrids, must be 
fully researched and understood. There already exist large bodies of both theoretical 
and experimental literatures concerning the characteristics and properties of the 
various conventional auctions. From this research a number o f hybrid auctions have 
already been developed and tested experimentally (for example, McCabe, Rassenti 
and Smith, 1993, develop a uniform-price double auction). The overwhelming 
evidence from the experimental literature on double auctions concerns the robust 
convergence of transaction prices to the competitive equilibrium price and the high 
percentage of gains from trade exhausted in these markets. Unfortunately, these 
properties of the double auction remain shrouded in mystery and there is no generally 
accepted consensus as to why the double auction is such an efficient institution.
Whilst this research focuses solely on the double auction, and more 
specifically on experimental financial asset markets conducted under the rules of the 
double auction, the results will be of interest to those individuals designing and 
implementing auction rules for the conduct of trade across electronic networks. The 
impact on observed market performance o f uncertain period duration is the mam 
treatment under investigation here. The effect of uncertain period duration will be of 
interest to the numerous sites that offer on-line auctions. Many, if not all, of these on­
line auctions are conducted for fixed, known durations. For example, eBay allows 
sellers to choose durations for their own personal auctions o f 3, 5 or 7 days. Any 
positive, or indeed negative, effect of uncertain period duration will be exceptionally 
useful information to the providers of on-line auctions.
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1.7 Structure of Thesis
The content of the remaining chapters is now introduced. The following 
chapter focuses on the notion of informational efficiency, providing a definition of the 
term and discussion of theoretical models. Conventional empirical research is briefly 
discussed and a critique offered. The chapter concludes by introducing the various 
measures o f efficiency as adopted in the experimental literature. Chapter Three offers 
a thorough review of the findings to date in the experimental financial asset market 
literature. Chapter Four provides a general discussion o f both methodological and 
design issues in experimentation, the chapter also introduces the main experimental 
design adopted throughout the thesis. Chapters Five, Six and Seven document the 
results o f the series of experiments. Each chapter begins with a short review of the 
relevant theoretical and experimental literature and introduces specific experimental 
design issues. The major discussion of each chapter is centred on an analysis ot the 
results. Chapter Five looks at the impact of constant, variable and uncertain period 
duration on the market performance observed in markets with perfect information 
structures. The chapter includes a review of the findings of a pilot study of the impact 
of period duration on market performance, reported in Duxbury (1997). Chapter Six 
builds on the previous chapter by introducing an imperfect information structure to 
the design. Chapter Seven takes the designs of both Chapters Five and Six and 
introduces costly information via the implementation of a market for private 
information. The power of the experimental design adopted across the series ot 
experiments is exploited in Chapter Eight, in which a holistic analysis of the results is 
presented using the data generated across the entire range of experiments conducted. 
It is left to Chapter Nine to provide a summary of the results and a discussion of the 
conclusions drawn and their implications for the experimental literature, the 
development of double auction theory and implications for the development ot on-line 
auctions conducted across electronic networks.
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Chapter Two
2  In f o r m a t i o n a l  E f f i c i e n c y : T h e o r y  a n d  M e a s u r e m e n t
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2.1 Introduction
The previous chapter highlighted the price formation characteristics and gains 
from trade generated in auctions with different rules o f trade as being the central 
themes of this research agenda. The chosen institution of exchange was the DA, 
because of the similarities with features present on the world’s financial markets. It is 
the purpose of this chapter to introduce the notion o f market efficiency. A definition 
of an efficient market will be introduced and distinction will be drawn between the 
terms informational and allocational efficiency. Whilst the discussion is couched in 
terms o f the pricing and trading of securities on financial markets, it is equally valid 
for a discussion of the efficiency of the on-line auctions emerging as a result of the
growth in virtual communities.
The structure o f this chapter is as follows. The next section defines the term 
‘informational efficiency’ in the context of financial asset markets and distinguishes 
between the different types o f market efficiency. Section 2.3 then discusses the static 
equilibrium models developed in the theoretical literature, commenting on their 
predictions concerning equilibrium prices and allocations. Section 2.4 briefly reviews 
the conventional empirical literature that has investigated the efficiency of financial 
markets and attempts to test the theoretical predictions of the static equilibrium 
models. The section goes on to provide a critique o f the conventional empirical 
literature concerning the efficiency of financial markets. This critique forms the basis 
o f an argument for the adoption o f a different methodology, namely an experimental 
methodology. Section 2.5 is divided into two subsections. The first subsection 
reviews the static equilibrium models that have been introduced and developed in the 
experimental financial asset market literature, whilst the second discusses the different 
measures of market efficiency adopted in the experimental literature. Recognising 
that the static equilibrium models offer a limited interpretation of the price formation 
process due to their very nature, section 2.6 introduces the few theoretical papers that 
attempt to develop a dynamic theory of price formation and trading behaviour under 
the institutional rules of the DA. A dynamic theory of DA trading behaviour is 
required in order to understand why the DA is so efficient at pricing assets and 
exhausting gains from trade. The final section draws together the discussion in this 
chapter, which has been centred upon a discussion of market efficiency.
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2.2 Definition of Informational Efficiency
The discussion in this section is centred around the concept of informational 
efficiency, however, initially it is useful to make the cursory distinction between the 
terms operationally efficient, informationally efficient and allocationally efficient 
capital markets. A market is said to be operationally efficient if the costs of 
conducting trade are small. Transaction costs include the payment of commissions on 
trades and dealers’ bid-ask spreads. In an informationally efficient market prices fully 
reflect all available, relevant information at all times. If assets are held by those 
traders that value them most highly then all gains from exchange will be exhausted 
and the market can be said to be allocationally efficient. The discussion within this 
thesis will address both informational and allocational efficiency1, but will not address 
the notion o f operational efficiency. A more technical interpretation of informational
efficiency will now be offered.
A market is deemed informationally efficient if "prices fu lly  reflect all
available information and interpretations of that information’ (Griffiths, 1990 p.46, 
emphasis added). Thus the efficient markets model asserts that prices are related to 
conditional expectations, such that the price of a security today is equal to the 
conditional expectation of its price tomorrow. Any difference in price between two 
dates in time is therefore analogous to a forecast error. Such forecast errors will be 
uncorrelated with any available information, consequently price changes are 
unpredictable. Security prices, therefore, follow a random walk, implying that 
technical analysis is redundant and the stock market represents a ‘fair game’ (has the 
martingale property) as it provides an equal opportunity for all. ‘[TJoday’s forecast 
already embodies the best guess as to what tomorrow’s forecast will be so expected 
profits cannot be made on the change in price' (Sheffrin, 1983, p.126). 1 hus the 
excess return (= ex post return - ex ante (expected) return) will be equal to zero, d the 
market truly represents a fair game. It may appear that this (the fact that the best 
estimate o f tomorrow’s price is today’s) would imply an expected return of zero, 
however, this is not so, ‘the implication is that the past price series contains no
1 For clarification, within the discussion whenever both informational and allocational 
efficiency are referred to the term ‘market efficiency’ will be adopted. When necessary the discussion 
will be more specific and use the terms ‘informational efficiency’ and ‘allocational efficiency .
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information about the change [in price]’ (Elton and Gruber, 1987, p.j65).
In order to test the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) it is necessary to be 
able to estimate the expected return in time period t+1. This is conventionally 
achieved using one of a number of equilibrium return models, including the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM), arbitrage pricing theory and the single index model. 
The most extensively used being the Sharpe-Linter-Mossin CAPM (equation -.1 
below).
E(R/) = Ry+ p;.[E(Rm) - R/j 21
Where: E(R/) = expected return on the z'th asset,
Ry= risk free rate of interest, 
p; = cov.(R/,ROT)/var.(ROT),
E(Rm)= expected return on the market portfolio.
Thus, in equilibrium the expected return on a security will be equal to the risk tree 
return plus a market premium. It is this estimate o f expected return that is required to 
empirically test the fair game model (the EMH).
2.3 Theoretical Models of Static Equilibrium
Having introduced the definition of informational efficiency in the previous 
section, the discussion will now turn to a consideration of the static equilibrium 
models developed in the theoretical literature. Those discussed include a fully 
revealing rational expectations equilibrium (FRE) and a partially revealing rational 
expectations equilibrium. The models predict the equilibrium price at which an asset 
should trade, the final allocation of assets and the value of information.
The rational expectations equilibrium model naturally assumes, in a world of 
differential information and uncertainty regarding asset values, that individuals 
exploit market prices to provide an additional source of information.
Thus ‘(g)iven enough replications o f the economy, the 
uninformed investor would eventually be able to construct a 
model linking share prices to the states of the world. I he 
sophisticated trader would then use share price as an 
additional signal about the true state of the world. Strong and 
Walker (1989, p.99).
An equilibrium price is a price function, which maps from possible information
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signals to equilibrium price vectors. The assumption that individuals act upon this 
price vector results in a rational expectations equilibrium (REE).
In the case where individuals have differential information2 if the REE price 
function reveals to each individual the non-price information of all individuals 
collectively, then this is termed the fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium 
(FRE). Grossman (1976) proposes a theory of fully revealing asset prices which 
predicts that if  individuals are able to invert the relationship between asset prices and 
private information, then they need not receive the message personally to react 
optimally as though they had. This is because prices will fully reveal the information, 
resulting in perfect aggregation and dissemination of private information. More 
technically, the REE price function is a sufficient statistic for the information signals 
received by all traders taken collectively. That is individuals are able to infer the 
private information signals of others by observing the publicly available price.
As with all the static equilibrium models the key characteristics ot the fRE 
model are the assumptions made concerning the information individuals incorporate 
in their price forecasts. Traders form their forecasts of asset value by supplementing 
their own private information with the information available from bids, asks and 
transaction prices. These signals are publicly available to all traders. The values 
observed for these reflect other individual traders’ private knowledge concerning the 
value of the asset. As a result, previously private information is made known to other 
individuals, who were not initially privy to such knowledge. In this respect, private 
information is disseminated through the market via the publicly available signals. 
This essentially addresses the notion o f the efficient markets hypothesis (Fama, 1970). 
The equilibrium price is predicted to be equal to the highest amount paid to any trader 
holding the asset, given the state of nature. If transaction prices converge to this 
equilibrium price the market is deemed to be informationally efficient. I he traders 
predicted to hold the asset are those with this highest dividend potential, thus all the 
gains from trade are exhausted and the market is deemed to be allocationally efficient.
The value of private information is zero.
However, a paradox exists. If prices convey all information then there will be
2 O f  which asymmetric is a special case, where one individual receives a finer (more 
informed) information function than another.
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no incentive to actively collect ‘costly’3 private information, making it confusing to 
see how prices could reflect such information. Therefore, if no individual collects 
information, there will be an incentive to begin to do so. Thus the argument becomes 
circular and no equilibrium will result. In an attempt to remedy this criticism, and 
thus provide an explanation for the existence of costly information acquisition, 
Hellwig (1980) presents a theoretical model in which the equilibrium price does not 
fully reveal all information if sources o f uncertainty other than simply price are 
incorporated. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) develop a similar model in which 
additional uncertainty is represented via the random supply ot risky assets. Thus 
‘noise’ is introduced into the equilibrium price mapping function, which consequently 
only partially reveals all information and so a partially revealing rational expectations 
equilibrium (PRE) potentially exists. Traders choose between being informed or 
uninformed on the basis of the expected utility derived from each choice. In 
equilibrium they will be indifferent because the cost of becoming informed will 
directly offset any benefits (i.e. the expected utility of the two choices is identical). 
Furthermore, both the number of informed traders and the ability of prices to reflect 
information (perfectly or partially) are determined simultaneously in equilibrium.
Thus the theoretical literature was able to refine the notion of efficient markets 
in the light of criticism, by demonstrating that a PRE model provides incentives to 
gather private information, because if prices cannot fully reveal an item of 
information it is potentially valuable. As a result there will be a demand tor the 
information and so it will be priced in the market place, becoming costly to acquire. 
As Strong and Walker (1989, p. 142) suggest, ‘costs of information are no less real
than costs o f production; no market failure is implied.
To summarise, the main difference between FRE and PRE equilibrium models 
is that in the former prices fully reveal private information, whilst in the latter they 
only partially reveal it. Thus private information is worthless under the FRE model, 
but retains some value under the PRE model.
2.4 Review and Critique of Conventional Empirical Literature
Research into the informational efficiency of asset markets is widespread and 
has dominated the finance literature for a number o f decades. The question ot
3 In ways other than purely monetary, for example time consuming information search.
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‘efficient markets’ is an important issue that requires consideration because of the role 
capital markets undertake as allocators of scarce resources. Fama (1970) offers a 
taxonomy of informational efficiency, making a three fold distinction for the 
classification of empirical tests. These are: strong form efficiency in which prices 
reflect all information, both public and private; semi-strong form efficiency in which 
only public information is impounded in asset prices; and weak form efficiency in 
which prices reflect the information implied by prior price movements. More recently 
termed private information tests, event studies and return predictability tests,
respectively.
During the 1960s and up to the middle of the 1970s evidence in favour of the 
EMH began to mount. The Fama (1970) review article came to the conclusion that, 
although security markets were not strong form efficient and so did not reflect all 
available information, they were efficient with respect to past and public information 
and so could be classed as at least semi-strong form efficient. By the mid-1970s this 
had become the overwhelming viewpoint and the EMH had become virtually accepted 
as an uncontroversial fact (Mandell and O ’Brien, 1992, p.500). However, around the 
same time, both empirical and theoretical work became increasingly critical of the 
notion of informational efficiency in its strongest sense. Empirical research began to 
report a volatility in stock prices that could not be justified by the view that such 
prices reflected the discounted present value of a share’s future dividend stream (that 
is fundamental economic value). Furthermore, other empirical anomalies exist, such 
as the size effect, small firm effect, price/earnings ratio effect and numerous calendar 
effects that violate the EMH. Consequently, by the mid-1980s, the weight of 
evidence against the EMH called into question the concept of informationally efficient 
markets (Mandell and O’Brien, 1992, p.503). Due to the limitations on space and the 
vast number o f studies concerned with the EMH it is not possible to cite all the 
references used to arrive at this overall view of the current state of the empirical 
literature. However, many surveys exist and it is to these that the reader is directed. 
Griffiths (1990) offers a limited review of the research, whilst Elton and Gruber 
(1987, Ch. 15) provides a comprehensive review of the research into weak, semi­
strong and strong forms of efficiency and also the various anomalies unearthed by this 
research. The emergence of variance-bounds (volatility) tests pioneered by Shiller 
(1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) is documented in the surveys by West (1988) 
and Cochrane (1991), with critiques provided by Flavin (1983) and Kleidon (1986,
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1988). For an additional review of both the theory and empirical findings in the EMH 
literature, LeRoy (1989) provides a useful study.
The results of empirical studies concerning market efficiency are not as 
‘sound’ as would initially appear to be the case, due to the problems and weaknesses 
inherent in such studies. Consideration will be given to the general limitations ot the 
empirical literature beginning with the testing of the relevant theories, the problematic 
definition o f informationally efficient markets and moving on to Roll s (1977)
critique and the joint hypotheses problem.
Empirical papers have preceded those aimed at providing a theoretical concept 
of informational efficiency. The theories developed subsequently have been based on 
the concept of static equilibria. However, empirical research is unable to provide 
adequate tests o f such equilibrium theories due to the constant and ad hoc arrival ot 
new information, resulting in a perpetual adjustment o f prices. Griffiths (1990, p.48) 
argues that the empirical research into the EMH is concerned with reaction time ot the 
market to new information and that it is ‘misleading to stress the concept of 
equilibrium in the context of financial markets.' This would suggest that static 
equilibrium theories are redundant. Nevertheless to argue for a concentration on 
reaction time to new information, one must know in what direction the share price 
should move (that is react) to reflect such information. It is this role that static 
equilibrium theories fulfil. At a given point in time, with a given information set, the 
equilibrium theories predict the price o f the stock to reflect the available information. 
If the price is below the predicted equilibrium value competitive pressures will cause 
it to rise, conversely if  the price is above the predicted equilibrium value it will fall 
towards the predicted price. Static equilibrium theories, therefore, give an indication 
of the direction of change, or reaction to information, of the price if it is in 
disequilibrium. Thus static equilibrium theories cannot be dismissed out of hand and 
will require testing before adoption by the finance literature.
Unfortunately, the empirical research is inadequate for such a task due to a 
major weakness, the inability to strictly control important variables. Specifically, the 
private information used by traders is, by its very definition, unknown and thus 
uncontrollable when using field study data. The same is true of the arrival ot new 
information. A further problematic area is the definition of an "insider’. Elton and 
Gruber (1987, p.389) state that ‘investors who own more than a certain percentage ol 
outstanding shares or at a sufficiently high management level are considered insiders.
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This begs the obvious question; what parameters should be used to determine an 
insider (that is, what percentage and at what level in management)? An arbitrary 
choice that is consistent across studies would permit a comparative analysis. 
Unfortunately this approach is inadequate because the choice of parameters would 
seem to be company specific. However, the use of company specific parameter 
values would inhibit the ability to generalise results to the market level.
Moving to a further problematic area, the definition ot an informationally 
efficient market causes concern due to an inability to provide precise meanings tor 
such terms as ‘fully reflect’, ‘available information’ and ‘unbiased’. A related 
problem when using empirical techniques is the fact that an informationally efficient 
market is unobservable. As a result, the asset price that would prevail in an efficient 
market must be modelled. This requires the estimation o f expected returns in period 
t+1 via a model of equilibrium returns such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) and so consideration must be given to Roll’s (1977) critique ot tests of the 
CAPM. The problem of joint hypotheses testing is introduced as ‘the test of market 
efficiency is confounded with a test of the asset pricing model’ (Lundholm, 1991, 
p 486). A test of the EMH is a joint test of informational efficiency and the assumed 
equilibrium model of price determination. Thus it is difficult to determine whether 
evidence inconsistent with the joint assumption is evidence against informational 
efficiency or the chosen equilibrium model. This problem can be illustrated by the 
debate over whether volatility tests are evidence of inefficiency or whether the 
findings are a result of the model employed (see West, 1988, and Kleidon, 1986,
1988).
The preceding problems and weaknesses suggest that the conventional 
empirical methodology may not be sufficient to test for efficient markets and to 
evaluate the predictions of the competing theories o f static equilibrium. The 
conventional method may be beneficially supplemented by the adoption of another 
complementary method, that of experimental economics. The following section 
introduces the various theoretical models of static equilibrium studied in experimental 
asset markets since the 1980s and discusses the different measures of market 
efficiency used to evaluate the models predictions.
21
2.5 Theoretical Models and Measures of Market Efficiency in the 
Experimental Literature
2.5.1 Theoretical Models o f  Static Equilibrium
In order to test the theories proposed in the finance literature and the various 
forms of market efficiency, experimentalists design static equilibrium models with 
differing assumptions as to the information individuals are assumed to incorporate 
into their forecasts. This results in the different models making diverse predictions 
about equilibrium prices and allocations. These are exploited by comparing 
theoretical predictions to actual outcomes in order to evaluate the various models. 
Reference should be made to Table 2.1 as this provides a summary of the various 
models, including acronyms, definitions, and price, allocation and value of 
information predictions. Any models that are equivalent to other models are not 
discussed in the main body of text, but are referred to in the table. These models will 
be referred to in greater detail in the literature review of Chapter Three. It should be 
noted that when experimental studies refer to a rational expectations equilibrium 
(REE) they are in fact generally referring to the fully revealing model, FRE. Thus 
within the body of this text the acronym FRE will be used whenever other studies 
have used the acronym REE, so as to clarify the situation. Also, when other 
equivalent models are discussed in the literature this paper will attempt to make use of
one acronym to refer to them.
The concept of rational expectations has been extended to the allocative
properties o f experimental financial asset markets. These experimental markets have 
been used to test the theoretical predictions o f the static equilibrium models. Markets 
are conducted for assets that pay an uncertain, state contingent dividend. I hese 
uncertain dividends may vary from trader to trader, thus creating possible gains from 
exchange. In many of the markets conducted in the experimental literature some, but 
not all, traders receive information about the state of nature. In one of the earliest 
experimental asset market studies Plott and Sunder (1982) introduce a fully revealing 
rational expectations (FRE) model in which equilibrium prices reveal the state of 
nature. In this model traders supplement their own private information with the 
public information available from price signals which reflect others private 
information. As a result the equilibrium price is predicted to be equal to the highest 
dividend of any trader type given the state of nature. The traders predicted to hold the
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asset are those with this highest dividend potential. The vast majority of experimental 
studies into asset market efficiency also invoke this model or those models that are 
equivalent. A prediction of this model is that private information is fully revealed and
so consequently has no value.
Plott and Sunder (1982) also introduce a prior/private information (PI) 
equilibrium model under which individuals condition behaviour and expectations on 
private information only, ignoring any information to be gained by observing the 
market price. Thus expectations are exogenous to the price tormation process, which 
is determined by the intersection of supply and demand as in a Walrasian market. As 
described by Plott and Sunder (1988), the PI model is premised on three principles oi 
individual action: 1) traders apply Bayes law to determine the likelihood of a state 
having occurred given any private prior information; 2) traders act on the above 
probability; 3) individuals’ actions follow the expected utility hypothesis (EUH). 
Given these presumptions, the market price predicted by the PI model is equal to the 
highest expected dividend value among all traders. Those traders with the highest 
expected value (EV) are predicted to hold all assets. If a market were to behave as 
such a model predicts, it would be classed as weak form efficient and any private 
information known by individuals would have a positive value, because the
equilibrium market price would not reveal it.
The above two models are by no means the only ones employed to prescribe 
the behaviour of asset markets, different studies have invoked different models 
depending upon the assumptions made about the information sets of traders. 
Friedman, Harrison and Salmon (1984) develop an uninformed rational expectations 
(URE) model in which no private information is available tor incorporation into 
prices, only public information. This URE equilibrium therefore corresponds to the 
notion of semi-strong form informational efficiency. A further model equivalent to 
semi-strong efficiency is the ordinary rational expectations (ORE) equilibrium 
proposed by Copeland and Friedman (1987), in which individuals combine private 
information with public knowledge to refine conditional probabilities, but are unable 
to infer the private information of others.
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M ode! Definition Predictions
Fully revealing rational Equilibrium prices reveal the private 
expectations information o f  all individuals, thus 
equilibrium (FRE) revealing the state o f  nature with 
certainty
Price: Equal to the highest state contingent 
dividend
Allocation: Assets held by traders with 
highest dividend given state 
Information: Zero
Rational expectations 
equilibrium (REE)
Individuals form expectations o f  the 
underlying state conditioned on both 
price and non-price information
Price: Equivalent to FRE 
Allocation: Equivalent to FRE 
Information: Zero
Perfect foresight (PF) Equivalent to FRE Price: Equivalent to FRE 
Allocation: Equivalent to FRE 
Information: Zero
Telepathic rational 
expectations 
equilibrium (TRE)
Equivalent to FRE Price: Equivalent to FRE 
Allocation: Equivalent to FRE 
Information: Zero
Partially revealing 
rational expectations 
equilibrium (PRE)
Equilibrium prices only partially 
reveal the private information o f  all 
traders, thus the state is not revealed 
with certainty
Price: Within the interval defined by the 
FRE and PI predictions 
Allocation: Traders with highest dividend 
value given state and imperfect signals 
Information: +ve
Noisy rational 
expectations 
equilibrium (NOIRE)
Equivalent to PRE Price: Equivalent to PRE 
Allocation: Equivalent to PRE 
Information: +ve
Private information 
equilibrium (PI)
Individuals condition expectations on Price: Equal to highest expected dividend 
private information only, not on prices value given state and private information
Allocation: Traders with highest expected 
dividend value 
Information: +ve
Ordinary rational 
expectations 
equilibrium (ORE)
Traders combine private information 
with public information to form 
expectations, but are unable to infer 
the private information of  other 
individuals
Price: Equal to highest expected dividend 
value given state, private information and 
the use o f  some public information 
Allocation: Traders with highest expected 
dividend value 
Information: +ve
Nonrevealing rational
expectations
equilibrium(NRE)
Identical to ORE Price: Equivalent to FRE 
Allocation: Equivalent to FRE 
Information: +ve
Uninformed rational 
expectations 
equilibrium (URE)
Individuals condition expectations on Price: Equivalent to u R E  
publicly available information such as Allocation: Equivalent to ORE 
bids, asks and transactions. No private Information: n/a 
information available
Naive expectations 
equilibrium (NEE)
Individuals initially expect to only be 
able to make a gain in period A (each 
market day split into period A and B)
Price: Period A and B specific 
Allocation: Period A and B specific 
Information: +ve
Maximin equilibrium 
(MM)
Individuals act only on certainty and Price, hqual to maximum (actos^ UdUcis) 
do not purchase unless price is below minimum (across states) dividend value 
the minimum they could receive given Allocation: Traders whose dividend 
prior information determined the equilibrium price
Information: +ve__________ _____________
Table 2.1 Description of Static Equilibrium Models
In line with the theoretical model of Hellwig (1980), Copeland and Priedman 
(1991) develop a partial revelation equilibrium (PRE) model that assumes traders can
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infer some, but not all, privately held information from observable market data and so 
private information will have a positive value, albeit smaller than predicted by PI 
models. The model is intended to bridge the gap between semi and strong form 
theories.
The FRE model in equilibrium identifies the state o f nature with certainty, and 
so its predictions about equilibrium price and allocations are free from any 
assumptions about the risk preferences o f the traders. However, the other models 
above must all make the assumption of risk neutrality. In contrast, both Plott and 
Sunder (1988) and Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) propose a model based on the 
assumption that traders are risk averse. The maximin (MM) model is based on the 
hypothesis that traders act only on certainty, and so do not purchase unless the price is 
less than the minimum they could possibly receive given their prior information. 
Traders with the maximum minimum dividend will hold all assets and the equilibrium 
price will be equal to this dividend. Under this model private information has positive
value.
In summary, the main models introduced above ditter with respect to the 
information it is assumed people use in forming their expectations ot prices. As a 
result they make different predictions regarding equilibrium prices and allocations and 
the value o f private information.
2.5.2 Measures o f  Market Efficiency: Informational and Allocational
There are a number o f measures used in the experimental literature to evaluate 
the diverse predictions o f the different models when compared to actual outcomes. 
These measures can be divided into the five areas o f price, allocation, efficiency, 
profit and analysis o f the bid-ask spread. These will be discussed briefly below and 
Table 2.2 provides a selective summary of some o f the measures adopted and further
comments.
25
Comparison Measures Comments
Price
Convergence
Mean absolute deviation 
Mean squared deviation 
Root mean squared deviation 
Time-weighted mean 
squared deviation 
Regression of mean observed 
price on predicted__________
Non-parametric Signs, Wilcoxon 
rank sum and Mann-Whitney tests 
are used to determine significance 
o f convergence.
Asset
Allocation
Root mean squared deviation 
Asset transfer prediction 
(direction of trade)
Final occurrence of each state of 
nature used as it will give 
allocations more akin to 
equilibrium values.
Efficiency 
Gains from 
Trade
Profit
TSA
TSE
(:T S A -T S I) 
(:T S E -T S I)
FRE results in 100% efficiency.
Percentage deviation 
Sum of squared deviations 
from mean
Prediction of whether 
uninformed buy or sell 
differs between models 
resulting in different profit 
predictions
Deviations between gross 
and net profit____________
Essentially a measure of allocative 
efficiency, with misallocations 
weighted according to the reduction 
in gains from exchange.
FRE predicts all traders will earn 
same profit regardless of decision to 
purchase information but PI 
predicts gross and net profit will 
differ.
Bid-ask
Spread
Observation
Regression of spread against 
time
Average of bid-ask spread 
used as a proxy for price
Useful when trade is thin and there 
are few transacted prices.
Table 2.2 Measures o f Market Efficiency
Price Convergence'. In measuring the accuracy ot equilibrium price 
predictions, these predictions are compared to the experimental outcomes observed. 
There are various alternative measures that can be used for such a comparison, such as 
the mean squared (e.g. Copeland and Friedman, 1991) or root mean squared (e.g. 
Friedman, Harrison and Salmon, 1984) deviations o f predicted prices trom those 
observed. Table 2.2 offers some alternative measures. However, when no trade takes 
place the above measures will not be strictly defined.
Asset Allocation'. Rubinstein (1975) raises the issue that theories ot
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efficient markets should explain asset allocations in addition to prices. Models that 
make different assumptions about traders’ information sets will make different 
allocation predictions, which when compared to observed outcomes will give a 
measure o f the misallocation of assets. This measure is contained in, amongst others, 
Friedman, Harrison and Salmon (1984) and Copeland and Friedman (1991).
The above measure is inadequate if the predictions o f one model are a subset 
of those o f another, as it will be biased in favour o f the latter model. This frequently 
occurs with the predictions of the PI model being a subset o f those of the FRE model. 
O f those subjects who are members o f the trader type receiving the highest dividend, 
given the state of nature, the PI model predicts that the informed (insiders) will 
purchase the asset at a price equal to their reservation (dividend) value. On the other 
hand, those who are uninformed and so use expected value to determine the worth of 
the asset to them, will sell to the informed. This will result because the expected 
value to the uninformed, who do not know the state and under the PI model cannot 
infer it by observing prices, is lower than the reservation price of the informed. In 
contrast the FRE model is based on the premise that uninformed traders are able to 
infer the private information of the informed, and thus the state of nature, trom the 
publicly available price. As a result, the subjects in any given trader type will have 
the same reservation price, thus both the informed and uninformed of the trader type 
with the highest dividend will hold the asset. It is clear, therefore, that the PI model 
prediction o f the informed with the highest dividend holding (I) is a subset of the FRE 
prediction o f both the informed and uninformed holding (I+U). Notationally, I c= 
I+U. This is a valid criticism of the paper by Plott and Sunder (1982).
As a result a number of papers have provided various alternatives. Plott and 
Sunder (1988) used the security transfer predictions o f the models rather than final 
holdings. Given that the various models result in different asset valuations for 
different traders, they also, therefore, make different predictions as to which traders 
will buy/sell in certain states. Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) found that the 
predictions of MM were contained in those of FRE in every state. To overcome this 
they divide the number of properly allocated units by the number of traders predicted 
to be in the holding group by the conflicting theories, thus normalising the measure. 
Camerer and Weigelt (1991) make use of the fact that FRE predicts that uninformed 
traders with the highest dividend will purchase whilst PI predicts that they will not be 
buyers. Thus providing a ‘novel’ test of predicted allocations, although not dissimilar
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to that in Plott and Sunder (1988).
Efficiency Gains from  Trade: The incentive mechanisms adopted in the
literature mean that individuals will trade until there are no further gains to be sought,
providing a benchmark for efficiency of 100%. A second benchmark is provided by
the initial allocation prior to trade, which corresponds with an efficiency of 0%. This
follows the procedure in Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott (1984) that defines the total
surplus of an allocation as the sum, across all traders, o f dividend earnings under that
allocation. Resulting in a measure o f the percentage possible gains from trade
realised o f the form in equation 2.2 below:
(TSA -  TSI) 9 7
%Gain -  ->---------- —x
(TSE -  TSI)
Where: %Gain = Percentage gains from trade exhausted,
TSA = total surplus of actual allocation,
TSI = total surplus of initial allocation,
TSE = total surplus of efficient allocation.
Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) define trading efficiency as the percentage of the 
maximum gains from trade that are realised, where the maximum gains equal total 
dividends paid under a fully efficient allocation minus those paid under zero trade. 
Therefore, if the market is in FRE equilibrium 100% of the gains from exchange will 
be exhausted. The above two measures are equivalent.
Profit: It may be the case that in certain states, given the parameters 
incorporated in the experimental design, the models under analysis render identical 
price predictions. This is the case with the PI and FRE models when the G (good) 
state occurs in Camerer and Weigelt (1991), to overcome this a novel profitability 
test is formulated. When the G state occurred the two models predicted different 
trading behaviour for uninformed traders with the highest dividend given the state. In 
this situation the FRE model predicts such a trader will buy (at a price < the EV it 
informed) whereas the PI model predicts that they will sell (at a price > the EV if 
uninformed). These different ways of calculating profit will result in diverse profit 
predictions, these can be used to evaluate the models.
Sunder (1992) utilises the fact that the FRE model predicts that all traders will 
earn the same profit regardless o f their dividend type or decision to purchase. 
Consequently, the price o f private information will be zero, as discussed above, and 
gross and net profits will be equal. This will not be the case in models where the
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value o f private information is positive (e.g. PI model) and so comparison of gross 
and net profits will allow differentiation between the models under consideration.
Bid-ask Spread: When trade is thin or non existent analysis of the bid-ask 
spread can provide some evidence as to whether or not prices were converging to the 
value predicted by a certain model. Cursory evidence can be gleamed by simple 
observation o f a graph of the spread over time, however, more precise insight can be 
gained from a regression of the spread against time. Alternatively, Copeland and 
Friedman (1991) propose using the average o f the bid and ask prices to proxy the 
price at which a trade may take place, thus exploiting the trading opportunities
implicit in bid and ask prices.
The observed outcomes incorporated in the above measures are taken from 
varying times in an experiment. When calculating the overall accuracy of a model the 
data from the whole o f the experiment is utilised. In contrast only data from the iinal 
occurrence of each state is incorporated when calculating terminal accuracy, which 
shows the models in a ‘better light’. This is because the whole data set includes 
disequilibrium trades, whilst end period trades are more consistent with the static 
equilibrium predictions of the models. The studies also have a tendency to compare 
the measures calculated from ‘early’ in an experiment to those from ‘late’ on in the 
same experiment, showing whether there is a convergence towards predicted values.
2.6 Double Auction Theory
The theoretical models of static equilibria introduced above, particularly the 
FRE model which predicts a competitive equilibrium outcome where no excess 
supply or demand exists, generate accurate predictions o f end period prices and 
allocations. Experimental evidence reports convergence ot transaction prices and 
asset allocations to, or close to, these theoretically predicted equilibrium values 
(Chapter Three offers an extensive literature review). However, these models say 
nothing of the process by which prices and allocations converge to equilibrium 
values. In order to begin to understand why the DA institution is so efficient at 
pricing assets and exhausting gains from exchange, a dynamic theory of individual 
trading behaviour under the DA trading rules is required. Unfortunately, there is little 
by way of theoretical literature attempting to fill this void. Those papers that have 
attempted to model trading behaviour in DA markets are introduced below.
After observing flurries of trade late in a trading period but noting that
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experienced traders rarely miss out on profitable trades by waiting too long, Friedman 
(1984) offers a ‘no-congestion equilibrium’. The no-congestion condition requires 
that at the end of the trading period no trader wants to adjust, or accept, the closing 
bid or ask. The condition ensures that closing prices and allocations will be almost 
efficient, only one trade away from Pareto efficiency. However, the paper does not 
directly model the dynamic process of price convergence, but instead offers various 
institutional features that influence efficient outcomes. The paper does not explain 
how the no-congestion condition will occur, nor does it generate testable predictions
concerning the process of price formation.
Wilson (1987) incorporates a game theoretic approach to develop a model ot 
sequential equilibria in bid-ask markets. Traders experience an ‘impatience to trade 
that arises endogenously as a result of competitive pressures due to multiple 
buyers/sellers and the potential for any one trader’s opportunity to trade to be usurped 
by a competitor. Traders are, therefore, predicted to trade at the earliest profitable 
opportunity. Wilson (1987) makes the distinction between ‘serious’ and ‘non-senous’ 
bids and asks, such that traders’ beliefs and strategies are not dependent on the 
magnitude of non-serious offers. Assumed common knowledge of valuation 
parameters allows traders to infer which offers are serious, update their beliefs and 
strategies accordingly and compute the associated equilibrium. 1 he usefulness ot a 
game theoretic interpretation for modelling individual trading behaviour is severely 
limited. Strict common knowledge assumptions are required that are not satisfied in 
experimental markets and individuals would require exceptional computational 
abilities to solve the equilibrium outcome. Indeed Wilson (1987, p.411) questions 
whether game theoretic hypotheses will prove useful models for the explanation of 
observed experimental outcomes. Wilson’s (1987) model is further at odds with 
many experiments as it assumes that once buyers and sellers have traded a single asset 
they become inactive. Many experimental designs permit traders to buy and/or sell
greater than one asset.
Friedman (1991) proposes a model of price formation in double auction
markets. Whilst the theoretical models, introduced above, make use of individuals 
reservation prices to make predictions concerning the static equilibrium price attained 
in a market, the Friedman (1991) study utilises such reservation prices to develop 
optimal trading strategies. Thus, the study aims to develop a model of the dynamic 
nature of the price formation process, via the use of a game theoretic approach. The
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‘model generates specific predictions as to the time and nature of the next event in the 
Double Auction.’ (p. 62). To achieve this intention the paper employs the very 
strong simplifying assumption that traders neglect strategic feedback effects. Traders 
behave as if  they are playing a ‘Game against Nature’, in that each agent neglects the 
possibility that his current bid or ask may affect other agents’ contingent behaviour 
and thus affect his own future trading opportunities.' (p. 48). This assumption, 
together with a number of other subservient assumptions, allows the development of a 
model of optimal trading strategies. An aggressive reservation price strategy, where 
the trader betters the outstanding bid/ask, is found to be an optimal trading rule, 
providing a model of double auction markets that predicts bid, ask and acceptance 
behaviour. The paper makes the simplifying assumption that traders can be either 
buyers or sellers, but not both within the same trading period. In the majority ot 
financial asset market experiments, traders can simultaneously be both buyer and 
seller. Friedman (1991, p.63) acknowledges that such a feature would necessitate 
significant modifications to the existing model. A discussion of the necessary 
extensions is found in Friedman, Harrison and Salmon (1984, Appendix A). This and 
the previous cited study both adopt a further assumption in their attempt to model bid, 
ask and acceptance behaviour. Trade is permissible over a finite interval time [0, T], 
Friedman’s (1991, p.52) BGAN3 assumption allows for the random generation of 
new bid and ask prices at random times. The exact distribution of such prices is 
unknown, however, it is assumed that agents have sufficient knowledge ot the 
distribution of times to compute the expected number o f new prices available to them 
before the end of the trading period. To achieve this traders require information 
regarding the time at which trade ceases in the period, thus there is implied knowledge 
of the trading period duration. It seems that this is a fundamental assumption if the 
model is to predict convergence of prices and allocations to almost Pareto optimal
outcomes (see Proposition 3, op cit p.58).
Easely and Ledyard (1993) attempt a first pass at a positive theory of price 
formation by constructing a theory premised upon certain assumptions concerning 
individual behaviour. Individuals are assumed to act as if they adopt a range of 
‘boundedly rational’ rules-of-thumb and engage in optimal behaviour. The 
fundamental assumption concerns individuals’ reservation prices possibly differing 
from their true values (induced value parameters). Individuals’ reservation prices will 
then impact upon their willingness to better, or accept, any outstanding offers. 1 he
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reservation prices are assumed to be a function of time. Reservation prices are 
adjusted subject to individuals learning not to buy for too high a price (or sell for too 
low a price) and not to wait too long to trade such that they miss out on profitable 
opportunities. Competitive pressures drive prices up if too low and down if too high. 
Easely and Ledyard (1993) show that theoretically, after sufficient repetitions, prices 
will remain in a narrow interval around the competitive equilibrium price. They test 
the predictions o f convergence against experimental data. The results do not provide 
conclusive evidence in favour of their model but do offer support for its plausibility. 
Easely and Ledyard (1993, p.88) offer a deterministic theory and conclude that whilst 
it seems to describe what happens in DA experiments, it does not completely describe 
the path of bids, asks and transaction prices. As a result, they offer the model as the 
beginning o f a positive theory of price formation rather than the finished article.
Friedman (1991) and Easely and Ledyard (1993) offer insight into the 
modelling o f trading behaviour in DA markets. Considerably more research in this 
vein is required to provide a more thorough understanding of the dynamic price 
formation process in DA markets. Friedman (1984) concludes that, amongst other 
features, the knowledge o f the preset time at which trade will end is an institutional 
feature o f experimental double auction markets which enhances the inlormational and 
competitive efficiency of outcomes. As the end of trade approaches the opportunities 
to gain from holding back on transacting decreases, thus traders are more likely to 
accept or, more importantly, better (offer a higher price/ask tor a lower price) existing 
bids and asks. It is the impact upon trading behaviour, and thus upon market 
efficiency, o f knowledge of exactly when trade will end that is the main tocus of 
investigation in this thesis.
2.7 Discussion and Conclusions
The focus o f this chapter has been a discussion of market efficiency. 
Definitions o f informational and allocational efficiency were first introduced, 
followed by a discussion o f the static equilibrium models developed in the theoretical 
literature. These models make disparate predictions regarding equilibrium prices and 
allocations, and the value of private information. I he FRE model corresponds to 
Fama’s (1970) strong form market efficiency. The limitations of conventional 
empirical studies o f the EMH were recognised in section 2.4 and used to form the 
basis o f an argument for the adoption of an alternative methodology for the
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investigation o f financial market efficiency. The different static equilibrium models 
tested in the experimental asset market literature were introduced, with their disparate 
predictions highlighted. The two main models that will form the basis of comparative 
analyses in Chapters Five to Eight are the FRE and PI models. The various measures 
of market performance employed in the experimental literature were also introduced 
in section 2.5. Section 2.6 reviewed in detail the few theoretical studies that have 
attempted to develop dynamic theories of price formation and trading behaviour in 
DA markets. It was recognised that in order to offer justifications for the robust 
convergence o f prices and allocations to competitive equilibrium outcomes in the DA 
market a greater understanding of the price formation process is required. To date the 
theoretical literature falls short o f providing such an understanding. It is the intention 
of this research to focus on the effect of period duration on observed market 
performance in an attempt to provide insight into the convergence tendencies of the 
DA and thus guide future theoretical refinement.
Understanding why certain institutional trading rules result in the attainment 
of higher levels of informational and allocation efficiency is o f substantive practical 
interest. The employment of the most efficient trading institutions in particular 
scenarios is central to the creation of economic wealth via gains from exchange and 
thus the well-being o f society as a whole. Whilst particular institutional rules are 
already entrenched in certain markets (for example, the DA in the world s financial 
markets), the search for more efficient, refined trading rules should be a continual 
process. The issue is o f fundamental importance for newly developing on-line 
auctions and the increase in trade across electronic networks that is becoming evident 
due to the growth o f virtual communities. These newly established markets do not 
adhere to traditional business models and do not yet have entrenched institutional 
rules of trade. They are, therefore, at a crucial stage o f development where an 
informed choice of trading environment must be made. A greater understanding ol 
the price formation process under different institutional rules is ot paramount 
importance. It is for this reason that insight into the price formation process at the 
heart of the efficiency of the DA market is of imperative importance.
Chapter Three
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3 E x p e r i m e n t a l  F in  a n c i  a l  A s s e t  M a r k e t s
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3.1 Introduction
There exist a substantial number of experimental studies researching the 
performance of experimental DA markets. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a 
detailed review of the major experimental results. A distinction is drawn between 
‘commodity’ market and ‘asset’ market experiments. Sunder (1995, p.445) 
distinguishes asset markets from other commodity markets by two defining 
characteristics, the informational role o f prices and the dual role of traders as 
simultaneously (within a trading period) both buyer and  seller of assets. This review 
concerns the experimental financial asset market literature, in which the DA market 
plays a key role. To review all the experimental literature on the DA market would be 
onerous and too consuming of space, therefore DA experiments in which traders are 
either buyers or sellers are excluded. A few important exceptions are included when 
the results warrant discussion. Whilst the experimental studies into market efficiency 
have a number o f common design features, they also have a plethora of disparate 
features. The earlier studies design experiments with simple laboratory markets, 
whilst later studies add varying degrees o f complexity to these market designs. Below 
is an account o f how these treatment variables impinge on information aggregation 
and dissemination, and thus upon market efficiency.
An outline of the structure of the chapter follows. Section 3.2 contains a 
discussion of the key themes and results reported in the experimental asset market 
literature. The discussion in subsections 3.2.1 through to 3.2.5 includes the eltect ol 
stationarity, the number of periods in an experiment and so the effect ol experience, 
the number o f participants, the types of assets traded and the dividends received. I he 
majority o f studies are very similar in these areas and only a few depart lrom 
convention. The remaining areas discussed, in subsections 3.2.6 through to j .2.12, 
are the effect of information structures, markets for information, the existence ot 
mirages, futures and options markets, institutional rules, dilfering risk preferences and 
specialist trading rules. These provide the key areas of consideration within the 
literature, albeit with differing degrees. Also included in subsection 3.2.13 is a review 
o f important, relevant results from computer simulation studies. Section 3.3 offers a 
comparison of the experimental results to the results of conventional empirical 
studies. The final section summarises the experimental findings and draws 
conclusions. The content of the following discussion draws extensively on the review
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article by Duxbury (1995). An additional survey o f the evidence from experimental 
asset markets is provided by Sunder (1995).
3.2 Key Themes and Results
3.2.1 Stationarity
Grossman (1978) suggests that replication is necessary for the occurrence of a 
FRE equilibrium because without it traders are unable to acquire information about 
future prices. In the early studies by Plott and Sunder (1982) and Forsythe, Palfrey 
and Plott (1984), markets were designed so that each period was a perfect replicate of 
the other periods, with respect to the underlying distribution of returns. Both found 
that after a number o f replications the equilibrium price converged to the FRE 
prediction, the ramification being that subsequent studies have adopted the same 
strategy (e.g. Copeland and Friedman (1987, 1991) and Forsythe and Lundholm
(1990), etc.).
Flowever, there are a few papers that neglect to incorporate stationarity into 
their design. In Ang and Schwarz (1985) the equilibrium prices of both the FRE and 
PI models are not stationary, because the number of informed traders, common 
knowledge of their existence and the information they receive are all subject to 
change. In Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) reinitialisation of endowments does 
not occur because multiperiod lived assets are traded. Asset holdings and working 
capital are determined endogenously, and so stationarity is violated. Despite this the 
paper reports that prior to the last trading period, prices converge to near the FRE 
prices. In Campbell, LaMaster, Smith and van Boening (1991) supply and demand 
schedules are shifted by the addition of a random constant (positive or negative) so 
stationarity does not exist. Flowever, this last paper addresses the concept of ofl-floor 
trading rather than simply market efficiency, and so comparison is not possible.
3.2.2 Periods
Given that a number of studies found that replication in a stationary 
environment facilitated the convergence of price to the FRE equilibrium level, it 
seems logical to determine how long this process takes (that is the number ot 
replications necessary). Unfortunately, comparison across studies is not valid due to 
the disparate designs and parameter sets employed. Smith, Suchanek and Williams 
(1988) conducted experiments with 15 or 30 trading periods, but their concern was 
with the existence o f asset market bubbles and so the results are o f no direct
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consequence. Despite this they do provide the view that expectations are adaptive and 
that given time the adaptation is to FRE equilibrium outcomes, ‘when asset value 
‘fundamentals’ remain unchanged over the horizon o f trading.’ (p. 1148).
Of more direct applicability to the convergence of prices to predicted 
equilibrium levels is the amount of experience that participants have. Plott and 
Sunder (1982) suggest that experience may result in the possible existence of a 
learning curve effect. To allow for this possibility Camerer and Weigelt (1991) 
divided the set of periods o f each state type into two subperiods, ‘early’ and ‘late’. 
Findings suggested that prices converged to FRE predictions in the later subperiods 
but approximate PI predictions in the earlier subperiods, supporting the view that 
experience provides traders with the ability to learn. Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) 
used participants with no prior experience and conducted experiments spanning two 
nights, with the parameters remaining unchanged. Lhus by the second night 
participants had specific experience in the environment they faced. Results indicated 
that FRE did not perform well in the first night o f the markets, even by the last 
occurrence o f each state. By the end of the second night o f the market the FRE model 
accurately predicts prices and allocations. However, they felt that it may be due to the 
very specific type of experience gained by participants (i.e. constant parameters) and 
so they designed markets to give a more general type o f experience, by including 
different sets of traders, parameters and the non randomising of trader types. Finding 
that FRE significantly outperformed both PI and MM, they concluded that a specific 
type of experience was not necessary for a FRE equilibrium and traders could infer 
information from market data in different environments, once they had experience in a 
double oral auction. However, it was also found that experience is not a sufficient 
condition for convergence and that other conditions may be necessary (e.g. common 
knowledge o f payoff schedules, discussed later).
Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) supply evidence that increased 
experience results in the tendency for expectations and prices to converge to intrinsic 
values, but deviations still existed. Camerer and Weigelt (1991) furnish evidence that 
allocative efficiency is improved as experience is gained and FRE becomes better 
than PI in later periods. In studying the way in which individuals make inferences 
from public information, McKelvey and Page (1990) demonstrate that experienced 
participants have a higher relative efficiency than inexperienced ones, suggesting an 
improvement in inference through learning.
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Despite what appears to be very strong confirmation for the view that 
experience facilitates convergence, the issue is not so clear cut, as Copeland and 
Friedman (1987) find only weak evidence that convergence is superior in later
periods.
As the studies all invoke periods o f equal length for any given experiment it is 
possible that there are behavioural effects occurring towards the end of the period that 
are not being picked up. One avenue of research would be to randomise the length of 
periods within an experiment, without informing participants of the length of each 
period. A priori it would seem probable that trading would be concentrated more 
towards the beginning of each period under such circumstances than if participants 
knew the duration of the period. This avenue of research represents the major 
contribution to the experimental literature that the current research programme otters.
3.2.3 Participants
In analysing asset market efficiency experimentalists are interested in
aggregate behaviour. The theories under consideration use models of individual
behaviour that are too simple (because this eases the problem of mathematical
aggregation) in the belief that the rational model could capture market behaviour even
though it may be a poor description of individual behaviour. One reason for this
belief stems from the cancellation hypothesis4 which states that if  individual errors are
randomly distributed about the rational outcome then, by the law of large numbers, a
market with many participants will show no bias (i.e. zero average error) and thus be
rational5. This renders the question o f how many traders are required to conform with
the cancellation hypothesis. Again comparison across papers incorporating disparate
numbers o f traders is not possible because of inconsistencies in designs and parameter
sets.
Plott and Sunder (1988) provide an ex post conjecture that, with the number ot 
traders as a variable, an increase will not improve the FRE formation process. It is 
only a conjecture because the ceteris paribus condition required to provide an 
adequate control is violated. The same criticism can be levied at Camerer and 
Weigelt (1991) as the number of possible insiders and the prior probability of states
4 Camerer (1992) p.240.
5 H ow ever, a system atic  b ias w ill occu r i f  ind iv idua ls  e rr in the sam e d irection , resu lting  in correla ted  erro rs and an 
ind iv idual b ias  th a t m ay  re in fo rce  its e lf  w hen  aggregated .
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were both altered, although a consideration o f the effect o f the number of traders was 
not their intention. The same can be said for the papers by Smith, Suchanek and 
Williams (1988), O’Brien and Srivastava (1991) and Sunder (1992), all of which 
varied the number of traders but did not directly address its effect.
Fortunately Lundholm (1991) explicitly addressed the effect of varying the 
number o f traders and constructed markets that incorporated 6 (N6) or 12 (N 12) 
traders. There was no significant difference between the two markets with respect to 
price predictions but the speed of convergence was significantly faster for N 6 markets 
within a period. Furthermore, the N6 markets were significantly more efficient with 
respect to final asset allocations. Lundholm’s (1991) findings suggest that the 
cancellation hypothesis sheds no light on the efficiency ot markets.
3.2.4 Assets
The earlier studies (e.g. Plott and Sunder (1982), Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott 
(1984), Friedman, Harrison and Salmon (1984), Banks (1985) and Copeland and 
Friedman (1987), etc.) and a large number of the more recent ones (e.g. Lundholm
(1991), Camerer and Weigelt (1991), Copeland and Friedman (1991,1992) and 
Sunder (1992), etc.) all designed laboratory markets where a single asset was traded. 
If  participants are required to trade more than one type of risky asset, thus forecasting 
the value of a number of securities, additional complexity is introduced. Plott and 
Sunder (1988) compared the behaviour in single security markets with that in markets 
with a complete set o f state contingent securities. Somewhat perversely it was lound 
that FRE outperformed both PI and MM in the markets with complete sets of state 
contingent claims when any of the measures (discussed above) were employed. This 
was not the case in the simpler environment of the single asset markets, which is why 
the results are described above as perverse, because the notion of the FRE model 
performing better in complex settings than in more simple ones is counterintuitive. 
However, these findings maybe a product of the design implemented in the markets 
with a complete set o f state contingent assets. Three different assets were traded (x, y 
and z) and three states o f nature were possible (X, Y and Z). Assets of type x yielded 
a positive return when the underlying state of nature was X and a return of zero 
otherwise. The same procedure is followed for assets y and z. Thus a portfolio ot one 
of each type o f asset is equivalent to a portfolio of one security in the single asset 
market. Given the method of information distribution (i.e. assuming the state was X, 
half the informed traders would receive the message ‘not Y and the other half w ould
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receive ‘not Z ’, thus there is aggregate certainty), it is possible that the action ot one 
individual offering to sell a certain asset, is construed by others to imply that the 
offerer has received information about the state informing them that the asset is 
worthless (e.g. if  the asset were of type x the message inferred would be ‘not X’). 
Thus traders will be able to infer the preferences o f other traders and the task ot 
valuing the securities will become simpler. This knowledge of other traders 
preferences (discussed in more depth in the next subsection) is not accessible in the 
single security markets and so the design used does not realise an increase in 
complexity via an increase in the number of different assets traded.
O’Brien and Srivastava (1991) conducted experiments for markets with three 
(M3) or four (M4) different stocks, with each market year divided into two periods. 
The dividend in period 2 was dependent upon the dividend in period 1, therefore the 
state space (and thus complexity) was larger in period one. Results showed that FRE 
relative to PI performed poorly in period 1, but improves to become slightly better in 
period 2. When regressing the expected stream of dividends on price, little difference 
in behaviour was found between M3 and M4, but there is only one stock difference 
between the two markets. The two studies that have allowed tor diflering numbers of 
types o f securities were not adequately designed to address the issue ot how this will 
impinge upon information aggregation and thus upon market efficiency.
O’Brien and Srivastava’s (1991) use o f assets with two period lives is 
unconventional as it is usual within the literature to invoke single period lived assets 
which allows stationary replication (discussed above). This raises the issue of 
whether the use of multi-period lived assets would result in reduced information 
aggregation due to the increased complexity involved with calculating their uncertain 
value. Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) use such assets to test the theory that 
the current market value of a share tends to converge to the discounted present value 
of the rationally expected future dividend stream, and to search for the existence of 
price bubbles followed by crashes which deviate from the intrinsic value of a share, 
thus conflicting with the theory. They find that bubbles and crashes do occur, with a 
possible role for risk aversion, and conclude that the FRE model of asset pricing is 
only supported as an equilibrium concept that underlies an adaptive capital gams price 
adjustment process. The findings of these two studies indicate that the increased 
complexity resulting from the use of multi-period lived assets frustrates the 
convergence of prices to the FRE predicted levels.
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The introduction of studies incorporating multi-period lived assets opens up 
the issue of the ‘swingback hypothesis’ (Forsythe et al, 1982, p.546). The swingback 
hypothesis implies that prices in ‘later’ market periods converge to predicted values 
before they do so in ‘earlier’ periods. Convergence in the earlier market periods only 
occurs after replication. Thus the convergence o f asset prices ‘swings back from 
later market periods to earlier ones with repeated games. With respect to the literature 
in experimental asset markets, each market can be viewed as a single shot game. 
Thus, repeated play is possible in experiments with greater than one market year (the 
vast majority o f experimental markets). Coupling this aspect with an experimental 
design that includes multi-period lived assets renders it possible to test the swingback 
hypothesis in an experimental asset market setting. Friedman et al (1984) provides a
theoretical example o f the hypothesis.
At the first impression the obvious study to allow an analysis ot this effect 
would seem to be Smith et al (1988), because the design incorporated multi-period 
lived assets that lived for 15 or 30 trading periods. Unfortunately this design is 
analogous to a single shot game, because it effectively incorporates only one market 
year and therefore does not allow repeated play. However, early studies into the 
impact of futures markets in experimental settings satisfy both criteria and so permit 
such an analysis. For example, Forsythe et al (1982, 1984) design experiments which 
include two periods in each market year, PA and PB.
The swingback hypothesis, convergence in PA follows convergence in PB, can 
be expressed via a testable form via the inequality in equation 3.1.
\ p ' „ - p : \ > \ n - p , \  v '  3 J
Where: P'A ^average price during period A in year t,
P j  =FRE predicted price in period A,
Pg = average price during period B in year t, 
p  = maximum dividend across all traders in period B, 
t = market year.
Forsythe et al (1982) report evidence in support of the swingback hypothesis in all 
experiments, with the inequality in equation 3.1 being satisfied in every year. Thus 
the last period converges first and the convergence works back from this to earlier 
periods as the market years replicate. Friedman et al (1984) also offer results in 
support o f the hypothesis in their ‘Appendix B’ narrative.
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Forsythe et al (1984) propose that the adoption of preferences linear in asset 
holdings in earlier studies may have biased previous tests in favour o f the swingback 
hypothesis, because the equilibrium price in the final year is independent ot trade in 
earlier periods. They remove this potential bias by introducing time-interdependent- 
preferences into the experimental design. Despite this adjustment they report results 
(p. 372) in favour of the hypothesis in 97% of cases in the presence ot tutures 
markets, but only 57% in the absence of a futures market (see later for a discussion of
the role played by futures markets).
With respect to external validity considerations the swingback hypothesis
abstracts from reality due to the requirement of a finite time horizon. Participants 
must be able to observe the end of the game and then apply the experience thus gained 
to subsequent replications (market years). With respect to common shares (especially 
so for large p.l.c.’s) the assumption of finite lives is not strictly valid. (There may, 
however, be a case to be made in association with bonds.) Such a criticism draws 
attention to the possible comparison to be made between finite and infinite time
horizon games.
The study by Camerer and Weigelt (1993) allowed assets to live from period 
to period with a probability, (l-p) = 0.85, and pay a constant market clearing 
dividend, D = 100, at the end o f each period. The design induced infinite-lived 
assets, removing the ability of participants to witness the end of the game and then 
repeat the same game. Thus the ability of prices to converge as a result of the 
swingback hypothesis is removed. Assets had an intrinsic value given by the 
discounted dividend equation in 3.2,
d  + d { \ - p ) + d { \ - p ) 2 + ....... + d ( \ - p T  3 -2
Camerer and Weigelt (1993) report that prices were very slow to converge to FRE 
predictions and sometimes overshot the intrinsic value. Markets with experienced 
participants appeared to converge quicker than markets with inexperienced 
participants. A comparison of finite and infinite-lived asset market results offers the 
conclusion that the ability to observe the end of a game and then replicate it allows 
participants to Team’ quicker relative to infinite horizon markets where the pace of 
learning is hindered. Camerer and Weigelt (1993, p.380) conclude that single-period 
markets converge quickly to equilibrium values in the informationally rich DA 
institution, but multi-period markets converge more slowly, in the absence ol futures
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markets, because traders lack information concerning prices in future periods. In the 
stochastically lived asset markets of Camerer and Weigelt (1993), convergence is 
even slower still, because participants are not able to repeatedly observe the entire
asset life and learn via swingback.
The notion of multi-period lived assets has only briefly been touched upon by
the literature thus far, with the tentative conclusion that the added complexity 
involved in estimating the present value o f future dividend streams (asset value) 
hinders the convergence of prices to the levels predicted by the FRE model. This 
would seem to be an intuitive conclusion to reach, however, intuition has no place in 
hypothesis testing. To arrive at a conclusion with any level of conviction will require 
additional experiments explicitly designed to address the problem of multi-period 
lived assets. The trading of multiple assets as an additional source of complexity is a 
further area that has yet to be fully considered.
3.2.5 Dividends
Within the experimental literature, trade amongst participants has 
conventionally been invoked by creating the existence of gains from exchange. This 
has been achieved by paying diverse dividends between trader types given the 
underlying state of nature. This has formed the custom for the majority o f papers, but 
some have not adhered to the convention o f artificially invoking diverse preferences. 
Plott and Sunder (1988) design their series A markets with dividends differing 
between trader types and their series B markets with uniform dividends resulting in 
identical preferences. Messages were given to insiders with no single trader being 
given perfect knowledge but with the existence o f aggregate certainty (elaborated 
upon in 3.2.6). In the series A markets FRE provided a poor description of behaviour 
and was outperformed by both PI and MM, although there was no overall best model. 
This was not the case in series B, in which FRE was the superior model, indicating 
that to achieve FRE equilibrium required homogenous trader types.
Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) also designed markets in which traders 
holding the same type o f stock were paid identical dividends, with the explicit 
intention of investigating whether participants would trade when all faced identical 
uncertain dividend payout schedules. They argued that artificially induced differences 
in preferences were not necessary to ensure trade, as participants would have 
‘homegrown’ differences. The results allowed the conclusion that sufficient 
homegrown diversity in subjects’ price expectations and risk preferences existed,
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inducing subjective gains from exchange. Other studies incorporating uniform 
dividends include Lundholm (1991) and two o f the experimental markets in Sunder
(1992).
Finally, O ’Brien and Srivastava (1991) were concerned with the existence of 
arbitrage relationships and so designed experiments with multiple asset types which 
paid an identical dividend to any subject holding a given asset type at the end ot a 
period. They found the arbitrage relationships, suggested by the dividend structure 
incorporated, held. However, the markets were generally inefficient with respect to 
full information aggregation. Knowing this they tested the random walk hypothesis 
using the Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots, which provided evidence against the 
rejection of the implied hypothesis of an informationally efficient market. Their 
overall conclusion being that the lack of arbitrage opportunities and the failure ot 
standard tests to reject market efficiency are not sufficient to deduce that a market is
informationally efficient.
In compliance with the notion that stationarity (see above) is required for 
convergence to FRE equilibrium many studies (early examples include Plott and 
Sunder (1982) and Friedman, Harrison and Salmon (1984), etc.) maintained 
individuals’ payout schedules constant across periods. A notable exception being 
Ang and Schwarz (1985) who allowed payoffs to trader types to vary across periods 
thus creating a more uncertain environment in which to trade. Unfortunately, 
additional complexities were present and so direct comparison is not possible. 
Furthermore the objective of their paper was to analyse the effect of risk preferences 
on price variability, not solely an investigation into information aggregation.
Knowledge of ones own payout schedule is prevalent within the literature and 
it is common for information concerning others schedules to be nothing more than the 
knowledge that they may differ, thus resulting in an endogenous uncertainty as to 
what the price of an asset should be. This is the case in, amongst others, Friedman, 
Harrison and Salmon (1984), Plott and Sunder (1988), Camerer and Weigelt (1991), 
Copeland and Friedman (1991) and O ’Brien and Srivastava (1991). In contrast to this 
technique Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) and Lundholm (1991) both allow common 
knowledge of the payout schedules of all trader types. The following discussion will 
focus on the former paper as this permits comparison with Plott and Sunder (1988), in 
which the FRE model performed no better than the exogenous information models (PI 
and MM) in markets with a single asset and traders with diverse preferences (that is
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the series A markets). The design in Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) differed in three 
ways: 1) All market parameters were common knowledge. 2) Markets were 
conducted over two consecutive nights with constant parameters and rotation of trader 
types, resulting in gained experience. 3) Increased number o f traders. Comparison 
with Plott and Sunder (1988) showed the first night o f each market to behave 
similarly in that prices were relatively insensitive to the state of nature. However, in 
the second night of trade FRE significantly outperforms both PI and MM with respect 
to price and allocation predictions. To evaluate the effect of the common knowledge 
of dividends on the performance of the FRE model, Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) 
conducted experiments in which this was absent and consequently so was trader type 
rotation. They found that the FRE model fails to predict accurately even by the end of 
the second night of trade and so conclude that the common knowledge of payout 
schedules has a significant influence on the success of the FRE model, as it simplifies 
the task of inferring information from other traders’ activities. However, from the 
results in the first night of each market it is clear that common knowledge of both 
payout schedules and trader types, and an increased number o f traders is not sufficient 
to ensure a FRE equilibrium, suggesting that the poor performance in Plott and 
Sunder (1988) was not due solely to a lack of common knowledge. Forsythe and 
Lundholm (1990, p.341) conclude that ‘common knowledge of dividends and a 
similar prior experience are jointly, but not separately, sufficient to achieve an [F]RE 
equilibrium.’
3.2.6 Nature o f  Information Received by Insiders
The main area o f concern focused upon by the literature into informational 
efficiency is the aggregation and dissemination of private information held by a tew 
select individuals. It is for this reason that in many experiments news messages 
concerning the underlying state o f nature are sent to a number of ‘insiders’. Various 
studies consider different aspects o f the type o f information given (i.e. perfect or 
imperfect, and homogenous or heterogeneous), the manner in which it is given (i.e. 
simultaneously or sequentially) and the determination of insiders. It is to these issues 
and the findings in this area that the discussion now turns.
Perfect Information: Plott and Sunder (1982) distributed clue cards 
simultaneously to all traders, half the cards contained perfect, homogenous 
information as to the underlying state of nature and the other half were blank. 1 he 
blank cards were distributed so as to conceal the identity of the insiders, from whose
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actions and the influence they have on prices, the uninformed had to infer the state, 
thus requiring implicit Bayesian judgement (see Camerer, 1992). Results suggested 
that the four measures, price, allocation, efficiency and profit (see above), tended 
towards FRE predictions over time as experience grew, implying that with experience 
the uninformed were able to infer the state o f nature. However, it is not clear that they 
were using the market price to do so, as other observables (e.g. signs of emotion trom 
other traders which may have identified the insiders, this could have been controlled 
via the use of networked computers situated in various rooms) were not adequately 
controlled for. Friedman, Harrison and Salmon (1984) conduct similar experiments in 
which a third of traders (one out o f three from each of the three trader types) are given 
perfect information, and the effect o f futures markets on the behaviour of the asset 
market is considered (discussed below). They find that the market outcome evolves 
over time to the FRE prediction. Banks (1985) criticises the above two studies on the 
grounds that the same traders were informed in almost every period and states that the 
possibility cannot be ignored that the uninformed guessed the identity of the informed 
and used observed behaviour to infer the state as opposed to market prices, bids and 
offers. To limit the possibility of this Banks replicated Plott and Sunder (1982) but 
randomised (as far as participants knew, but predetermined in reality) the identity of 
the informed participants, finding that the fixed information structure in Plott and 
Sunder (1982) was not responsible for the convergence of price to the FRE level, but 
concluding that the claim that the uninformed infer the state from observing market 
price is weakened.
DeJong, Forythe, Lundholm and Watts (1991) investigate whether prices 
alone carry information. The FRE model predicts uninformed traders condition their 
beliefs about the underlying state of nature by observing market prices only. As 
suggested above, it is not clear that participants in Plott and Sunders (1982) markets 
were using only the market price to infer the private information of insiders. Other 
observables such as signs of emotion from other traders may have identified the 
insiders. DeJong, Forythe, Lundholm and Watts (1991) examine to what extent 
results in earlier experiments were the consequence of the richer information sets 
available in oral DA markets compared to computerised markets, by computerising 
some of Plott and Sunder’s (1982) markets. The results support the convergence of 
prices and allocations to FRE predicted equilibrium values. However, the 
convergence process is much slower, indicating that the dissemination ot information
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takes longer when price is the only market signal available.
To investigate the impact of the presence o f insiders on market outcomes 
Watts (1993) examines Plott and Sunder’s (1982) markets. The presence ol insiders 
is not guaranteed. Each period it is equally likely that there will be either zero or six 
insiders. Uncertainty over the presence of insiders reduces the markets ability to
converge to FRE predictions.
Imperfect Information: The previous studies all provided messages about the 
state of nature that were perfect and, therefore, are only concerned with the 
dissemination of information. A number o f studies have been concerned with the 
possibility that the market may be able to aggregate individual information that is 
partial, and so does not exactly identify the underlying state, and disseminate it 
through out the market. Plott and Sunder (1988) investigate the issue of information 
aggregation in the situation where traders have diverse information as to the state of 
nature, such that no individual knows the state, but if individuals pool their 
information the state can be identified with certainty (thus there is aggregate 
certainty). They found that information aggregation was poor and FRE equilibrium 
was difficult to achieve (series A). Convergence to FRE predictions required a 
complete set of state contingent markets and homogenous trader types (that is 
identical payoffs). O’Brien and Srivastava (1991) also construct markets with, on the 
whole, complete information, splitting each year into two periods and trading two- 
period lived assets. The use of markets with complete information allows the I RE 
equilibrium to be independent o f risk preferences and so allows the assumption ot risk 
neutrality. They discovered that information aggregation was much better in the 
second period due to the increased complexity involved in calculating the assets value 
in period one (due to the increased state space), but that markets are generally 
inefficient from the view point of full information aggregation. Forsythe and 
Lundholm (1990) is a further paper in which individuals receive partial information 
which results in aggregate certainty, but a contrasting design to that ol Plott and 
Sunder (1988) permits the conclusion that a common knowledge of all payout 
schedules and a similar prior experience are jointly sufficient to ensure convergence 
to FRE predictions. Thus the removal of uncertainty with respect to other traders 
incentives to trade results in a sufficient decrease in the noise inherent in the market 
for the uninformed to infer the market signal.
With aggregate certainty as part o f the information structure, Lundholm (1991)
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states that participants are able to calculate the FRE equilibrium ex ante. This is not 
the case with aggregate uncertainty in which the sum of all traders’ information does 
not perfectly identify the assets payoff. In this situation, the equilibrium price will be 
contingent upon traders’ risk preferences which are unobservable, thus negating 
participants ability to identify others’ incentives to trade. Consequently, Lundholm
(1991) provided traders with messages that only eliminated two out ot four states, 
resulting in aggregate uncertainty. Other features were incorporated in the design that 
should have facilitated convergence relative to other studies with aggregate certainty 
(e.g. common knowledge o f parameters and additional experience). Despite these 
aids the aggregate uncertainty markets were considerably less efficient. Such findings 
cast doubt over FRE and the informational efficiency of markets when diverse 
information requires aggregation in the presence o f aggregate uncertainty.
Differential Information Content and Arrival Times: In a key paper in the 
experimental literature Copeland and Friedman (1987) manipulated the arrival time of 
news messages to insiders, allowing them to arrive simultaneously or sequentially. 
The sequential arrival of news messages is analogous to the way in which information 
is received on actual stock exchanges. They also manipulated the informational 
content o f the news messages, allowing them to be homogenous or heterogeneous. 
The heterogeneous information messages are analogous in reality to different 
individuals having diverse interpretations as to the implications ol the same item ol 
information. Having predicted that prices and allocations would be closer to the final 
equilibrium predictions (equivalent to FRE predictions) in the simpler environments 
(simultaneous and homogenous) than in the more informationally heterogeneous 
environments (sequential and heterogeneous), they found fewer misallocations 
(marginally significant) in the simultaneous than sequential markets and 
insignificantly better price and allocation convergence in simultaneous than sequential 
and in homogenous than heterogeneous markets. Thus providing only weak support 
for their predictions. In a similar situation Copeland and Friedman (1991) find that 
FRE is inconsistent with heterogeneous data and NRE inconsistent with homogenous 
data, whilst their PRE model is generally supported. This model is partially 
successful in reconciling the support for FRE in asset prices with that lor NRE in 
information auctions. It is the literature into this latter auction that will now be 
discussed.
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3.2.7 Market For Information
In the analysis above consideration is only given to those findings related to 
the costless distribution of information. However, the various models under 
evaluation give different predictions for the value of such information. The FRE 
model predicts the value of private information to be zero, thus if a market lor 
information was conducted the FRE model would predict the price to fall to zero. I he 
price would remain positive according to the PI model in which information remains 
valuable because it is not revealed. These differences in price predictions for the 
models provides another means with which to discriminate between them and has 
been exploited by a few papers. Copeland and Friedman (1992) extends on Copeland 
and Friedman (1987) by incorporating a pretrade auction for information in which 
traders bid to receive their news message before each trading period opens. Messages 
are given anonymously to the three highest bidders, at the fourth highest bid price, in 
a uniform-price sealed-bid auction. Consequently, the identity o f those traders who 
receive information is determined endogenously, this is in contrast with such studies 
as Plott and Sunder (1982, 1988) in which the identity is determined exogenously. In 
the simple simultaneous/homogenous environments the market value o f information 
declines and tends to zero over time. However, in the more complex setting ot the 
heterogeneous markets, the market value remains positive providing evidence in 
favour o f the NRE model. Copeland and Friedman (1991) attempt to design a model 
that bridges the gap between semi- and strong form efficiency, which partially reveals 
private information, PRE. In the context of information markets PRE predicts that in 
homogenous environments the value of purchased information will decline to zero 
because the trading behaviour o f individuals will unambiguously signal their private 
information, whilst in the heterogeneous environment the value will remain positive 
because the signal-message correspondence is not perfect and so private information 
is only partially revealed. Their results from the information market are reasonably 
consistent with PRE, whilst heterogeneous data is definitely inconsistent with FRE 
and homogenous with NRE. Finally, Sunder (1992) investigates the proposition that 
in competitive equilibrium asset prices reveal information in such a way that net 
returns to the production of information are zero, using two different designs tor the 
information markets. In series A the supply o f information is fixed at four traders 
with the price determined by the market (i.e. fifth highest bid price), whilst in series B 
the price is fixed and the number of buyers is determined endogenously. Series A
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results show a decrease m the cross-sec,ional standard deviatjon o f net prof„ and thus 
convergence to the equality o f profit across ^  ^  ^  ^  resu|ts pr„v,de 
support for the FRE prediction that the price o f information in equilibrium is *«> >"d 
there is no difference between gross and net proflt Jhe resu|ts o f the series B markets 
are less supportive. The distribution o f proflt does not converge t0 the full revelation 
<FRE) benchmark even w ith  experience and all market observables point towards the 
lower informativeness o f the series B markets relative to series A. Despite this the net 
profit o f informed and uninformed traders were statistically i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e .
I n  a slightly different context Camerer (1992) reports o f  e x p e r i m e n t s  in wl>i<* 
worthless information is auctioned off, with the predictl0n that its value should be 
zero. One group o f uninformed participants were requested to guess the 1980 
earnings-per-share (EPS) for a number of actual companies, based on data concerning 
the companies during the previous decade. A further set o f participants then traded 
assets whose dividends were equal to t h e  average of the estimates o f the u n i n f o r m e d  
participants. In order to value the asset correctly the traders had to estimate what the 
uninformed thought the actual EPS's would be. Prior to the market for the asset, the 
actual EPS was auctioned off to the four highest bidders, at the fifth highest price- 
Initially bids were at high prices close to the asset value, but by the fifth auction prices 
had converged to zero. The results show that with experience participants realised th 
value of the information was zero. The worthlessness of the information is equivale 
to that of the private information in a fully revealing situation and so these resul 
have some implications for the efficiency of markets, although not directly.
In the above mentioned studies that have focused on auction markets for 
information, the private messages bid for always revealed the payoff state wit 
certainty, thus these studies have addressed the question o f information dissemination. 
It seems probable that the increased complexity introduced by incorporating imperfect 
signals into the design, via the need for the aggregation o f information, will have 
some bearing on the efficiency of the experimental market and on the convergence ot 
the price o f information to zero. Ackert, Church and Shehata (1997) incorporate 
costly, imperfect information in their experimental design and directly address the 
value o f imperfect information and dissemination and aggregation of imperfect 
information. They conducted 12 markets each of which consisted of 12 or 11 traders 
divided among two trade types with disparate state contingent dividends. Half the 
markets were conducted with inexperienced traders and the other half with
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experienced traders. The markets were conducted under the rules of oral double 
auctions, with a single asset traded at a time. Two states o f nature were possible, X 
and Y, drawn randomly from a deck of 50 cards, comprising 30 X and 20 Y. A 
market for information is conducted prior to trade under the rules of a sealed-bid 
auction with the four highest bidders acquiring the clues at the fifth highest bid price. 
Clue accuracy was determined by the draw of a card from a deck of 40, labelled A for 
accurate and I for inaccurate. Clue accuracy was manipulated to lie between 0.60 and
0.90 to determine the sensitivity of the market to the chosen parameter values. At the 
end o f each trading period the state of nature and clue accuracy (accurate or 
inaccurate) were revealed to all participants.
In seven out o f the twelve markets prices converged to predicted Bayesian 
prices. O f the remaining five markets, four experienced under-reaction and one 
market generated prices that over-shot the Bayesian price (over-reaction). Price 
convergence was found to be affected by clue accuracy with all five cases of failure to 
converge occurring under clue accuracy of 0.60 and 0.75. Those markets with the 
least uncertainty (0.90) never failed to converge. The results support at least partial 
dissemination of information with prices moving away from those predicted by a 
naive benchmark (reflecting only prior probabilities) in nine out of the twelve 
markets. Ackert et al (1997) also investigates the allocational efficiency of their 
markets. In those markets with inexperienced traders and the lowest level of clue 
accuracy (0.60) the majority o f assets were held by the wrong trader type under state 
X, whereas the other markets obtain asset allocations ranging between 60-96% 
accurate. Under state Y the 63-100% of assets were held by the correct traders.
Ackert et al (1997) report that the value o f the imperfect information decreases 
over time and tends to zero in some markets. Information value is lower in 
experienced markets than inexperienced markets, in one of which prices strangely 
increased over time. Overall, however, prices converge to a value that is above zero 
and below a computed upper bound (based on an assumption concerning the number 
o f assets an individual buys). Thus Ackert et al (1997, p.71) conclude, traders 
perceive imperfect information has value’ and this is consistent with imperfect 
information being slowly disseminated through the market. Like Sunder (1992), the 
study compares the profit o f informed and uninformed traders. Comparing the 
average gross profit o f the two, Ackert et al (1997) find that the uninformed 
outperformed the informed. Though not explicitly reported, this result would have
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been further exacerbated if the comparison had been on a net of information 
acquisition cost basis. Ackert et al (1997) relate this difference in average gross profit 
to the degree of clue accuracy, reporting that informed traders were able to earn a 
greater profit in those markets with a high degree of clue accuracy than in the low 
clue accuracy markets in which their ability to trade profitably suffered.
3.2.8 Mirages
In Sunder (1992) there were a number o f occasions when the market 
converged to the FRE prices of a state that did not occur and so the market seemed to 
have been ‘fooled’. This leads on to the phenomenon of informational mirages, to be
discussed in this section.
Ang and Schwarz (1985) incorporate a design that allows them to create the 
illusion that some traders have superior information when they do not. Consequently 
some market participants may ignore their own prior information and attempt to inter 
the nature of the ‘superior’ information, thus generating false information . The issue 
o f mirages is not their main aim and so direct conclusions are limited, however, they 
do conclude that speculative, as opposed to conservative, investors appear to be more 
rational and less likely to respond to false information. Copeland and Friedman 
(1991) conclude their discussion by stating that the existence o f mini-bubbles may be 
the result o f traders rationally attempting to extract information from imperfect market 
signals. A price rise due to noise may be misread as a response to private 
information, provoking a further price rise. The existence o f bubbles and crashes was 
investigated by Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) who tound that whilst 
experience reduced the number ot bubbles it did not eliminate them. King, Smith, 
Williams and van Boening (1990) report that allowing short sales does not reduce the 
propensity for bubbles to occur, nor the size o f the bubbles, contrary to widely held 
views based on the notion of better-informed traders making money at the expense of 
others and so disciplining them.
More recently Harrison (1992) designed a series o f experiments that allowed 
an investigation into the existence of price bubbles in the presence o f futures markets 
and programmed arbitrage traders. An interpretation of the results suggests that the 
existence of a futures market may actually promote price bubbles in spot markets.
6 A s no ted  by A ng  and S chw arz  (1985) p .829. the  tau to log ical natu re  o f  FRE m eans there  can be no such th ing  as 
fa lse  o r  irre levan t in fo rm ation , because  all in fo rm ation  is incorporated  into prices.
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However, introducing varying maturity futures reduces the potential for this to occur. 
The reported results also support the conclusion that programmed arbitrage between 
the spot and futures market is ‘crucial for ensuring the informational efficiency of the 
spot market’ (p. 60) despite being positively active in the existence of bubbles and 
crashes. The reasoning behind such an interpretation stems from the notion that 
arbitrage actually reduces the duration of a bubble by forcing the market to crash, thus 
removing the necessity for participants to trade at disequilibrium prices.
The first paper to directly address the existence of information mirages was 
that by Camerer and Weigelt (1991), the design o f which was very similar to Plott and 
Sunder (1982) except that before each period commenced a coin toss determined 
whether there would be any insiders in that period or not. Regardless of the existence 
of insiders everyone received a clue card and if there were no insiders that period then 
all cards were blank, therefore, nobody was able to infer when there were insiders. 
The results showed the existence o f only a few permanent mirages and these always 
occurred early on in the experiment. Trading was slower when there were no insiders, 
and with experience traders were able to learn that the pace of trading was a sign as to 
the existence of insiders, which is the reason for the existence ol permanent mirages 
only early in an experiment. The results further showed that for every sustained 
mirage, prices followed those of an earlier period with insiders that took a similar 
path, thus lending support for the representativeness theory.
As mentioned above, Sunder (1992) observed a few occasions when the 
market converged to the wrong price. In contrast to the above study this tended to 
occur in later periods, the reason being the focus ot the study. The intention was to 
investigate the purchase of costly information, it was found that the price and 
purchase o f information tended to converge towards zero. Thus in later periods there 
were relatively few traders with information, and this is when convergence to the 
incorrect price occurred.
3.2.9 Futures Markets
There is a commonly supported belief (see Hardy (1940)7) that trade in futures
is merely a form of gambling, and as it is speculative the spot price will exhibit 
greater volatility in the presence of a futures market than in its absence. Thus futures 
markets will result in inefficiencies, because price volatility will induce suboptimal
7 cited  in Forsy the , P alfrey  and P lo tt (1984) p .956.
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asset allocations. Contrary to this view Hicks (1939)8 suggests the presence of futures 
markets may eradicate two potential sources o f disequilibrium, namely the 
inconsistency across traders of future plans and price expectations. Future plans and 
prices are directly observable in the presence of futures markets, allowing an efficient 
equilibrium to arise. Grossman (1978) further advocates the benefits of futures 
markets, arguing that they alleviate the need for replication to achieve equilibrium, 
because traders can learn about prices tomorrow by examining current prices in the 
futures market. The last two studies above reflect the notion that futures markets are 
able to confer private information about the future, thus aiding equilibrium and 
improving efficiency. The effect of futures markets on spot price volatility and 
market efficiency is examined by a couple of ‘early’ experimental investigations,
these will now be considered.
Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott (1984) designed a series o f experiments that built 
upon their earlier, preliminary study (Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott, 1982) ot the role of 
futures markets in experimental asset markets. In order to examine this role, some 
markets operated in the presence of futures markets whereas others did not, thus 
providing a control. Those markets operating in the absence of a futures market were 
conducted with participants that had greater experience than their counterparts, 
resulting in a bias in the design against the futures markets. The reasoning being that 
this would provide a strong test o f the ability of futures markets to speed the 
convergence o f the spot market to FRE equilibrium. 1 he results were unambiguous , 
providing strong support for the view that futures markets did in fact speed 
convergence, as their earlier study had initially suggested. A further finding was the 
increased volatility o f spot prices (i.e. increased variance) in the presence ol a futures 
market, providing some support for the view expressed by Hardy (1940) and 
supported by Svenson (1976) who also believes they are destabilising.
However, Friedman, Harrison and Salmon (1984) provide a study with 
contrasting results. Their design incorporated a three period market year (as opposed 
to two period in Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott, 1984) and three trader types (as opposed 
to two types in the above study). Futures contracts were written in either of the first 
two periods and then delivered in the final period within a year. Comparable to the 
study of Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott (1984), they found that markets converged to
8 cited in F orsy the. P alfrey  and P lo tt (1984) p.957.
54
FRE equilibrium and this was robust to the inclusion or exclusion of futures markets. 
The disparity between the two papers is in relation to their results on the volatility ot 
spot markets with the presence of a futures market. As reported above, Forsythe et al 
(1984) found an increased volatility, whereas Friedman et al (1984) concluded that the 
presence of a futures market tended to stabilise spot prices. This discrepancy may be 
a product o f the treatment variables investigated, because Forsythe et al (1984) used 
the joint variable of ‘futures market and inexperience’, whilst Friedman et al (1984) 
separated out the two effects and found that futures markets reduced the ‘coefficient 
o f variation’ o f prices, but that inexperience caused it to increase. It therefore seems 
possible that the ‘inexperience effect’ was dominating the ‘futures market effect in
Forsythe et al (1984).
A novel finding of the study by Friedman et al (1984) is that tutures markets 
promote the ‘leakage’ of inside information (that is dissemination to the rest of the 
market), as supported by the result that the PF model (strong form efficiency, 
equivalent to FRE) outperformed the URE model (semi-strong form efficiency) only 
in the presence of a futures market.
Harrison (1986) provides an additional study of experimental asset markets 
where futures markets exist, however, comparison with the previous cited studies is 
not possible as the existence of a futures market was not the treatment variable under 
consideration (all the markets in the series of experiments contained a futures market, 
resulting in no effective control). Three experimental markets were conducted, each 
of which consisted o f three trading periods in each market year, denoted PA, PB and 
PC (futures market). The series of experiments were designed to allow the impact of 
event uncertainty (state contingent dividends) and inside information on the 
convergence o f asset prices to theoretical equilibria. Thus, this three way 
experimental design provided for an analysis of comparative market behaviour in the 
presence of futures markets. Harrison (1986) reports pooled results for PA and PB in 
each market year which support the conclusion that event uncertainty and inside 
information have strong and offsetting individual effects on the RMSD of transaction 
prices from FRE levels. Event uncertainty reduces efficiency whilst inside 
information improves efficiency, with the two effects approximately netting out. The 
impact of the two treatment variables on the propensity to hedge via the futures 
market was also reported, with event uncertainty discouraging and inside information 
encouraging the use of futures hedges.
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Introducing the notion o f stock-flow analysis, and thus explicitly recognising 
the interdependence of current production, consumption and asset holding plans, 
Harrison (1992) extends his previous study. The experimental design was adjusted to 
incorporate twice experienced participants trading over 5 market years each consisting 
o f 8 periods. In the series 2 experiments a futures market operated in period 8 of each 
year, whilst in series 3 and series 4 such a market operated in periods 4 and 8 . The 
distinction between series 3 and 4 was simply the introduction of programmed 
arbitrage in the latter series. The experimental design, therefore, permits analysis of 
the role of futures markets, the term structure of futures markets and programmed 
arbitrage by comparison to the control, series 1.
Results from the series 2 experiments support the belief that futures markets 
convey information signals concerning the likely equilibrium price, resulting in an 
increased speed of convergence. However, transaction prices tended to overshoot the 
equilibrium price in the initial periods (price bubbles) and a higher variance in spot 
prices was observed. The series 3 experiments also exhibited an increased volatility 
o f spot prices, however, less overshooting of the equilibrium price was reported. 
Prices ‘converged more rapidly and less violently’ (p. 60) to final equilibrium prices. 
This suggests that increasing the number of varying term futures may offer a better 
guide to the dynamic path of prices. In addition Harrison (1992) found that the 
arbitrage traders in the series 4 experiments constrained the duration of any price 
bubbles that formed in the spot markets and so facilitated informational efficiency.
Due to the conflicting results reported by the earlier studies into the role of 
futures markets no firm conclusion can be drawn with respect to their effects on spot 
price volatility. However, the evidence in support o f increased spot price volatility 
reported in Harrison (1992) may point opinions in this direction. Despite this possible 
dysfunctional aspect to the impact o f futures markets Harrison (1992) suggests they 
convey valuable information concerning equilibrium prices and so facilitate the speed 
o f convergence towards such prices. Furthermore, the impact upon volatility is 
reduced the more maturity dates are available for various futures. Unfortunately not 
one study stands out as providing conclusive evidence and so additional research is 
required to clarify the role futures markets play.
3.2.10 Options Markets and Arbitrage
In a study o f the relationship between arbitrage and informational efficiency, 
O ’Brien and Srivastava (1993) introduce options into the experimental design of DA
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markets. The markets trade four different securities; two different two-period lived 
assets plus an American call option and an American put option, both with exercise 
prices of 30. The dividend payout from each asset is dependent upon both a first- 
period and a second-period realisation of an uncertain state, X, Y or Z. The dividend 
is only paid in the second period, thus, the first period dividend is zero. The two 
assets have identical dividend distributions, but differ because the state realisation per 
period is drawn independently for each asset. The information structure is imperfect 
(‘Not x \  ‘Not Y’ etc.) with aggregate certainty. At the beginning o f period two all 
traders are informed of the state for period one. At the commencement of each trial 
(period one plus period two) traders were given one o f three endowments; cash plus 
100 units o f asset one, cash plus 100 units of asset two or 100 units of asset one and 
100 units o f asset two. The trading rules permitted unlimited borrowing and
unlimited short sales.
O ’Brien and Srivastava (1993) initially suggest that the relationship between 
arbitrage and informational efficiency may offer a dynamic story of convergence to 
FRE, with arbitrage opportunities disappearing over time. However, the evidence 
from their markets does not support this view, indeed in certain markets the 
persistence of arbitrage increased over time. The experimental investigation into the 
implications o f arbitrage opportunities and options is limited. It is clear that further 
work in this area would be beneficial.
3.2.11 Risk Preferences
The FRE model in equilibrium identifies the state of nature with certainty and
so consequently its predictions are free of any assumptions about the risk preferences 
of participants. However, Lundholm (1991) observes that this will not be the case 
when aggregate uncertainty is present. In this situation the union of all traders 
private information will not identify the state with certainty, thus the equilibrium price 
will be dependent upon risk preferences. In addition, the models of PI, URE, ORE, 
and PRE all require the assumption of risk neutrality, whilst the MM model requires 
the different assumption of risk aversion. It is therefore surprising that the 
investigation o f risk preferences as a treatment variable has been given scant
consideration within the literature.
LeRoy and LaCavita (1981) believe that risk aversion is a source of 
‘excessive’ volatility in prices, but acknowledge the fact that this cannot be 
investigated with the use of empirical data on stock prices because the degree ol risk
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aversion must be determined from the same price data as used to measure volatility, 
and so is not obtained independently as is required. This problem is of such a nature 
that it is readily overcome by employing an experimental methodology, which allows 
the determination of subjects’ preferences and the segregation o f the market to control 
for such a variable, prior to trade.
The earliest experimental paper to directly address the notion that risk 
preferences may have an influence on the functioning of asset markets is Ang and 
Schwarz (1985). They design two physically separate markets, one with risk averse 
traders (conservative) and the other with less risk averse traders (speculative)'*. The 
results show there is a difference in the behaviour o f prices when participants are 
speculative, as compared with when they are conservative. Conservative investors 
were found to demand higher risk premiums and were slower to adjust their portfolio 
to reflect the arrival o f new information. Ang and Schwarz (1985) suggest that this 
latter point is due to either a longer memory toward past price history or a greater 
dependence upon current wealth. In addition, it was found that markets with 
speculative investors exhibit greater price volatility, thus contradicting the theoretical 
predictions of LeRoy and LaCavita (1981), discussed above. However, it may be 
argued that this is not dysfunctional from an economic efficiency viewpoint, as such 
markets also display a number o f advantageous properties. Namely, in markets with 
speculative investors, prices tend to converge closer and faster to equilibrium values 
and a higher level o f allocational efficiency is achieved. Furthermore, speculative 
investors are less likely to be ‘fooled’ by ‘false’ price information.
O ’Brien (1992) also conducts oral DA markets with risk preferences of central 
concern. Five markets were conducted in which the dividend distribution was 
common knowledge and the only source o f gains from exchange was disparate, 
controlled risk preferences. The risk preferences o f marginal traders were controlled 
and manipulated across the five markets. In four of the markets traders were either 
buyers or sellers, whilst in Market 4 they were permitted to be both buyers and 
sellers. Therefore, only Market 4 is of interest here, however, the results are 
consistent across the five markets. The results indicate that risk preferences can be
9 T his w as ach ieved  by g iv ing  70 subjects tw o psycho log ica l tests on  preference  tak ing  behaviour. A  h igh score 
s ign ify ing  least risk aversion  and a low  score sign ify ing  m ost risk aversion . T he  tw elve sub jects in each  o t the po lar opposite 
ex trem es (that is the tw elve  h ighest and tw elve low est scores) w ere used  to  perfo rm  the experim ent.
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controlled in DA markets via a set of incentive contracts between the experimenter 
and each trader, of the binary lottery form developed in Berg, Daley, Dickhaut and 
O ’Brien (1986). Also, the DA market attains high levels of market efficiency, 
averaging 92%, in markets where gains from trade result solely from disparate risk 
preferences, indicating trade towards efficient risk sharing.
It is clear that further research into the effects of disparate risk preferences is 
necessary, not only because many models of equilibrium require assumptions about 
such preferences, but because these preferences may have a role to play in the 
determination o f price patterns prior to equilibrium. The behaviour of prices prior to 
convergence to equilibrium is of prime importance because o f the insight such 
information provides with respect to an individual’s decision making process and 
expectation formation. These are areas requiring additional theoretical and empirical 
research.
3.2.12 Specialist Trading Rules
The structure o f the market institutions that govern the trade of financial assets 
are constantly under review to see if  changes can be made to improve both operational 
and market efficiency. To introduce whole scale changes to market structure and 
trading rules is potentially very risky and costly. Experimentation has a productive 
role to play, providing a test bed in which new market structures and trading 
mechanisms can be explored and evaluated before their implementation on the 
world’s stage. The implications of trading suspensions, off-floor trading and 
specialist traders, amongst others, have been investigated in the experimental 
literature. Discussion will now turn to a brief review ol these papers.
In an experimental design similar to that of Plott and Sunder (1982), Coursey 
and Dyl (1990) introduce trading suspensions and price change limits to the 
experimental design. In a control market of fifteen trading periods, after the fifth 
trading period, they adjusted the probability of occurrence of the two states by an 
amount unknown to participants. This design was repeated with the inclusion ot a 
trading suspension. During periods 6-10 trading was suspended but participants were 
still informed o f the state o f nature and received the corresponding dividend. In a 
second treatment market the control design was repeated with the introduction of a 
4% price change limit. The price convergence process was faster and more precise in 
the control market, which also achieved higher allocative efficiency. In the market 
with trading suspension, prices did tend to the predicted equilibrium after the trading
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suspension was removed, but more slowly and less accurately than the control market. 
The market with the 4% price change limit also exhibited slower convergence and
reduced allocative efficiency.
In Campbell et al (1991) supply and demand schedules are shifted by the 
addition o f a random constant (positive or negative) so stationarity does not exist. 
This paper addresses the concept of off-floor trading and block trading. Off-floor 
trading was more prevalent in those markets with a wider bid-ask spread and those
that permitted block trades.
Benabou and Laroque (1992) offer a theoretical analysis of privileged 
insiders’ ability, and their incentives, to manipulate public information and asset 
prices. Whilst not explicitly addressing the theoretical analysis of Benabou and 
Laroque (1992), Friedman (1993b) explores the profitability of specialist trader 
privileges and market behaviour. Only those privileges under the DA institution are 
discussed here. Four treatment variables offering privileges were considered; POST 
(the ability to enter bids and asks, market making), DELAY (earlier access to 
orderflow information), ARB (ability to arbitrage crossing ot the bids and asks) and 
BOOK (complete orderflow information, outstanding bids and asks). The least 
profitable privilege is the complete orderflow information, which was effectively 
worthless. Earlier access to orderflow information offers statistical improvements in 
profitability of in excess of 70 cents per period. These two privileges did not impair 
market performance and even improved efficiency. The arbitrage privilege generates 
an excess profit o f $1.00 per period. The market making privilege was exceptionally 
profitable, generating excess profits averaging $3.32 per period and three times the 
level o f unprivileged traders’ profits. This privilege is statistically very harmful for 
informational efficiency and market depth, but less so for volume and allocational 
efficiency. Friedman (1993b, p.533) concludes th a t with the exception of market 
making, most privileges do not have the expected adverse impact on market 
efficiency.
3.2.13 Computer Simulation
The previous section highlights the importance of individual trading behaviour 
on the price formation process, however, a number of studies concerning trading 
behaviour in DA markets adopt a computer simulation approach. Whilst not being 
experimental, these studies warrant discussion here due to the implications of their 
findings for the trading rules o f the DA.
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Gode and Sunder (1993a) compare trading behaviour observed in 
experimental markets with that generated under simulated markets with ‘zero- 
intelligence traders’ (ZI) represented by computer programmes. The market design 
adopted did not incorporate the dual role o f traders as both buyers and sellers 
simultaneously, traders were either buyer or seller. As a result the design is more 
akin to the early commodity markets investigated in the experimental literature than 
the asset markets that are the focus of this study, however, the importance of Gode 
and Sunder’s (1993a) findings requires their inclusion here. The ZI traders generated 
random bids and asks depending upon whether they were assigned as buyers or 
sellers, with each market comprising six buyers and six sellers. Two types of ZI 
traders were investigated, ZI unconstrained (ZI-U) and ZI constrained (ZI-C). The 
former’s bids and asks were generated from a uniform distribution of prices that 
encompassed the feasible range o f prices, the latter were restricted to random bids and 
asks that would result in non-negative profits, as determined by their reservation 
prices.
Gode and Sunder’s (1993a) control markets with human traders converged to 
competitive equilibrium prices and allocations in most markets after only a few 
trading periods. However, in comparison the ZI-U markets were very erratic with no 
convergence o f prices and poor efficiency of allocations. The interesting results from 
the simulated markets concern the ZI-C markets. The transaction prices converged 
close to competitive equilibrium prices and a high level of efficiency was attained, 
though not as high as the 100% efficiency observed in the experimental markets. 
Importantly, the transaction prices later in a trading period were generally closer to 
the competitive equilibrium than prices from early in a period, thus mirroring the 
nature of price convergence observed in the experimental markets. Given that the ZI- 
C traders were incapable of learning Gode and Sunder (1993a) were able to show that 
the institutional rules o f the DA, rather than solely individual rational behaviour, 
promote the high levels of efficiency and convergence of transaction prices to 
competitive equilibrium values. Gode and Sunder (1993a) conclude that the market 
discipline’ imposed on traders resulting from the structure of the DA institution 
produces aggregate (market) rationality with or without the presence ol individual 
rationality. In a related study, Gode and Sunder (1993b) attempt to determine the 
lower bounds of expected efficiency (surplus extraction) in DA markets under 
‘continuous’ and ‘synchronised’ trading rules and investigating the effects of extra­
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marginal traders. Under the rules o f a continuous DA traders are permitted to submit 
bids and asks as and when they desire. The essential difference in a synchronised DA 
is that all traders are simultaneously solicited to submit bids and asks, the highest and 
lowest o f which become, respectively, the current bid and the current ask. As usual, a 
binding transaction occurs when the current bid and ask cross. Gode and Sunder 
(1993b) report that the worst case expected efficiency of the synchronised DA market 
is 81% compared to 76% for the continuous DA. Gode and Sunder (1993b) conclude 
that this reduction in relative efficiency is the result o f extra-marginal traders 
displacing intra-marginal traders being more likely to occur in continuous DA 
markets than the synchronised DA markets. Extra-marginal traders are those that, 
given the demand and supply schedules derived from induced cost and redemption
values, are predicted not to trade
Gode and Sunder’s (1993a, 1993b) results were generated using single 
markets, Bosch and Sunder (1996) generalise their findings to the multi-market level. 
In each market buyers and sellers submit randomly generated bids and asks, subject to 
a non-negative profit constraint. The markets are governed by the rules of the DA 
institution. Each market is inter-related and linked by the presence of arbitrageurs 
that are permitted to sell in one market and buy in the next. Initially, these 
arbitrageurs are permitted to trade subject to constraints upon their opportunity set, 
requiring them to submit only bids and asks that can be immediately and 
simultaneously executed, thus their inventory is zero at all times and they too are 
restricted from making a negative profit due to price changes. Under these 
restrictions Bosch and Sunder (1996) report transaction prices that gradually and 
noisily converge to the competitive equilibrium price and allocations that are highly 
efficient. Relaxing the constraint on arbitrageurs’ inventories, allowing them to hold 
long and short positions, Bosch and Sunder (1996) report a marked drop in the level 
o f allocative efficiency attained, allowing them to conclude that scarcity is one of 
the sources of order imposed on a market that promotes efficiency.
In a further paper, Jamal and Sunder (1996) generalise and extend Gode and 
Sunder’s (1993a, 1993b) findings to an asset market, where traders are permitted to be 
both buyer and seller, with an imperfect information structure. The simulation design 
investigates the market behaviour of three different types of computer trader, all of 
which are zero intelligence strategies with randomly generated bids and asks subject 
to a non-negative profit constraint. Bayesian traders observe the imperfect signal and
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compute a posterior expected dividend value that defines the feasible set of bids and 
asks. Actual market transactions do not impact on bidding behaviour. Empirical 
Bayesian traders use the realised frequency of each state o f nature (X and Y), the 
given base rate probability o f occurrence of the two states is ignored. Expected 
dividend values are computed from the observed frequencies and so are subject to 
change each period. Representativeness and anchor-and-adjust heuristics are 
combined to give biased heuristic traders. These traders overreact and set initial 
aspiration levels based on the imperfect signal as though it was perfect. These initial 
aspiration levels are then updated subject to a simple anchor-and-adjustment 
procedure. Biased heuristic traders, therefore, do not process information in a 
Bayesian manner.
Jamal and Sunder (1996) report that the price observed under the Bayesian 
traders, as expected, converged to the Bayesian predicted price. The empirical 
Bayesian traders generated prices that initially deviated substantially from the 
Bayesian predicted price and were very erratic, however, prices gradually converged 
overtime as traders observed higher frequencies o f each state given the imperfect 
signal. Prices generated by the biased heuristic traders begin close to the 
representativeness price but then, due to the anchor-and-adjustment process, exhibit a 
progressive tendency to move closer to the Bayesian predicted price. Importantly, 
Jamal and Sunder (1996, p.285) are able to conclude that the ‘[bjiased heuristics of 
individual traders do not directly translate into biases in aggregate market level 
outcomes.’ With respect to median allocative efficiency, Bayesian traders 
consistently attain levels of 100%, whereas the empirical Bayesian traders generate 
initial efficiency levels of approximately 92%, which then converge close to the 100% 
level. In contrast, the biased heuristic traders generate median efficiency levels of 
between 93% and 95% and exhibit much greater dispersion of values.
The main advantage o f a computer simulation method over an experimental 
method is the increase in the number o f periods and market duration. Experimental 
markets with human participants are prone to participant fatigue and boredom, which 
restrict the duration of markets to generally 15-20 periods. There is no such limitation 
imposed in computer simulated markets. Jamal and Sunder (1996, p.285) offer the 
possibly premature termination o f human experiments as one reason for the mixed 
results generated. Had markets that exhibited non-convergence continued for many 
more periods they may well have converged to predicted values, because participants
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would have observed far more occurrences of each signal-state combination. The 
obvious limitation of computer simulated markets is their inability to say anything 
about individual behaviour at the micro-level. Admittedly, this is not the intention ot 
such studies. Individual behaviour is strictly controlled, permitting a clean 
investigation into the impact of specific institutional rules and structures. It is 
apparent that simulation and experimentation can, and should, exist side by side. 
Simulation is o f use in the creation and exploration of theoretical models, whilst 
experimentation is useful for observing behaviour and the adaptation of strategies in 
light o f learning and experience.
3.3 Direct Comparison with Conventional Empirical Results
The results reported in the experimental literature will now be compared with 
those previously generated within the conventional empirical literature. However, 
before this is undertaken it must be noted that such a comparison is severely limited 
because o f the disparate foci of the two techniques. The experimental literature has 
primarily concerned itself with the identification o f the market conditions and 
institutional rules under which competing static equilibrium models best predict 
observed experimental outcomes. In contrast, the empirical literature focuses on the 
testing o f the three forms o f informational efficiency, as defined in Fama (1970), and 
the ability to generate excess returns.
One area where comparison is possible is the impact of futures markets on 
spot price volatility and market efficiency. Empirical evidence is inconclusive with 
some studies suggesting futures markets stabilise spot prices whilst others report 
increased volatility (see Cox (1976) for a review). Unfortunately, evidence from the 
experimental literature reflects the empirical literature with respect to inconclusive 
results. For example, Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott (1984) report an increased variance 
in spot prices in the presence of futures markets, as is also evident in Harrison (1992), 
whilst Friedman, Harrison and Salmon (1984) find results to the contrary. No firm 
conclusions can therefore be drawn.
A second possible avenue o f comparison concerns the existence of arbitrage 
opportunities. The empirical literature offers the inability to profit from mechanical 
trading rules and the absence o f arbitrage opportunities as evidence in favour of 
informationally efficient markets. However, Plott and Sunder (1988) calculated the 
returns generated by various filter trading rules in informationally inefficient
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experimental asset markets and found them to be dominated by a simple buy-and-hold 
strategy. O ’Brien and Srivastava (1991) report strengthening evidence. In addition, 
they use the generally adopted Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots to test the random 
walk hypothesis. On the basis o f this test previous empirical studies draw conclusions 
concerning the informational efficiency of asset markets. O’Brien and Srivastava 
(1991) apply the technique to experimental asset markets that were informationally 
inefficient with respect to full information aggregation and surprisingly were unable 
to reject the hypothesis of informationally efficient markets. It is evident, therefore, 
that a lack of arbitrage opportunities and an inability o f conventional statistical tests to 
reject market efficiency are not sufficient to characterise a market as informationally 
efficient. These findings directly call into question the strength of conclusions in 
much o f the empirical literature.
3.4 Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter has reviewed the results reported in the experimental financial 
asset market literature to date. The discussion was broken down into a number of 
areas o f key themes and results. A brief summary of the most robust findings follows. 
Early experiments report the importance of replication of stationary environments for 
the convergence o f observed behaviour to that predicted by the FRE model. A further 
important treatment variable is the level of participant experience in the trading 
environment. The greater the experience the greater the convergence to FRE 
predictions. The type o f information structure also plays an important role in the 
degree o f convergence that a market exhibits, and thus the level o f market efficiency 
attained. The efficiency observed in perfect information markets is generally much 
higher than that witnessed in similar markets, but with imperfect information 
structures. The presence o f aggregate uncertainty in imperfect information markets 
reduces the level o f market efficiency still further. A number of studies have 
conducted pre-trade auctions for private information and report results that are 
generally in line with the FRE model’s prediction o f zero value of private 
information. Whilst not always reaching a zero value, the price paid for information 
tends to converge towards zero over time.
The main concern of the studies reviewed in this chapter has been the extent to 
which experimental markets are able to aggregate and disseminate diverse, private 
information and to determine what conditions hinder the ability to do so. The FRE
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model was found to predict well in the simple settings o f homogenous information 
structures with simultaneous message arrival, as analysed by earlier studies. This is 
interpreted as evidence o f high levels o f informational and allocational efficiency 
achieved in simple experimental markets. However, with the introduction of more 
complexity in later studies the FRE model did not accurately predict the outcomes 
observed in some experiments. In environments with heterogeneous information and 
sequential arrival, the PRE model predicts better in asset markets, whilst the NRE 
provides a better description of information auctions. In summary, the most general 
conclusion to draw from the experimental literature concerns the strong convergence 
tendencies towards competitive equilibrium outcomes of markets governed by the DA 
institutional rules with simple trading environments. Whilst the FRE model does not 
perform as well in more complex trading environments, many studies still report some 
degree of convergence o f market performance to FRE predicted values. However, 
theoretical models more akin to semi-strong market efficiency supersede the FRE 
model in these more complex environments. With greater levels ot experience, 
however, it is possible that the FRE model may better represent participants 
behaviour. This is evidenced by the numerous studies that report an increased 
convergence tendency the greater the experience level of participants (for example 
Forsythe and Lundholm, 1990). The computer simulations of Jamal and Sunder
(1996) further substantiate this result.
Two very minor criticisms o f the literature will now be offered. As is readily 
apparent from the review above, a criticism of the experimental literature as a whole, 
as opposed to individual papers, is the inability to collectively compare results across 
papers because o f the number o f variables that vary from study to study, thus 
violating any ceteris paribus conditions. In order to arrive at an overall view ot the 
area it would be preferable to make the studies more comparable, this would in turn 
provide stronger support for any findings. In a similar vein, the studies can be 
criticised for introducing different terminology to describe what are essentially the 
same equilibrium models. The use o f different acronyms for the same models makes 
for confusing reading. Consequently, in reviewing the literature this chapter has 
attempted to refer to a certain model with one acronym only, even if it is not the one 
used in the actual study under discussion.
Chapter Four
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4  M e t h o d o l o g i c a l  a n d  D e s i g n  I s s u e s  in  E x p e r i m e n t a t i o n
67
4.1 Introduction
In the search for decisive insight concerning financial asset market efficiency a 
new method o f investigation has been embraced by the research, one o f experimental 
economics. The fundamental objective of experimental economics is the creation of 
an environment that can be controlled, manipulated as desired and which allows 
accurate measurement o f variables (Wilde, 1980). This chapter is intended as an 
introduction to the experimental method as employed in the economics literature. The 
chapter is intentionally double focused. It deals initially with general issues as they 
relate to experimental work, discussing both methodological and experimental design 
considerations. Included are an address and rebuke of criticisms made against 
experimental economics as a legitimate research tool and a justification for the 
adoption of this method in the study of financial asset market efficiency. Secondly, 
the chapter moves on to a more specific and detailed discussion of the choice ol 
experimental design at the heart of this research programme.
An outline of the structure o f the chapter follows. The next section olfers a 
general discussion o f the experimental economics method. Included is a comparison 
of the experimental method with the conventional empirical research method in 
economics. This is followed by a discussion of the components that comprise an 
experiment and the different purposes of experimentation in the economic discipline. 
Section 4.3 highlights general design considerations in experimentation and includes 
detail on the necessary conditions required for experimental control and the generally 
adopted method o f motivating participants. Section 4.4 addresses generally voiced 
criticisms of the experimental method in economics and offers argument against such 
criticisms. Also included is an argument detailing the justifications for the adoption 
of an experimental method in the research ol financial market efficiency. Section 4.5 
signals the introduction of the second major focal point of this chapter, the 
experimental design adopted in the current research programme. 1 he section 
introduces general design features that permeate through out this study and are, 
therefore, observed in all eighteen experimental markets conducted. In contrast 
section 4.6 is more specific in focus and deals with the disparate design features of 
each group of experiments (detailed discussions of the specilic designs are included in 
subsequent chapters). The final section summarises the content of the chapter and 
reiterates the applicability of the research method and experimental design for the
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research programme studied here.
4.2 Experimental Methods in Economics
The discussion to follow in this section introduces the general experimental 
method as adopted in the economic discipline and discusses the method’s sp ec ific  
applicability for the investigation o f financial asset market efficiency.
4.2.1 The Interaction between Theory and Data
Economics is endowed with numerous theories that, to a greater or lesser 
extent, abstract from the naturally occurring economic environment in order to 
overcome the complexities associated with economic processes. These complexities 
arise with respect to trading institutions and/or the structure of preferences and 
information. The convention within the economic discipline is to derive the 
propositions of a theory under strict ceteris paribus conditions, consequently the 
theory is well defined and clearly specified. This is especially so of theories 
developed within the Neo-classical paradigm, for which the ‘rules of the game’ and 
agents’ objective functions are clearly specified. There exists a hard core proposition 
that is surrounded by a number of auxiliary hypotheses (Lakatos, 1978).
Rice and Smith (1964) recognise that hypothesis formulation and testing is a 
primary means of extending scientific knowledge, and thus impioving economic 
theory. Furthermore, Rice and Smith (1964, p.259) argue that simply subjecting a 
theory to the test of logical completeness is not sufficient to provide understanding. It 
follows, therefore, that comparison to empirical observation is required to 
fundamentally test the propositions of economic theory. Theory and data interact 
continuously over time. Economic theory offers propositions concerning economic 
behaviour under certain ceteris paribus conditions. These propositions provide the 
motivation for empirical investigation of their validity. The theory states which 
economic variables are relevant and which irrelevant. Regular empirical observations 
serve to refine the theory and the alternating cycle, of theory followed by empirical 
work giving way to theoretical refinement, continues. This is the process by which
scientific knowledge progresses.
Control is the substance o f experimental economics, providing tor the ceteris
paribus conditions specified by the theory to be satisfied. A carefully designed 
laboratory experiment can achieve greater precision than is possible with empirical 
research. This permits the testing o f theoretical predictions in a domain where the
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theories make unambiguous predictions. Indeed, Roth (1995, C h.l, p. 10) suggests 
‘ ... insights gained from designing an experiment are ... often o f value [in theoretical 
refinement] even apart from the actual conduct of the experiment. Thus there is an 
interplay, on many levels, between theory and experiment.’
4.2.2 Conventional Econometric v Experimental Techniques
In the following discussion the distinction between experimental and non- 
experimental data is drawn and a number o f problems inherent in the use of non- 
experimental data in the evaluation o f economic theory are introduced. The dominant 
advantage afforded by the adoption o f an experimental methodology is then
expressed.
Traditionally within economics observations derived from the ‘natural 
economic environment have been the sole source of data to stimulate the revision of 
economic theory. However, recent decades have witnessed the gradual integration 
into the economic journals o f research incorporating an experimental methodology. 
Thus there is a new source of data with which to refine economic theory. Distinction 
needs to be drawn between the above two forms of data. The naturally occurring field 
data is created by the economy and simply gathered in. In contrast, experimental data 
is generated by experimentation in carefully controlled laboratory conditions. Thus, 
it is the origin of the data that determines the classification. Whilst this distinction is
simplistic it is sufficient for the current discussion .
Field data is generally collected by government agencies, and the like, for non- 
academic purposes. As a consequence there is the possibility of omission of relevant 
or interesting (as determined by the theory) variables. In such circumstances the use 
o f (crude) proxies is required and so the validity o f the field data may be questioned. 
The controlled environment in which experimental data is generated means that such 
(internal) validity questions are not an issue (Friedman and Sunder, 1994, p.5).
The above weakness o f field study data renders its use problematic, however, 
when the objective is to evaluate the predictions o f economic theory it is not the 
fundamental weakness. The essential frailty o f field study data in the evaluation ot 
theoretical predictions derives from the manner in which it is arises. The data is 
generated in the natural economy with the complete absence of any form of control, 
allowing key variables to fluctuate over time. Thus, the data and the theoretical
10 See B inm ore  (1987 , pp. 2 5 7 -2 5 9 )  fo r  a m o re  precise  dis tinction  b ased  on replication.
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predictions being tested are generally not generated under the same conditions. The 
ceteris paribus conditions specified by the theory are violated. As variables fluctuate, 
confounding extraneous factors serve to frustrate the evaluation o f the theory. Davis 
and Holt (1993, p.3) recognise that ‘[t]hese problems have become more severe as 
models have become more precise and intricate.’ The absence of direct control 
renders interpretation o f the data, and subsequent directions of causality, less precise 
than is achievable with experimental data generated under controlled laboratory
conditions.
Within the informational efficiency literature, conventional empirical papers 
have preceded those aimed at providing a theoretical concept of informational 
efficiency. The theories developed subsequently have been based on the concept of 
static equilibria (Grossman (1976), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) are examples). 
However, empirical research is unable to provide adequate tests of such equilibrium 
theories due to the inability to control important variables, specifically the private 
information o f traders (unknowable by definition) and the arrival of new inlormation. 
The major benefit accorded by the adoption o f an experimental methodology is the 
ability to control relevant variables so as to maintain the ceteris paribus conditions 
specified by the theory under consideration. Alternatively, a specific treatment 
variable can be set at different levels across different experimental sessions or at 
different points in time in the same experimental session, in order to assess the impact 
o f its variability on the predictive ability of the theory. It is this potential that enables 
the investigation of static equilibrium theories, which is not conventionally possible if 
one or more variables fluctuate rapidly. To place the discussion in the context of an 
experimental analysis o f informational efficiency, theories have been developed 
which predict the extent to which prices reveal information in equilibrium. 
Attempting to evaluate such theories using conventional methodology is problematic 
because the variable ‘information’ fluctuates greatly and so convergence will
constantly change towards different equilibrium values.
Hey (1992, p.87) argues that the testing of economic theory under conditions 
other than those under which it was derived, results in conventional (econometric) 
tests becoming combined tests of whether the theory is correct under the specified 
ceteris paribus conditions and if it also survives the transition to the real world. The 
result is the inability to critically test the theory and draw conclusive inferences about 
its predictions when using field study data. In an attempt to overcome the obstacles
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inherent in the use o f this type of data econometricians have developed various high 
powered econometric techniques. However, these techniques usually require 
numerous auxiliary hypotheses that can be relaxed in order to save the hard core 
proposition. Once more the analysis becomes an investigation of joint hypotheses. 
This issue is well illustrated in the efficient markets literature. A test of the EMH is a 
joint test of informational efficiency and the assumed equilibrium model of price 
determination, generally the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Roll’s (1977) 
critique demonstrates that previous tests of the CAPM are invalid. Without the true 
market portfolio it is not possible to validly test the CAPM. Thus it is difficult to 
determine whether evidence inconsistent with the joint hypothesis is evidence against 
informational efficiency or the chosen equilibrium model. Further, in conventional 
tests the definition of an informationally efficient market causes concern due to an 
inability to provide precise meanings for such terms as fully reflec t, available 
information’ and ‘unbiased’. An operational definition of informational efficiency is 
elusive. Fama’s (1976) revised definition, in which a market is efficient if it uses all 
information to determine prices and uses it correctly, contains the ill-defined term the 
market’.
Related to the notion of total control is the complete knowledge of all 
parameters by the experiment designer. The private information used by traders is, by 
its very definition, unknown when using field study data. This does not pose a 
problem, however, when examining experimental asset markets, as both the public 
and private information sets o f participants can be controlled and manipulated as 
desired. This ability to control the temporal distribution of traders’ private 
information when using experimental techniques makes such a method of analysis 
ideal for studying the question ot asset market efficiency and evaluating static 
equilibrium theories. Strict control allows the theory’s predictions to be computed
and compared to observed outcomes.
A possible critique of conventional econometric methodology is that it may 
encourage the changing o f a model’s specification in a way suggested by the 
empirical results, in order to obtain a better fit for the data used. I he problem with 
such an approach is that the model can become sample specific and in addition any 
tests o f significance on the ‘new’ model utilising the same data become meaningless. 
The advantage o f experimental techniques in this context is the ability to run 
additional experiments to test the revised theory. Such a technique is subject to one
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qualification however, the cost of running additional experiments. Not only would 
participants have to be rewarded but further resources, in the form of computing 
facilities and the researchers own time etc., would also be taken up. If such costs were 
substantial then they would limit the ability to rerun experiments, however, it would 
seem that the relevant costs would be exceeded by the benefits (in the form of 
advancements in theory) o f running supplementary experiments.
There are very few cases where the effectiveness of econometric techniques is 
directly evaluated. A notable exception is LaLonde (1986) in which simple statistical 
analysis provided a significant difference in mean earning values across a ‘control 
group and a ‘treatment’ group when analysing experimental data. However, when 
treating the data as field study data (as if the control group did not exist), the use of 
various econometric procedures failed to correctly estimate the treatment eftect, with 
estimates and signs varying across procedures. The econometric techniques adopted
in economics are not infallible.
The discussion above has cast doubt on the efficacy of using conventional 
econometric techniques in the analysis of financial market efficiency. An 
experimental methodology was suggested as an alternative research tool that avoids 
the problems inherent in the conventional analysis. The following subsection 
discusses the various component parts of an experiment.
4.2.3 Components o f Experiments
When testing economic theory using an experimental methodology the key 
elements o f the theory must be captured by the experimental design. Smith (1982b, 
1994) identifies three essential ingredients of economic theory that serve to form the 
essential components of economic experiments. The envi/onment ot the theory 
consists o f the collection o f all agents characteristics. The experimental 
environment, therefore, specifies participants initial endowments, prelerences and 
cost/revenue functions etc., all of which provide the motivation for trade via the 
existence of gains from exchange. In experimental economics this environment is 
controlled via the procedures of induced value theory derived in Smith (1976) and the 
payment o f monetary rewards (discussed below). The institution in the theory defines 
the language of communication between agents and specifies the characteristics of the 
commodity to be traded. The experimental institution is specified in the instructions 
and defines the rules governing the exchange o f information and the trade ot assets, in 
addition to the method o f communication (bids, asks and acceptances). I he final
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ingredient of economic theory is agents’ behaviour. The theory makes assumptions 
about agents’ behaviour (maximise utility or profit etc.) given the environment and 
institutional rules governing their actions. In the experimental design the environment 
and institution specified by the economic theory are controlled and the resultant 
individual behaviour is observed. Any inconsistency between predicted and observed 
behaviour is borne by the behavioural assumptions of the theory. Thus, laboratory 
market experiments test the behavioural assumptions o f economic theory.
4.2.4 Purposes o f  Experimentation
The type of experiment and the subsequent design depend upon the purpose 
for which the experiment is conducted. Various experimentalists offer alternate 
opinions as to the purposes for conducting experiments in economics (see Hey (1992), 
Friedman and Sunder (1994, Ch.l), and Smith (1994) for examples). Reported here is
a synthesis o f those opinions.
1. Test a theory. To evaluate a theory the predictions are compared to 
observed outcomes. As argued above there are situations where conventional 
econometric analysis does not allow critical tests of economic theory. Observed 
behaviour may deviate from theoretical predictions because, either, the theory is 
incorrect or because the ceteris paribus conditions specified by the theory do not hold. 
Thus, conventional econometric tests of a theory are not a te s t ie r  se (Hey, 1991, p. 8). 
No conclusive inference can be drawn, because it is possible to salvage the hardcore 
proposition by suggesting that the auxiliary assumptions are violated. Falsification of 
the theory is not possible. This obstacle can be avoided when economic theory is 
tested using an experimental methodology. The intention is to design an experiment 
which captures the essential features o f the environment and institution specified by 
the theory, whilst controlling for all other factors. If the observed behaviour 
contradicts the predictions of the theory to a degree that can not be explained be 
chance or simple error, then the theory is disputed. An experimental methodology 
allows determination of the validity of a theory to be separated from the determination 
o f whether it survives the transition from ceteris paribus conditions to the real world.
2. To discriminate between competing theories. In order to discriminate 
between two or more theories conventional tests require the natural occurrence o f a 
situation where the competing theories predict measurably different outcomes and the 
data allows the separation of these predictions. On the rare occasions when such a 
situation arises naturally, other confounding extraneous may factors serve to cloud the
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issue. The adoption of an experimental methodology nullifies this problem as it is 
perfectly feasible to design a single experiment where the competing theories do 
predict measurably different behaviour and the usual thorough control is exercised 
over all other factors. When attempting to differentiate between a number of 
competing theories, the intention is to design a single experiment in which the chosen 
parameters ensure that the different theories predict measurably different outcomes 
and to then compare these predictions to the experimental outcomes. This is the 
technique employed in the experimental asset markets literature. Smith (1982b, 
p. 784), however, offers a word of caution, suggesting that the testing o f theories in the 
exact domain o f their assumptions is sterile unless it forms part ot an intention to 
extend the theory into the domain of the field environment.
3. ‘Stress Tests ’/'Boundary Experiments’. Experiments can be designed to 
provide rigorous tests of a theory, exploring the causes o f the theory’s failure. Ihese 
experiments investigate the extreme or boundary conditions under which a theory 
fails. This type o f experiment allows the determination of the key variables essential 
to the theory and the range of parameters applicable. Guidance is, therefore, given 
with respect to which areas require additional theoretical development. To illustrate 
reference is once more made to the experimental literature on financial asset markets. 
The experimental design of Plott and Sunder (1982) provided certain traders 
( ‘insiders’) with information that perfectly revealed to them the value of the asset to 
be traded. With a perfect information structure the FRE model outperformed the PI 
model. In a subsequent study Plott and Sunder (1988) provide insiders with imperlect 
information and as a result the predictive ability of the FRE model was weakened.
4. Discover empirical regularities. Empirical regularities that can not be 
explained by existing theory provide a basis for the suggestion ot new theory. This 
notion relates to the cycle of scientific progress discussed above. Empirical 
observations throw up areas where the current theory is deficient, provoking 
theoretical development in those areas. An example directly relevant to experimental 
asset markets is the empirically documented high levels of efficiency of gains lrom 
exchange available with the double auction trading institution. Modelling the 
equilibrating processes of the double auction has lagged behind the incorporation ol 
the institution in experimental designs. Recent attempts to remedy this situation were 
discussed in Chapter Two and include Friedman (1984, 1991).
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5. Comparison o f the efficiency o f different institutions. Trading institutions 
differ with respect to their rules of exchange. Comparison o f efficiency levels across 
institutions, under identical environments, provides a comparative ranking ot the 
properties of the various trading rules. Kagel (1995) reviews the auction literature, 
evaluating the comparative market performances of various trading institutions.
6. Policy proposal evaluation (pre-tests). Policy proposals such as new forms 
o f exchange can be cost-effectively investigated prior to implementation via the use of 
experimental methods. The predicted properties of a new institution for exchange can 
be evaluated in the laboratory, at low cost, before the institution is implemented for 
testing in the real world, thus reducing the subsequent possibility of expensive failure 
to deliver expected results. An illustration is the experimental testing of the uniform 
price double auction and the subsequent finding of efficiencies comparable with the 
continuous double auction (McCabe, Rassenti and Smith, 1993). Other examples 
include the investigation o f specialist trader privileges on market performance (see
Chapter Three for more detail).
It is clear, therefore, that there exist a preponderance of purposes for which the 
methodology of experimental economics can be fruitfully employed. Within the 
financial literature the experimental investigation into informational efficiency 
initially provided a means o f discriminating between competing theories and has 
subsequently become a vehicle for the stress testing o f theory, identifying important 
variables.
4.3 General Design Issues in Experimentation
4.3.I Introduction
The first dilemma to rear its head when determining the specific design of an 
experiment is whether to pursue a policy of realism, and so mimic reality as 
accurately as is possible, or to precisely reproduce the specifications detailed in the 
theory under investigation. The two generally differ, because simplifying 
assumptions of the theory abstract from reality. Friedman and Sunder (1994, p. 10) 
argue that neither o f these polar extremes is singularly appropriate. It is impossible to 
capture all the intricacies of the natural environment in an experimental design. Even 
if the theory is so explicit as to allow exact replication in the laboratory, this too is 
unproductive. There is no scope for learning, because observations consistent with 
the predictions of the theory only provide evidence that there is no logical flaw in the
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theory and only offer limited evidence of the theory’s predictive ability. Thus, 
Friedman and Sunder (1994, p. 12) conclude that ‘... a laboratory experiment should 
be judged by its impact on our understanding, not by its fidelity either to reality or to a 
formal model.’ A simple design that captures the essential and interesting features of 
the theory offers the greatest scope for improving understanding. A simple 
experimental design enhances control and consequently provides a clearer 
interpretation of observed behaviour. The intention is to design an experiment that 
magnifies the effects of treatment variables and removes as far as possible the noise 
due to nuisance variables and confounding effects of other variables. Once more the 
discussion turns to the issue that is fundamental to experimental economics, control.
4.3.2 Conditions for Control
Control is the substance o f experimental economics and is achieved using a 
reward structure to induce specific monetary values on given actions and the resulting 
outcomes. It is, therefore, possible to control agents preferences. However, to 
accomplish this an experiment must satisfy a number of sufficient conditions, which 
Smith (1982a) terms precepts. Each o f these conditions will be discussed in turn.
Nonsatiation: Utility is a monotone increasing function of the monetary 
reward, thus an autonomous individual will choose (prefer) the action with the highest 
reward. Such individuals do not become satiated and always act so as to increase
their level of the monetary reward.
Saliency: In order to have a motivational effect the reward structure must be 
related to the actions o f individuals, thus an individual s reward will depend upon the 
action chosen. A fixed payment for participation is not salient because it is not 
dependent upon the actions, and resultant observed outcomes, of individuals. 
However, a monetary reward related to (say) the level of experimental profit earned is 
salient and motivates individuals to choose actions that maximise the level of
experimental profit earned.
Dominance: To guarantee control over an individual’s preferences, the reward 
structure must suppress any subjective costs associated with that individual s 
participation in the experiment. Consequently, the overwhelming influence on 
individuals’ utility from participating derives from the monetary reward structure. 
This is most likely to be the case the higher is the salient monetary reward. Thus, the 
increase in monetary reward that an individual experiences as a result of a given 
action dominates any other influence on that individual s choice o f action.
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Privacy. Participants are given information only with respect to their own 
payoff alternatives, thus there is incomplete information. The potential for loss of 
induced value (preference) due to interdependent utilities is eradicated. Thus, 
irrespective of whether participants care about the reward earned by others, the 
removal o f such information, via privacy, ensures that the induced value is solely the 
result o f the individual’s own monetary rewards.
Parallelism: Parallelism occurs when the conclusions drawn from the 
experiment are equally valid for field data under similar ceteris paribus conditions.
The first four of the above precepts provide for controlled microeconomic 
experiments and ensure the achievement of control over agents characteristics. It is 
viable to impose any relationship between the intrinsically worthless asset and the 
monetary reward, thus inducing value upon the asset. This induced value will hold 
providing that the relationship is made explicit to the participants (saliency), whom 
are motivated by the monetary reward (nonsatiation and monotonicity) rather than 
other confounding influences (dominance and privacy). These conditions are 
sufficient if the purpose of the experiment is to test predictions derived from 
theoretical models. The parallelism precept allows the conclusion that experimental 
results carry over into the field.
4.3.3 Motivation
It is clear from the above discussion of induced value that participants in 
economic experiments are motivated to ‘do as well as possible by the payment ot a 
reward for performance. The theoretical justification for this is provided by Neo­
classical economics, which requires the maximisation ot an objective function. 
Within experimental economics participants attempt to maximise their reward for 
participation. The payment for participation in economic experiments is in contrast to 
the situation in psychology, where salient monetary payments have been deemed 
relatively unimportant (Hey, 1992, p.85), with individuals asked to consider
hypothetical questions.
It is standard practice within experimental economics for the reward medium 
to be money. Monetary payment negates, to a large extent, the problems arising with 
respect to heterogeneous individual dispositions concerning the reward medium 
(disparate private preferences). In addition, monetary rewards are likely to fulfil the 
requirement o f nonsatiation, with individuals always preferring more money to less. 
It is usual within the literature to employ an experimental currency that is converted
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into domestic currency at the end of the experiment (for example Plott and Sunder 
(1982) incorporate francs in their experimental design). The use of an experimental 
currency permits the disparate theoretical predictions of competing models to be 
separated more readily.
The previous experimental literature suggests that the provision of payment 
for participation reduces the variability o f performance. Empirical evidence on the 
impact of financial incentives is mixed, however, their provision does appear to 
reduce the rate o f occurrence o f errors (in performance) due to confusion or 
carelessness, but does not improve the average performance (Camerer, 1992, p.245). 
In the specific context of double auction markets Jamal and Sunder (1991) conclude 
that whilst the payment o f performance-based monetary rewards is not a necessary 
condition for the convergence o f transaction prices to theoretical equilibrium, they do 
increase the reliability of laboratory results.
When inducing value on the experimental asset via a monetary reward 
structure caution must be exercised to ensure that the cost to a subject of departure 
from optimal behaviour is significant. If this is not the case then significant departure 
from optimal behaviour in terms of decisions may have insignificant implications for 
a subject in terms o f loss of monetary reward and departure from maximum payott 
(Harrison’s, 1989, ‘marginal payoff critique’). If the costs o f making a decision are 
greater than the marginal monetary reward from making that decision, then 
participants may ‘rationally’ depart from theoretically optimal behaviour.
It is also conventional in the majority of the experimental literature for an 
appearance fee to be paid to participants to encourage them to participate. Davis and 
Holt (1993, p.26) suggest that the ‘[pjayment of a preannounced fee facilitates 
recruiting of participants, establishes credibility, and perhaps provides some incentive 
for participants to pay attention to instructions.’
4.3.4 Types o f Design
The particular design of any experiment is determined, to a significant degree, 
by the intended purpose of the experiment. The purpose of a given experiment 
determines those variables that are treatment variables and those that are nuisance 
variables. When designing an experiment the intention is to ‘sharpen the effects ot 
focus variables and minimise the blurring due to nuisance variables (Friedman and 
Sunder, 1994, p.21). To achieve this, control must be exercised over the variables, 
either as treatments or constants. This is possible directly or indirectly. Direct control
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of a treatment at different levels across an experiment allows the variable’s impact on 
observed behaviour to be determined. Holding a variable constant across treatments 
ensures that the impact of the particular variable on observed behaviour is removed. 
However, some variables are impossible to control directly (for example, participants’ 
cognitive capabilities). Fortunately it is possible to negate the impact of such 
uncontrollables on observed behaviour by ensuring that they are independent of the 
treatment variable. This is achieved via randomisation, which provides indirect 
control by ensuring the eventual independence of uncontrolled variables across 
treatments. The basic procedure is to assign the uncontrolled variable at random to 
the various levels o f the treatment variable. For example, to prevent results being 
subject specific it is preferable to assign participants to treatment groups at random, 
thus negating the influence of subject specific characteristics.
Both Davis and Holt (1993, Ch.9) and Friedman and Sunder (1994, Ch.3) 
include a detailed and practical discussion of the various types o f experimental design. 
Boniface (1995) also offers an excellent coverage of experimental design. The 
interested reader is directed to these references for a more comprehensive coverage of 
the various experimental designs possible and the benefits of utilising a given design.
4.4 Experimental Economics: A Critique
4.4.1 Address and Rebuke o f Criticisms
There exist a number o f commonly voiced limitations of the experimental 
methodology, the discussion will now address these concerns and where possible 
answer any criticisms.
A fundamental attack on experiments in economics focuses on their 
simplicity. Experiments are too simple to describe the real world, which is a tar more 
complex phenomenon. However, as argued by Hey (1992, p.91), if  the intention of 
the experiment is to replicate the domain of a theory and test its predictions, then a 
fortiori the theory is too simple. The unrealism reflects parameters that are absent 
from the theory. If this is the case, the above is primarily a criticism of the theory, as 
the experiment merely reflects the conditions under which the theory was developed. 
In fact simplicity may be a virtue o f experimentation rather than a weakness, because 
it permits a clear interpretation of the observed behaviour. If  the theory fails to 
predict observed behaviour in a simple setting then its validity in a more complex 
environment is fundamentally questioned. Experiments utilise reward motivated
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individuals, thus capturing human behaviour and providing a more complex 
environment than may be parameterised by theories. Therefore, an experiment is an 
adequate vehicle to falsify a theory because it captures behavioural considerations and 
so abstracts less from reality. If a theory is falsified this implies that an assumption it 
makes about the behaviour of economic agents is not a valid one. However, an 
experiment is designed to replicate the circumstances under which the theory was 
developed, therefore, an experimental analysis only allows one to study behaviour in 
the context o f the economic environment represented. If such a representation is 
incorrect then the analysis may not improve our knowledge.
Following on from the above discussion, an obvious point of contention for 
cynics is that, due to their simplicity, experiments are artificial and abstract from 
reality. It is possible to suggest that individuals will behave differently in the real 
world. Hey (1991, p. 13) ‘counters this by arguing that, in experiments, the 
participants (who are undoubtedly real) are tackling a real problem for real money, 
that their payment depends on their decisions and that everything about it is real. It 
may be further argued that inducing value on abstract outcomes is not equivalent to 
‘real’ preferences, however, economic systems do produce intangible assets for which 
value is induced via property rights for the holder (an obvious example being financial 
instruments). Smith (1982a, p.262 ft.l 1) suggests; ‘to argue that preferences based on 
cash-induced value [are] ... different than homegrown preferences ... is also to argue 
that preferences among intangible instruments in the field are ... ditterent than 
commodity preferences.’ Control over participants preferences is obtained by the use 
o f a reward structure and property system to induce monetary value on abstract 
outcomes. This notion of induced value is based upon the precept of nonsatiation (see 
earlier), however, there are some qualifications which require consideration.
Firstly it is possible that participants attach nonmonetary subjective costs to 
the procedure o f making individual decisions. These are termed subjective costs of 
transacting’ (SCT) and include such things as the cost of thinking, calculating, 
deciding and acting. If these costs are not negligible, the link between monetary 
reward and the control of individuals preferences will be weakened, resulting in some 
loss o f control over the induced value. Fortunately it is possible to reduce the SC I by 
designing experiments with simple, transparent tasks or by the use of computers to 
reduce the computational burden. Any SCT that remains can be eradicated by 
ensuring the reward structure ‘dominates’ the cost.
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In addition, it is possible that individuals are not autonomous own-reward 
maximisers and so there may be an interdependence o f utility, resulting in diminished 
control over preferences. Such a situation can be avoided by invoking the privacy 
precept and only providing incomplete information with respect to other individuals’ 
payoff schedules (that is, inform individuals of their own payoff schedule only). 
Consequently no individual can gain utility from the payoff of another and control 
over preferences is maintained. Furthermore, control over preferences will be lost if 
participants attach ‘game value’ to the experimental outcomes, such that they derive 
utility purely by participating in the experiment. It is for this reason that abstract 
names and tags (neutral terminology) have been used in experiments.
It is conceivable that different categories of individuals behave in significantly 
different ways. Thus the use o f students as the predominant recruitment background 
for participants results in a potential criticism of experiments. What can the study ot 
‘naive’ students in an alien environment provide by way of insight into the behaviour 
o f experienced professionals? However, Duh and Sunder (1986) and Anderson and 
Sunder (1992) find that students behave in the same manner as professionals, and the 
only difference is that the results are amplified when professionals are used. Thus 
such a criticism is not as damning as it would initially seem.
A final limitation of the experimental methodology derives from the fact that it 
only really works well with theories based around well structured axioms, thus 
rendering them refutable. Consequently, the experimental literature has focused 
heavily on theories steeped in the neo-classical paradigm, such as rational 
expectations and competitive equilibria, whilst neglecting other ideologies.
To conclude this section, it remains to remark that close critical scrutiny of the 
experimental economics literature by sceptics can only benefit the discipline by 
ensuring checks on the reliability and validity o f experimental results. The 
implication is continuing improvements in experimental method and design.
4.4.2 Experimental Financial Markets: A Validation
What are the benefits from the adoption o f an experimental methodology in 
the investigation of financial asset market performance?
The use of laboratory markets allows efficiency to be measured directly by 
comparison o f the experimental market to a control in which all inlormation is 
disseminated. Thus the price in the control market is the efficient price by definition. 
The private information used by traders is, by its very definition, unknown when
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using field study data. This does not pose a problem, however, when examining 
experimental asset markets, as both the public and private information sets of 
participants can be controlled and manipulated as desired. This ability to control the 
temporal distribution o f traders’ private information when using experimental 
techniques makes such a method of analysis ideal for studying the question of asset 
market efficiency.
The use o f experimental asset markets will not allow the question of whether 
naturally occurring markets are informationally efficient to be resolved. However, it 
will allow the identification o f features of markets and o f information structures that 
facilitate or frustrate efficiency. In addition, an experimental analysis enables the 
testing of theories previously proposed in the finance literature, but which require a 
number of assumptions abstracting from reality, thus rendering them untestable using 
naturally occurring field study data. The experimenter is free to design the laboratory 
market so that it conforms to the conditions required by the theory in question.
The overwhelming result to derive from the experimental literature on asset 
markets is that institutions are important. The rules of trade which are governed by 
the institution determine the information (bids, asks and acceptances in a double 
auction) available to individuals and their incentives. Thus, 'institutions matter 
because incentives and information matter.' (Smith, 1994, p. 116). The experimental 
literature indicates that the rules of trade governing exchange in a continuous double 
auction result in the maximisation of gains from exchange and the convergence of 
transaction prices to the FRE equilibrium value.
In conclusion, experimentation is a valuable additional research tool that 
compliments the more conventional methods of analysis in economics.
4.5 Details of the Experimental Design
4.5.1 Introduction
‘[Experimentalists] have learned patiently to introduce only a few novel 
features at a time in to the laboratory environment, because only then can they 
confidently disentangle each feature’s direct and interactive effects. Friedman 
(1993b, p.517). With this advice in mind the experimental design adopted here is 
similar to the earlier design of Plott and Sunder (1982), as adapted by Banks (1985) 
and further developed by Sunder (1992). The novel feature of the experimental 
design adopted is the introduction of period duration as a treatment variable. Other
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treatment variables investigated include perfect versus imperfect information 
structures and costless versus costly private information. The following paragraph 
gives an overview o f the design, whilst the remainder of this section details the 
general experimental design.
The eighteen experimental asset markets conducted as a part of this research 
programme provide an insight into the impact of period duration on the market 
efficiency of experimental stock markets. The experiment is therefore designed to 
reflect certain conventions that the London Stock Exchange exhibits. Participants in 
the experiment are endowed with assets that pay an uncertain dividend at the end of 
each trading period and working capital that permits them to purchase the dividend 
paying assets from other participants should they desire. Thus a market in the 
dividend paying asset is established and trade between participants is permissible for 
the duration o f the trading period. Each trading period runs sequentially, thus 
removing the possibility of operating a futures market. Participants assume the dual 
role o f being simultaneously buyers and sellers. Trade is conducted under the 
following general rules o f double auction markets. New bid and ask prices are subject 
to the ‘improvement r u le 11. Within a trading period, the current bid and ask, and a 
history o f transaction prices are publicly available. No queuing system tor bid and 
ask prices is utilised and after each transaction the bidding process begins afresh. No 
short sales or borrowings were permitted. No payment of a commission on trade was 
adopted. The reason participants would be willing to trade the risky asset stems from 
the payoff parameters utilised in the design, which are discussed later.
4.5.2 Experimental Markets
A control market is required to isolate the effect of period duration upon the 
trading behaviour of experimental financial asset markets. The control incorporates 
trading periods of constant (C) and known (K) duration. It is against this control 
market that the performance in the treatment markets (incorporating varying period 
duration) is gauged. In order to distinguish between the effects of varying period 
durations and knowledge of the period durations, two different groups of treatment 
markets are conducted. Markets are conducted with varying (V) but known (K) 
durations to isolate the effect of simply incorporating a variable period duration.
11 A n y  b id /ask  m us t be tte r  the  curren t bid/ask. T ha t is, new  b ids /asks  m us t be h igher /low er
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Markets are also conducted with varying (V) and unknown (U) durations to 
determine how removing knowledge of when trade will cease impacts on trading 
behaviour.
The total number of periods, P , in all markets is identical and equal to 15, thus 
controlling for the impact of the number o f trading periods on a individual’s ability to 
learn from experience gained in earlier periods. Thus if  pj  denotes a given period,
then the set
P = { p j e Z + :0<j<15} ,  4.1
applies for all markets in the experimental design, regardless of period duration.
In the CK markets the length of each o f the 15 trading periods, lc (subscript c
denotes constant duration), is held constant at 240 seconds12. Thus the set, Lc? of all
possible period lengths contains only one element,
Lc = {lc eZ + :c=240}. 4.2
The length of each trading period was common knowledge to all traders, who also had 
access to information concerning the time remaining in the prevailing trading period.
In contrast, both the VK and VU markets incorporate differential period 
durations that permit the length, /v, of any period to vary between 120 and 360 
seconds (where subscript v denotes variable). Strictly speaking the set Lv (possible 
period lengths in VK and VU markets) contains all the real numbers represented by 
the interval [120,360], because time is continuous. However, for the purposes of this 
research it is sufficient to allow period duration to vary by increments ot one second. 
As a result lv will take positive integer values and the set Lv can be represented as
Lv = {lv e Z +:120<r<360}. 4.3
There may exist a minimum length of time that traders take to organise themselves 
and to evaluate the situation they are faced with, and it is for this reason that a 
minimum time limit is incorporated in the design.
The actual duration of any period in the VK and VU markets was generated
than  ou ts tand in g  bids/asks.
12 Plott and  G ray  (1990) sugges t  a rule o f  th u m b  o f  e igh t seconds  is requ ired  per trade in a 
co m p u te r ised  doub le  auction. T he  PI m odel  p redicts  a vo lu m e  o f  trade o f  tw en ty  units , w hich  is h igher  
than  the F R E  pred ic tion  o f  s ix teen  units. T h e  period  dura t ion  o f  2 40  seco nd s  shou ld  perm it the
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randomly by computer from a uniform distribution prior to the experiment1’. In the 
interest o f controlling for the experience gained by participants whilst actually taking 
part in the experiment, lv is subject to the further constraint that the total trading time
available in all the experimental markets be equal. Thus
X  = X I'iPi) = 240 x 15 = 3,600 seconds. 4.4
7=1 . /= '
In VK markets participants know the duration of the trading periods, and they also 
have access to information concerning the time remaining in the current trading 
period. In VU markets participants do not know the duration of the trading periods, 
nor do they have access to information concerning the time remaining in the current 
trading period, for obvious reasons. Participants are simply informed that the trading 
period may close at any time.
4.5.3 Experimental Assets
Each trader is endowed with two types of financial asset at the beginning of 
each trading period. One asset is riskless, paying no return and acts as the numeraire 
within the experiment. Participants are endowed with a sufficiently large amount of 
this asset (working capital in the form of an interest free loan repayable in full at the 
end o f each trading period), so as never to be a binding constraint. Thus the demand 
function for the risky asset is elastic because traders face no effective wealth limit. 
This experimental currency is entitled an emu (experimental monetary unit) and the 
endowment each period is 50,000 emus. The second type o f asset offers an uncertain 
payoff (Dj j) at the end of each trading period. This feature o f the experimental
design replicates the dividend paying attribute o f common shares traded on the 
London Stock Exchange. As the asset has no intrinsic value and expires at the end of 
each trading period, this uncertain payoff represents its value. Each period, each 
trader is endowed with a finite amount of the discrete, homogenous risky asset and 
short sales are prohibited. All traders are endowed with identical volumes of both the 
risky asset and the numeraire. The endowment o f risky assets for each trader is 2,
required  n u m b e r  o f  trades  u n d e r  ei ther equ il ib r ium  prediction.
13 T rad e rs  are in fo rm ed  o f  the m an n er  in w hich  rando m isa t ion  o f  all such param eters  occurs. 
To  ensure  th ey  be lieve  these  p a ram ete rs  to  be rand om ly  de te rm ined ,  behave  as th ough  they are and  do  
no t a t tem pt to  p reg uess  subsequ en t  values, indiv iduals are to ld  they  can inspect the  values utilised for 
all the ran d o m ly  d e te rm in ed  param ete rs  in the experim en ta l  design , upon  com pletion  o f  m arke t trading.
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therefore, because o f the restriction on short sales, the total supply of risky asset in 
any one market is fixed at 24 units in all periods.
At the end o f each period participants have their initial endowments of both 
types of asset taken back, any difference remaining is profit. Each market is 
reinitialised at the beginning of each trading period, when traders are again endowed 
with the same magnitude of the two kinds of asset.
Within each market assets are traded using the experimental monetary units 
(emus). The reason for incorporating such a technique here, and in earlier 
experimental designs, stems from the need for relatively high nominal asset prices so 
as to ensure the separation of the theoretical predictions made by the equilibrium 
models under consideration. The convention is further maintained so as to remove 
any preconceived biases individuals may have otherwise held with respect to the use 
and ‘value’ o f pound sterling.
4.5.4 States o f Nature
The dividend is uncertain for any given trader because it is conditional on the 
‘state o f nature’ prevailing throughout the period. In the experimental design there 
are 3 possible states X, Y and Z. Thus, if  S  represents the set of states of nature, then 
letting sfc be a subset o f S  containing 3 elements (states) gives
X, Y, Z e  sk c  5, 4.5
where the subscript k (= x, y, z) identifies the particular state that has occurred. For 
example, the notation sx indicates that state X has occurred for the particular period in
question. Each state o f nature has an equal probability of occurring, thus P(X) = P(Y) 
= P(Z) = 1/3. The sequence of states in each market was randomly generated in 
advance by computer. The state o f nature that exists in a particular period is revealed 
to all traders at the end of the period in question. Those traders who receive 
information concerning the state of nature governing a particular period prior to its 
conclusion are termed ‘insiders’ (see below).
4.5.5 Participants and Motivation
The experimental markets were conducted during November 1996 through 
May 1997. The participants were a mixture of undergraduate and postgraduate 
students, drawn from the entire population of students at the University of York. 
Students were recruited via advertisement posters and mailing lists, asking them to 
sign up for an experimental session. Two further experimental markets were
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conducted using undergraduate students at the University of Leeds.
So as to control for the number of traders as a variable, all markets comprise 
12 participants (subscript n= 1, 2 ... 11, 12, and identifies a given trader). The set T of 
the 12 participants is divided equally among into 3 trader type groups denoted tj,
where subscript i = 1, 2 or 3 and refers to the trader type.
T= {tj&Z+:l<i<3}. 4 -6
These trader type groups differ with respect to the uncertain dividends payable to 
them at the end of each trading period. Traders in the same group receive the same 
uncertain dividend per asset held at the end of a trading period (D jj), conditional
upon the state of nature pertaining, whereas, across groups the state contingent 
dividend will differ. It is the diverse dividend payout across trader types that 
introduces the possibility o f gains from exchange and thus induces trade among 
individuals.
An individual’s distribution of returns, Dn(sfc), is private, known only by
themselves. Participants were instructed not to reveal this information to any other 
trader. The only information given to participants with respect to other individuals 
distribution o f returns is that they may differ from their own. They were not aware ot 
the identity o f the other traders in the same trader group. The result is an endogenous 
uncertainty as to what the asset price should be in any given period. I his particular 
feature o f the experimental design replicates earlier studies such as Plott and Sunder 
(1988) and O ’Brien and Srivastava (1991). Table 4.1 illustrates the state contingent 
dividends14 paid to trader types. Two different parameter designs were used 
throughout the experiment, though only one parameter set was applicable tor any 
given experimental market. In each of the individual results chapters to follow the 
discussion will make clear which parameter set was in play tor a given market. Note 
that whilst the expected emu dividend differs across trader types, the expected 
dividend in pound sterling terms is identical (expected emu dividend multiplied by the 
relevant conversion factor).
14 N ote  that it is these  state con tingen t  d iv idends that d e te rm in e  the equilibr ium  price 
p red ic t ions  o f  th e  F R E  and  PI m o d e ls  u n d e r  consideration .
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Trader State Conversion
Type X Y Z Factor
1 350 200 200 0.000667
2 100 300 200 0.000833
3 300 200 700 0.000417
Panel A: Parameter set A
Trader State Conversion
Type X Y z Factor
1 250 300 350 0.000833
2 200 350 950 0.000500
3 200 400 600 0.000625
Panel B: Parameter set B 
Table 4.1 State Contingent Dividend Distributions (emus)
As the risky assets have no intrinsic value of their own, preferences (values) 
for them need to be induced via the procedures derived by Smith (1976). A 
redemption function, denominated in emus, is assigned to each trader o f the form 
given in the equation below:
Profitn ~ Yjj=i [^/,n " ( j,n  + ^j,i(sk) ^j,n\ 4-7
Where;
Profitn = profit earned by trader n during the entire experiment,
£ l5=1 = summation over all periods,
Rj n = revenue of trader n from the sale o f risky assets in period pj, summed over all 
periods,
Cj n =  cost in period pj of the purchase of risky assets for trader n, summed over all 
periods,
Dj,i(sk) = dividend for trader type / given the state prevailing in period pj, summed 
over all periods,
hj n = number o f assets held by trader n at the end of period p j,
Note that the loan o f initial working capital of 50,000 emus is reclaimed each period 
and does not constitute profit. Thus it is omitted from the redemption function. Each 
individual’s redemption function is private information and thus, as already indicated
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D^s^) is not common knowledge.
As is the convention in experimental economics, individuals are motivated to 
perform to the best o f their abilities by the existence o f salient financial rewards. The 
orthodoxy in previous studies has been to convert individuals’ experimental currency 
profits into ‘domestic’ currency and pay participants exactly what they earn tor 
participating. Thus providing participants with an incentive to earn as much 
experimental profit as possible. The payoff structure in this experimental design 
adheres to this convention, in addition participants were given a £2.00 attendance 
payment.
Given the reward structure adopted, it is clear that bankruptcy is a real issue. 
It is possible that an individual’s experimental profit, when converted to pound 
sterling, may be so highly negative that the net payment to the participant, including 
the £2.00 attendance payment, is still negative. The 'best way to deal with the 
bankruptcy problem is to design the experiment in such a way as to minimise, if  
possible, eliminate, the chances of bankruptcy.’ (Friedman and Sunder, 1994, p.52). 
With this advice in mind, the parameter designs were chosen so that the expected 
value of participating in the experiment, assuming the markets achieved 100% 
efficient allocations, was a minimum of £9.75 (when private information was 
costless) and rose to £10.801' (when private information was costly). Unfortunately, 
it was not possible to eradicate the possibility of bankruptcy from the design and so it 
was necessary to devise a plan o f action should a participant end the experiment 
bankrupt. It was decided to permit traders to make a maximum trading loss of £2.00, 
equal to the attendance payment they received. Thus resulting in a minimum net 
payment for participation o f zero. This was announced to all participants prior to the 
start o f the experiment. Whilst not ideal, due to potentially induced risk-seeking 
behaviour in participants with highly negative profits, this procedure did allow 
participants to make some financial loss, thus the payoff structure was not entirely one
15 This latter figure is expressed  gross  o f  any  cost  o f  private  inform ation . N o t  know ing  in 
advan ce  w h a t  the e n d o gen ou s ly  de te rm ined  cost o f  private  inform ation  w ou ld  be, it w as  impossible to 
guaran tee  that the net expec ted  value  across the  tw o types o f  des ign  w o u ld  be identical. It w as decided 
to adjust the p a ram eters  o f  the  design to  increase the  ex pec ted  v a lue  o f  partic ipation  in those markets 
with cost ly  inform ation  acquisit ion. This  w ou ld  com pen sa te  partic ipants  for hav ing  to pay tor 
inform ation  and also m ainta in  the h ighest poss ib le  degree  o f  com parab il i ty  be tw een  the costless and 
costly  inform ation  m arkets ,  on a  net expec ted  value  basis.
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sided. Furthermore, other options such as dismissing participants from the 
experiment as soon as they became bankrupt were not possible due to the constant 
number o f traders required each period of each experimental market. Fortunately, 
despite Friedman and Sunder’s (1994, p.52) advice that ‘[n]o matter how carefully 
you design the parameters, an occasional bankrupt will occur’ none of the participants 
in the eighteen experimental markets conducted became bankrupt. Table 4.2 offers 
some descriptive statistics summarising the payments made to participants across all 
eighteen experimental markets.
All Sessions £
Mean 8.55
Median 8.40
Standard Deviation 1.62
Maximum 14.74
Minimum 3.15
5th Percentile 6.30
95th Percentile 11.52
Table 4.2 Summary of Payment to Participants
Each session had places for sixteen volunteers to sign up to attend, although 
only twelve were required for the experimental markets. The four ‘spare’ places were 
included as insurance to try to guarantee exactly twelve participants were available for 
all markets. On those occasions when greater than twelve volunteers signed up and 
attended the session, twelve were randomly drawn to stay and take part in the 
experiment, whilst the others were thanked for attending, paid the £2.00 attendance 
payment and asked to sign up for another session. On those occasions when less than 
twelve volunteers turned up to take part, the session had to be cancelled and 
rescheduled. Those that had turned up were thanked, paid the £2.00 attendance 
payment and asked to sign up for another session.
Participants were issued the instructions prior to the beginning of an 
experimental session so they could familiarise themselves with the requirements. At 
the beginning of each experimental session the experimenter reviewed the instructions 
and answered any questions that the participants had. Before each market 
commenced trading proper a nine minute practice period16 was played out so that
16 N in e  m inu tes  w as  chosen  to  p rov ide  suffic ient t im e  fo r  all par t ic ipan ts  to familiarise 
th em se lv e s  w ith  the t rad ing  p rocess  and  to  w itness  a n u m b e r  o f  t ransact ions. In V U  m arke ts  traders
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individuals could familiarise themselves with the computer screen layout, the key 
strokes required to enter bids and asks and the whole process by which trade took 
place. After the practice session any further questions were addressed and the 
experimenter made sure that all participants appeared to understand the trading rules 
and the relationship between their trading performance and their ultimate payment for 
taking part in the experiment. Details of the instructions used are contained in 
Appendix One. The convention of identifying markets with the labels CK, VK, VU, 
P, and I is adopted to indicate where the instructions differed across markets. Any 
text contained in square brackets was only included in the instructions for those 
markets identified by the label in parentheses after the square brackets. All emphasis 
was contained in the original instructions.
Each experimental session lasted approximately 90 minutes. Trading was 
conducted over a total o f sixty minutes and each practice period lasted nine minutes. 
The remaining time was taken up with clarification of instructions, questions and 
payment to participants. On average, participants received, in cash, £8.55 for 90 
minutes o f their time. This is equivalent to an hourly rate of £5.70, far more than 
would be available to students through part-time jobs such as bar work or waiting 
tables. The reward structure and parameters adopted, therefore, meet the 
requirements o f salient, dominant rewards.
4.5.6 Information Structure
In all the experimental markets, six individuals, termed ‘insiders’, are 
provided with private information at the beginning of each period. Those individuals 
not so privileged (uninformed) only learn the identity of the state of nature with 
certainty at the end o f the trading period. Their clues simply contained the word 
‘Blank’. The identity o f insiders was concealed in all periods o f all markets, to ensure 
that the only public information utilised by uninformed traders to determine their 
trading behaviour are the bids, asks and transaction prices observed in the market. It 
is the role of prices as disseminators of private information that the series of
w ere  in fo rm ed  tha t the  dura t ion  o f  the practice  period  could  not be interpre ted as indicative o f  the  
dura t ion  o f  the  subseq uen t  t rad ing  periods. N o te  also tha t  traders  did no t rece ive  in form ation  
con ce rn in g  the i r  state con tingen t  d iv idends  until after  the practice period  w as  over. T h is  information  
w as  w ith he ld  to p reven t  the  practice  t rad ing  session from  revea l ing  any  inform ation  to  traders  
con ce rn in g  o th e r  in d iv idu a ls ’ state con tingen t  d iv idends.
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experimental markets is designed to capture, not the ability to identify an insider.
The number and the manner in which insiders were determined each period 
were common knowledge in all markets. Also common knowledge was the fact that 
all traders would receive clues, even if they were ‘Blank’, so as to conceal the identity 
of insiders in all periods. The type of information (perfect and imperfect) given to 
insiders and the manner in which individuals were chosen to be insiders (exogenous 
and endogenous) differ between the four groups of experimental markets and so will 
be detailed in later, relevant chapters.
4.5. 7 Computerised Double Auction
All the markets were conducted using a computerised double auction. 
Illustrations o f the screens participants saw during each trading period are contained 
in Appendix Two and are briefly reviewed here. At the beginning of all trading 
periods participants viewed an ‘initial endowments screen’ that identified the number 
of the forthcoming trading period and reconfirmed to participants that reinitialisation 
o f endowments had occurred since the last period. Their endowments of assets and 
emus were reset to values of 2 and 50,000, respectively, and their profit for the 
forthcoming period was reset to zero.
At the signal of the experimenter the trading period began and the computer 
moved to the ‘trading screen.’ This screen continuously displayed and updated the 
current bid and ask prices, plus the participant’s holdings of assets and emus. Also 
displayed were the period number and a continuously updated history o f the 
transaction prices to date in that period. These prices were displayed across the screen 
in green, unless the trader was involved in a particular trade in which case that price 
was displayed in red on their screen. If an individual wished to enter a bid (ask) they 
would press the letter ‘b ’ (‘a ’) on the keyboard. This would open up the box at the 
bottom left (right) of the screen, allowing them to enter the value in emus at which 
they would like to buy (sell) an asset. Traders then had to confirm this value for the 
computer to then enact the instruction. The current bid and ask prices were displayed 
on the screen in white, unless a particular trader held the current bid or ask in which 
case it was displayed in pale blue on their screen. If the market was designated a CK 
or VK market then the trading screen also displayed the time, in seconds, remaining in 
the current trading period. If the market was designated a VU market then the screen 
simply displayed a question mark where the time would have been.
The rules governing trade (discussed in subsection 4.5.1) were imposed on
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traders by the computer. For example, the no short sales rule was enforced and if a 
trader tried to sell an asset when their current holding was zero a message to the effect 
‘too few assets’ would be displayed on the screen. If a trader tried to enter a bid to 
buy an asset for a price higher than their current holding o f emus a message to the 
effect ‘too few emus’ would be displayed on the screen. The improvement rule 
concerning permissible bids and asks was enforced and if a trader tried to submit a 
bid/ask that was below/above the current bid/ask a message to the effect 1 bid/ask too 
low/high’.
At the end of trading in a period, signalled by an audible beep, the computer 
screen moved on to display the ‘state of nature screen’. This screen displayed, to all 
traders, what the state of nature was for the period just ended. After a short time 
allowing participants to take this information in, the computer moved on to display 
the end of period financial position for the trader. The ‘financial position screen’ 
displayed the number of assets held by the trader at the end ot the period and the 
dividend that would be paid for each asset held. Also displayed was the end of period 
holding of emus less the initial loan, and the computed end o f period profit in emus.
On the signal from the experimenter the next trading period commenced and 
the computer cycled through the above four screens. This process repeated until the 
‘financial position screen" of the fifteenth and final trading period had been displayed. 
The ‘closing financial position screen’ then displayed the emu profit the trader made 
in each of the fifteen trading periods and converted the total emu profit into an amount 
in pounds.
The experimental sessions conducted at the University of York were run over 
a network of PCs connected to a server running Novell netware 3.12. The server 
machine was an Elonex 486DX2 (66MHz) with 8Mb ram. The networked PCs were 
a mixture of Elonex 386SXM16 (16MFIz) PCs and Elonex PC88c XT (9.54MHz) 
PCs, with one of the former specifications being designated the control machine. All 
these PCs had 1Mb ram and no hard disk drive. At the University ot Leeds the server 
was a Hewlett Packard Pentium 133MHz with 128Mb ram, running Novell netware 
4.11. The networked PCs were 386SX25 (25MHz) with 40Mb hard disk drives and 
8Mb ram. The ‘control’ and ‘participant’ programmes were written using Turbo 
Pascal v7. Versions of these were produced that enabled the ‘participant PCs to 
simulate human trade. Each generated bids and asks as appropriate and several hours 
o f simulation were run to enable checks to guarantee the data was being saved
94
correctly. The speed of responses being produced by the PCs was far in excess of 
those actually produced by human participants in the subsequent experimental 
sessions.
To briefly summarise the general experimental design, the novel feature of this 
experiment is the inclusion of varying period duration as a treatment variable in 
experimental financial asset markets. The CK markets incorporate constant period 
duration and act as the control against which to contrast the trading behaviour in the 
VK and VU markets. The following section introduces the disparate design features 
o f the four groups o f markets comprising the experiment, however, discussions of the 
specifics o f these designs are left until the relevant subsequent chapters.
4.6 Specific Experimental Designs: An Overview
4.6.1 Experimental Group 1
In the first group of experimental markets insiders are given perfect 
information (P) free of charge, thus no market for information (N) is conducted. The 
ability o f markets to disseminate private information is investigated. These factors are 
held constant across all six markets in this group. The markets ditfer with respect to 
the type of period duration in existence. Two markets are conducted with constant 
known (CK) period durations, two with variable known (VK) durations and two with 
variable unknown (VU) durations. These markets are identified with the acronyms 
CKPN, VKPN and VUPN, respectively, with 1 and 2 referring to the parameter 
design adopted (see Table 4.3). Thus each cell ot the experimental design is 
replicated once, giving a total number of trading periods in each cell ot thirty. All 
participants were inexperienced in so much as they had not taken part in a double 
auction asset market previously.
4.6.2 Experimental Group 2
The design in the second group of experimental markets replicated that in the 
first group with only one change. The previously perfect insider information was 
replaced with imperfect information (I). Again, no market for information (N) was 
conducted and the information was free. The ability of markets to simultaneously 
aggregate and disseminate private information is investigated. As with the group one 
markets, two markets were conducted tor each ot the three period duration types, 
giving a total of six markets. These markets are identified with the acronyms CKIN, 
VKIN and VUIN, with 1 and 2 referring to the parameter design adopted (see Table
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4.3). Each cell o f the experimental design is replicated once, giving a total number of 
trading periods in each cell of thirty. All participants were once more inexperienced.
4.6.3 Experimental Group 3
The design in the third group of experimental markets replicated that in the 
first group with only one alteration. A market for information (M) was conducted 
prior to trade in every period. Traders took part in a sealed-bid auction, entering the 
price at which they were prepared to purchase the perfect information (P). Appendix 
Two illustrates the ‘information auction screen’ the participants faced and also 
indicates how the ‘financial position screen’ was amended to include information 
costs. In contrast with the group one markets, only one market was conducted for 
each of the three period duration types, giving a total of fifteen trading periods in each 
cell of the design. These markets are identified with the acronyms CKPM, VKPM 
and VUPM. All participants were experienced in so much as they had taken part in 
one of the experimental markets from group one or two.
4.6.4 Experimental Group 4
The design in the fourth group of experimental markets replicated that in the 
second group with only one alteration. A market for information (M) was conducted 
prior to trade in every period. Traders took part in a sealed-bid auction, entering the 
price at which they were prepared to purchase the imperfect information (I). The 
screen illustrations in Appendix Two are once more relevant. In contrast with the 
group two markets, only one market was conducted for each of the three period 
duration types, giving a total of fifteen trading periods in each cell of the design. 
These markets are identified with the acronyms CKIM, VKIM and VUIM. As with 
the group three markets, all participants were experienced in so much as they had 
taken part in one o f the experimental markets from group one or two.
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Period Parameter set 1 Parameter set 2 Parameter set 3a Parameter set 3b
State Duration State Duration State Duration State Duration
1 Z 186 X 178 Z 133 Y 133
2 X 251 Y 319 Y 249 Y 249
3 X 130 X 175 X 181 Z 181
4 Y 303 z 138 X 129 Z 129
5 Z 319 Y 244 Z 360 X 360
6 Y 175 Y 351 Z 287 Y 287
7 Y 128 X 128 Y 327 X 327
8 Z 301 Z 213 Y 156 X 156
9 X 286 X 338 Y 226 z 226
10 Z 140 X 182 X 349 X 349
11 Y 338 Z 350 X 328 Y 328
12 Y 197 X 327 z 147 Y 147
13 X 347 X 130 X 129 z 129
14 X 359 Y 355 Y 339 X 339
15 Y 140 Y 172 X 260 Y 260
Total n/a 3600 n/a 3600 n/a 3600 n/a 3600
Table 4.3 Summary of Parameter Designs
4.6.5 Full Factorial Design
The preceding discussion highlights how each group of experimental markets 
builds upon the previous groups, thus adding additional layers to the overall 
experimental design. Table 4.4 provides a summary of the overall design. The 
combination of all layers o f the experimental design results in a 3x2x2 full factorial
design. A discussion o f the strengths of the chosen design follows.
Exp.
Group
No.
Information
Structure
Cost of Duration
Information Constant
Known
Random
Known
Random
Unknown
1 Perfect No market CKPN1 a VKPN1a VUPN1a
(free) CKPN2 b VKPN2 b VUPN2b
2 Imperfect No market CKIN 1a VKIN1a VUIN1a
(free) CKIN2 b VKIN2 b VUIN2 b
3 Perfect Market CKPM C VKPM C VUPM L
4 Imperfect Market CKIM d V K IM d VUIM J
Key: a P a ram ete r  set 1
b P a ram ete r  set 2 
c P a ram ete r  set 3a  
d P a ram ete r  set 3 b
Table 4.4 Summary of Experimental Design
The strength o f the experimental design follows from the ability to isolate
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certain treatment effects by blocking out other effects. Each o f the groups of 
experimental markets can be analysed in isolation to determine the impact of period 
duration on trading behaviour and market efficiency. In all such comparisons the only 
treatment (or nuisance) variable that changes is the period duration type, thus its effect 
is not confounded with the effects of any other parameter changes. A comparison of 
experimental markets between groups permits the effects o f information structure and 
information costs to be isolated and also investigated absent of any confounding 
effects.
The major strength of the chosen design results from the ability to investigate 
the impact o f the treatment period duration type using all experimental markets, thus 
improving the sample size and power of statistical tests, whilst blocking out the 
confounding effects from information structure and information cost changes. The 
same argument is true for both information structure and information cost as treatment 
effects. The use o f a full factorial design, whilst being more demanding of time and 
money than a fractional factorial design, allows all treatment variables to be 
manipulated independently17 and thus offers the clearest possible picture of their 
effects.
At this point it is necessary to address a couple of methodological design 
concerns previously raised in the experimental literature. Roth (1994) raises 
methodological concerns regarding data selection and the definition of exactly what 
constitutes the ‘experiment’. The approach taken here is in line with Roth s (1994) 
method o f planned experimental design, in which the entire experimental design (all 
experimental markets) was conceived prior to the conduct of any one market. All the 
cells in the 3x2x2 factorial design constitute the ‘experiment and all the observations 
are reported. Thus, Roth’s (1994) concerns over selective data reporting, resulting 
from the method of independent trials in which each trial is regarded as an experiment
17 M a n y  exper im en ta l  asset m a rke t  papers  have  chang ed  grea te r  than  o n e  variab le  across 
m arke ts ,  thus  s trict com par ison  o f  a theore tica l m o d e l ’s p erfo rm ance  is no t poss ib le  due  to  confound ing  
effects. In these  si tua t ions care m o s t  be taken  in d raw ing  conclus ions ,  it is n o t  poss ib le  to say that the 
ch an g e  in the  relative perfo rm an ce  o f  the  m o de l  is due  to the ch ange  in a part icu la r  trea tm ent.  For 
exam p le ,  in C o p e lan d  and  Friedm an (1992)  the  n u m b er  o f  t rad ing  periods  d iffers d ram atica lly  across 
m arke ts ,  at the  sam e  tim e  as the ir  t r ea tm en t  variables  change  across markets.  T h e ir  results  are valid, 
h o w e v e r ,  as they  co m p are  d ispara te  theore tica l  p redic tions w ith in  m arke ts  and  draw  no inferences 
ab o u t  h o w  a t r ea tm en t  variab le  im pacts  on a g iven  m o d e l ’s relative perform ance .
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and is designed sequentially, are not an issue. Sunder (1991) concurs that there is no 
justification for less than full disclosure, even of exploratory experiments used to 
guide the subsequent design of future experiments. Sunder (1991) criticises two-step, 
sequential designs suggesting that it is not defensible to present the results as if the 
cells were designed at once, because statistical tests across the cells become 
problematic to interpret. The experimental design adopted here is not subject to this 
criticism due the one-step nature o f its conceptual design. This draws to a close the 
discussion of experimental method and design contained in this chapter. Subsequent 
chapters will go on to consider specific design considerations that are not applied 
generally across the entire experiment and will go on to analyse the data and report 
the results of the investigations carried out in this research.
4.7 Discussion and Conclusions
The chapter began with an introduction to the method of experimental 
economics, which also compared the applicability o f conventional econometric and 
experimental techniques in the investigation of financial market efficiency. Via 
commentaries on both the inherent weaknesses of the econometric methods applied to 
field data and the rigorous control provided by the experimental method, the 
discussion questioned the use o f conventional econometric techniques. The adoption 
o f an experimental method was offered as an alternative research tool that could 
overcome the problems associated with conventional methods, specifically the lack of 
control of important variables. The experimental method is a versatile research tool 
that can be put to many uses, of which the testing o f theoretical predictions is only 
one. Subsection 4.2.4 reviewed the other purposes of experimental methods in 
economics. This was followed by a detailed discussion of the necessary conditions 
required to achieve control via an induced reward structure. Economic experiments 
are characterised by the incorporation of monetary rewards in the experimental 
design. It is this feature that separates economic experiments from psychology 
experiments. Generally voiced criticisms o f the experimental method in economics 
were considered in section 4.4, which concluded with a justification of the adoption of 
the method in the investigation of financial asset market efficiency.
The focus o f the chapter changed with the discussion in sections 4.5 and 4.6. 
These sections detailed the specifics o f the experimental design employed in the 
current research programme. Eighteen experimental asset markets were designed
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that, when combined, formed a 3x2x2 full factorial design. The markets differed with 
respect to three treatment effects, period duration, information structure and the 
incorporation o f a pre-trade information auction. It is the inclusion of period duration 
as a treatment variable that is the novel feature of this experimental design.
Control is the substance o f experimental economics. The ability to strictly 
control treatment variables ensures that an experiment can be designed in which the 
ceteris paribus conditions specified by a given theory are not violated. This ability 
means that experimental methods are ideal for such purposes as the evaluation of 
theoretical predictions, the discrimination between competing theories and the 
comparison o f market performance observed under different institutional rules of 
exchange. It is the control offered by experimentation that ensures the method has a 
role to play in the development and choice of institutions o f exchange for adoption by 
the emerging on-line auctions and the growth o f trade centred around virtual 
communities. Thus, whilst the experiment was not designed specifically to address 
these issues, it is able to offer general insights concerning the effect of uncertain 
period durations on observed market performance and the level of market efficiency 
obtained.
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Chapter Five
5 Im p a c t  o f  P e r io d  D u r a t io n  o n  E x p e r im e n t a l  A s s e t  M a r k e t s  
w ith  P e r f e c t  In f o r m a t io n  St r u c t u r e s
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5.1 Introduction
The focus of this chapter is an investigation o f the impact o f trading period 
duration, as a treatment variable, on the market performance observed in experimental 
financial asset markets. The high level of market efficiency observed, and gains from 
exchange exhausted, under the rules of the DA are well documented in the 
experimental literature. Unfortunately, why the DA is so efficient is a question that is 
still to be answered. The purpose o f this chapter, and a fundamental objective of the 
thesis as a whole, is to consider the influence of period duration on the market 
behaviour observed in experimental asset markets. It is possible that the high level of 
efficiency witnessed in experimental DA markets is a result of the use of trading 
periods in which the duration of trade remained constant and was known by traders. 
The closer the end of a trading period, the more myopic an individual’s trading 
strategy must become if they are to realise any potential gains from trade available. 
This adds to the competitive pressures that are driving the transaction price towards 
the competitive equilibrium price. It is possible that the high level of market 
efficiency is the product of constant, known period durations.
As this is the first major study of such an effect the markets studied are 
intentionally simple, drawing on earlier experimental designs. The treatment variable 
takes on three levels; constant known (CK), variable known (VK) and variable 
unknown (VU) period durations. Six experimental markets are conducted in this first 
group o f sessions, two in each of the treatment levels. The information structure, 
identical across all six markets, is intentionally simple in design, providing some 
traders with perfect information. Thus, the markets studied are only required to 
disseminate private information, and information aggregation is not necessary. 
Chapter Six considers markets with imperfect information structures, therefore, 
requiring both information aggregation and dissemination.
The following section briefly reviews relevant experimental and theoretical 
literature, providing the motivation for this research. Section 5.3 introduces a number 
of testable hypotheses. Section 5.4 discusses in detail the findings of Duxbury (1997), 
a pilot study o f the impact of random period duration. Specifics of the experimental 
design, not included in the earlier general design chapter, are introduced in section
5.5. Section 5.6 provides analysis and reports the results of the study. Discussion and 
conclusions are contained in section 5.7.
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5.2 Review of Relevant Literature
Previous experimental studies of the convergence of asset prices and 
allocations to theoretically predicted equilibrium values, have incorporated trading 
period durations that remain constant for a given experiment. Participants in such 
experiments have known the trading period duration they face. For example, 
Copeland and Friedman’s (1987) experimental design incorporates a constant period 
duration of 5 minutes, as does Sunder (1992), whereas studies by Forsythe, Palfrey 
and Plott (1984) and Banks (1985) invoke period lengths of 7 minutes. In many of 
the studies the time remaining in a trading period has been information readily 
available to participants via computer screens. In addition, in some studies 
participants have been warned when the trading period nears completion. In Ang and 
Schwarz (1985) the experimental design includes a known period duration of 6 
minutes, with warning bells that sound after 5 and 5'A minutes have elapsed since the 
current period began. It is possible that this knowledge has an important influence on 
the efficiency of outcomes reported in these and other studies.
In the theoretical literature, Friedman (1984, p.71) concludes that, amongst 
other features, the knowledge of the preset time at which trade will end is an 
institutional feature o f experimental DA markets that enhances the informational and 
competitive efficiency of observed outcomes. As the end of trade approaches the 
opportunities to gain from holding back on transacting decrease, thus traders are more 
likely to accept or, more importantly, better (offer a higher price/ask for a lower price) 
existing bids and asks. The closer the end of a trading period becomes the more 
myopic a trader’s behaviour must become if they wish to realise any remaining gains 
from exchange. Indeed, many of the previous studies o f experimental DA markets 
indicate an increase in the rate of trade in the closing stages of trading periods. For a 
graphic example see Plott and Sunder’s (1982, p.680) Figure 4 which shows the time 
series of transaction prices in their Market 3.
Friedman, Harrison and Salmon (1984) and Friedman (1991) develop models 
of DA markets that predict bid, ask and acceptance behaviour. Both studies adopt the 
assumption that trade is permissible over a finite interval time [0, T]. Friedman’s 
(1991, p.52) BGAN3 assumption allows for the random generation o f new bid and 
ask prices at random times. The exact distribution o f such prices is unknown, 
however, it is assumed that traders have sufficient knowledge of the distribution of
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times to compute the expected number of new prices available to them before the end 
of the trading period. To achieve this traders require information regarding the time at 
which trade ceases in the period, thus there is implied knowledge of the trading period 
duration. It seems that this is a fundamental assumption if the model is to predict 
convergence o f prices and allocations to almost Pareto optimal outcomes (see 
Proposition 3, op cit p.58).
Thus there is limited theoretical and indirect experimental evidence that the 
certain knowledge o f when a trading period will end actually influences a market s 
trading behaviour, with respect to overall efficiency and the timing of transactions. 
Participants may delay transacting because they are waiting to see if additional 
information concerning the prevailing state of nature is forthcoming. Such behaviour 
would consequently impact upon the speed at which transaction prices converge to 
theoretically predicted equilibrium values. Thus the results reported in previous 
experimental studies may in fact have been biased towards, or away from, the rapid 
attainment o f a FRE equilibrium. Given the high level o f informational and 
allocational efficiency reported in the literature it is more likely to be the former.
The pilot paper by Duxbury (1997) is the only study of the impact o f trading 
period duration on market performance, to date. Drawing extensively on Duxbury 
(1997), the following section develops a number of testable hypotheses. The 
subsequent section provides a detailed review of the results reported in Duxbury
(1997).
5.3 Development of Hypotheses
The trading performance reported in previous experimental asset markets may 
potentially be a result of the artificial trading period deadline. In an attempt to 
overcome this potential bias, period duration is introduced into the experimental 
design as a treatment variable. Markets are conducted with variable and known (VK) 
durations and variable and unknown (VU) durations. In the former markets 
individuals still know when the trading period will end, whilst in the latter markets 
individuals’ knowledge of exactly when a trading period will end is removed. I he 
outcomes observed from a market under the regime of constant and known (CK) 
period duration form a control against which the trading behaviour witnessed in VK 
and VU markets can be compared. Comparison of market behaviour observed in VK 
and VU markets permits the impact of knowledge of period duration to be isolated
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and investigated.
The issue raised is of substantive theoretical and practical interest. The few 
theoretical models o f bid, ask and transaction price behaviour in experimental DA 
markets developed to date rely on assumptions concerning the time remaining until 
the end of trade. Indication of the importance of these assumptions for the 
convergence behaviour advocated by these theoretical models is necessary for future 
theoretical development. This study can be viewed as a ‘boundary’ experiment 
designed to determine the importance of the period duration on the efficacy of 
theoretical models and so provide guidance with respect to those areas or variables 
requiring theoretical refinement. The results may also shed light on the disparate 
results reported by the empirical (low level of efficiency) and experimental (high level 
of efficiency) literature investigating the informational efficiency of financial markets 
and associated trading institutions. The experimental results to date may be an 
artefact, due to the known trading period duration.
The remainder o f this section details the development of a set of null (Ho) and 
alternative (Ha) hypotheses, concerning the impact of period duration on the volume 
o f trade, informational efficiency and allocative efficiency observed in the 
experimental markets. Due to the lack of theoretical literature concerning the DA 
market institution the hypotheses offered are exploratory in nature and are intended to 
motivate the development o f relevant theoretical models.
Early trading volume: The uncertain period duration in VU markets may well 
result in a reduction in the length of time taken over bartering and thus an increase in 
the volume of trade early in the period as traders attempt to realise potential gains 
from trade before the trading period closes. Alternatively there may be no impact (see 
1H0 below). A priori, it is not clear in which direction VK period duration will 
impact on the volume o f trade. Therefore, for reasons o f consistency, the alternative 
hypothesis will be two-sided for all comparisons.
Informational efficiency: Following Friedman s (1984) line o f reasoning, the 
introduction o f uncertain period duration (VU) may result in a decrease in the 
informational efficiency of the experimental markets with respect to the convergence 
o f transaction prices to theoretically predicted equilibrium values. Non-convergence 
o f prices could plausibly occur if the predicted higher volume of trade early in a 
period meant that, in their haste to trade, individuals imperfectly infer the underlying
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state of nature from the publicly available information. Alternatively, a priori, the 
predicted higher volume o f trade may result in an increase in the speed of 
convergence to equilibrium values if the bids, asks and transaction prices correctly 
reveal the underlying state of nature. For the VK markets there is no a priori 
predicted directional change in volume and so consequently it is difficult to conjecture 
in what direction varying the period duration will impact on the informational 
efficiency o f such markets.
Allocative efficiency: Similarly, Friedman’s (1984) line of reasoning, suggests 
that the introduction of uncertain period duration (VU) may result in a decrease in the 
allocative efficiency of the experimental financial asset market with respect to the 
convergence of asset allocations to theoretically predicted equilibrium allocations. 
The result would be a reduction in the percentage of potential gains from exchange to 
be exploited. Once more, non-convergence could plausibly occur if the predicted 
higher volume of trade early in a period meant that, in their haste to trade, individuals 
imperfectly infer the underlying state o f nature. Alternatively the percentage of 
potential gains from exchange to be exploited may be increased if, a priori, the 
predicted higher volume of trade resulted in the underlying state o f nature being 
revealed earlier in a period. Thus, more time is available for traders to position their 
portfolios efficiently. Once again, for the VK markets there is no a priori predicted 
directional change in volume and so consequently it is difficult to conjecture in what 
direction varying the period duration will impact on the allocational efficiency ol such 
markets.
Premised on the above line of reasoning, a set of null and alternative 
hypotheses can be tentatively formulated. The hypotheses are worded generally so 
as to be equally valid for both VK and VU markets. All alternative hypotheses are 
two sided and are not explicitly stated.
1H0: The treatment period duration does not impact on the volume of trade 
early in a given period, as compared to that observed under a control market.
2.1 H0: The mean deviation of transaction prices from theoretically predicted 
values in the treatment period duration market does not differ from those 
observed in a control market.
2.2H0 : There is no correlation between the difference in the volume of trade, 
across the experimental markets, and the difference in the mean deviations from
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predicted transaction values, across the experimental markets, ‘early’ in trading 
period.
3.1Ho: The percentage of gains from trade to be exhausted in the treatment 
period duration market does not differ from those observed in a control market. 
3.2H0: There is no correlation between the difference in the volume of trade, 
across the experimental markets, and the difference in the percentage of gains 
from trade to be exhausted, across the experimental markets.
Evaluation o f lH o determines whether period duration impacts upon the volume of 
trade in a trading period. An ability to reject 2.1H0 for the VU markets provides 
evidence in support o f Friedman’s (1984) suggestion of an enhancement of efficiency 
as a result o f predetermined, known period duration. Taken together, an analysis ot
2.1 and 2.2 H0 determines the impact on price convergence {informational efficiency) 
of a change in the volume of trade as a result of the treatment period duration. An 
analysis o f 3.1 and 3.2 H0 permits an evaluation of a change in the volume of trade 
(as a result o f the treatment period duration) on the percentage of gains from exchange 
exhausted (allocational efficiency).
5.4 A Review of Pilot Study Results
The pilot study of Duxbury (1997) conducts two experimental markets; one 
(CONPERIOD) is equivalent to the CK markets conducted here, whilst the other 
(RANPERIOD) is equivalent to the VU markets. The experimental design of these 
markets is essentially the same as the markets conducted here. Both markets included 
12 traders, subdivided into 3 trader type groups. Three states ol nature were in 
existence and 6 insiders received costless perfect information. The major exception is 
that both markets comprised only 10 trading periods, rather than the 15 adopted here. 
The paper defines three measures of ‘early in a trading period (45, 60 and 90 
seconds) to be used in the analysis. A review ol the results follows.
Firstly, the volume of trade per period was compared across markets to 
determine whether random period duration actually had an impact on overall volume. 
So as to control for the disparate period durations experienced across CONPERIOD 
and RANPERIOD, the absolute volume of trade each period was normalised by 
dividing the volume by the duration in seconds for each period in question. This 
procedure created a volume/duration (V/D) ratio that could be compared acioss
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markets, without being biased by the duration of trade each period. Figure 5.1 
illustrates the normalised volume of trade per period. The V/D ratio of RANPERIOD 
is greater than that for CONPERIOD in 8 out of 10 periods with mean V/D ratios lor 
CONPERIOD and RANPERIOD of 0.051 and 0.060 respectively.
The preliminary analysis indicated that random period duration does influence 
the timing of transactions in experimental financial markets. Preliminary 
consideration was then given to the prices at which assets trade in the two markets and 
the deviation o f these from theoretically predicted values. Figure 5.2 shows the root 
mean squared deviation (RMSD) of transaction prices per period graphed against 
period number. Over the entire market the RMSD per period shows a declining 
nature for both CONPERIOD and RANPERIOD. However, without exception, in all 
ten periods the deviations in RANPERIOD were in excess ol those observed lor 
CONPERIOD, suggesting that the average transaction price in CONPERIOD was
closer to the predicted FRE value.
Duxbury (1997) also conducts a preliminary analysis of the allocative 
efficiency of the markets. The actual gains from trade realised were expressed as a 
percentage o f the theoretical gains from exchange to define the measure /oGAIN. 
Neither market ever achieved 100% of the theoretical gains from trade per period. 
CONPERIOD's average efficiency level was 45.49%, with a maximum of 73.81%
Normalised Volume of Trade: Volume/duration.
0.08
■  CONPERIOD D R A N P E R IO D
Figure 5.1 Normalised Volume of Trade per Period
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Figure 5.2 RMSD of Transaction Prices per Period
and a minimum of 12.50% (standard deviation = 18.21). The corresponding figures 
for RANPERIOD where a mean of 45.89%, maximum of 69.53% and a minimum ot 
17.89% (standard deviation = 17.89). Efficiency losses incurred in both markets were 
predominantly the result o f missed trades (intra-marginal efficiency losses), indicating 
there may have been insufficient time per period to trade all the predicted assets 
(especially relevant for RANPERIOD). Direct comparison of the %GAIN values 
across the two markets was not possible due to the disparate period durations, thus 
Duxbury (1997), compared normalised %GAIN figures per period. The level of 
normalised %GAIN is greater in RANPERIOD than in CONPERIOD in 6 out o f the 
10 periods. It appears, therefore, that random period duration did not impact upon the 
final allocation o f assets in any systematic manner in the two markets investigated.
In order to more directly address the predictions o f lHo, 2.1 Ho and 2.2Ho 
three measures o f ‘early’ in a trading period were defined; the first 45, 60 and 90 
seconds of trade in a period. The volume of trade (VOL45, VOL6O and VOL90) and 
the associated root mean squared deviation of transaction prices from theoretically 
predicted equilibrium values (RMSD45, RMSD60 and RMSD90) o \er these three 
time intervals were compared for CONPERIOD and RANPERIOD.
Volume o f trade: RANPERIOD exhibited significantly higher volumes of 
trade for the three measures o f early in a trading period, providing support tor the 
rejection of 1H0. The significance levels for 45, 60 and 90 seconds were a=0.01, 
a=0.02 and a=0.005, respectively. Duxbury (1997) concluded that the uncertainty
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introduced by random period duration caused individuals to adopt more aggressive 
trading strategies, with respect to speed of trade.
Informational Efficiency: Analysis of the RMSD of transaction prices over all 
three measures of early indicated that the mean RMSD for RANPERIOD was 
statistically greater than for CONPERIOD (a<0.04 for all three measures). This 
evidence allowed the null hypothesis of no statistical difference (2.1H0) to be rejected 
for all three measures of early. Duxbury (1997) then related the higher volume of 
trade early in a period with the degree of convergence of asset prices to equilibrium 
prices, by examining the degree of correlation between the two variables. To this end 
the correlation coefficients between the change in volume and the change in RMSD 
across the two markets were computed. The correlation coefficients for the first 45 
and 60 seconds of trade in a period were high and positive (0.705 and 0.741 
respectively, a=0.05%). Duxbury (1997) interpreted these results as providing 
evidence o f a positive relationship between the volume of trade and the deviation ot 
prices from predicted values early in a period, sub 60 seconds. As the difference in 
the volume of trade increases across markets, so does the difference in the deviation ol 
prices from predicted values. Thus the higher volume for RANPERIOD relative to 
CONPERIOD was positively correlated with a greater RMSD of transaction prices 
from equilibrium levels in RANPERIOD relative to CONPERIOD. This was 
interpreted as indicating a reduced level of informational efficiency early in a period. 
No such correlation was found for 90 seconds into a trading period. Duxbury (1997) 
provided an ex post rationalisation premised on the 90 second measure not strictly 
being ‘early’ in many of the periods, particularly for RANPERIOD.
For the root mean squared deviation of prices over the entire duration ol a 
given period, Duxbury (1997) reports a mean RMSD of 243.743 emus for 
RANPERIOD which is greater than the value of 176.091 for CONPERIOD (a=0.05). 
Thus the higher volume of trade early in a period for RANPERIOD caused such 
highly inefficient trades, compared to CONPERIOD, that these price inefficiencies 
are not reversed by the close o f trade in any given period. Evidence that random 
period duration greatly affects the transaction price behaviour observed in 
experimental financial asset markets. The ability to reject 2.1H0 (a=0.05) for RMSD, 
offers evidence in favour o f Friedman’s (1984) view that a predetermined, known 
trading period duration is one of a number of features which enhances the
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informational efficiency of experimental markets.
Allocational Efficiency: Duxbury (1997) was unable to reject the null 
hypothesis (3.1 Ho, a>0.05) of no statistical difference between the mean %GAIN for 
CONPERIOD and RANPERIOD. Thus random period duration did not impact on the 
allocational efficiency o f experimental asset markets, despite the differences in 
volume of trade and informational efficiency across the two markets.
The results above indicate that random period duration should indeed be 
considered an important treatment variable in experimental asset markets. The 
current thesis, therefore, offers a full scale study o f its impact on market trading 
behaviour and efficiency. As discussed earlier, the additional feature offered here is 
to include markets with variable and known (VK) period durations to provide a 
stricter comparison (control) for random (VU) period duration markets. The 
following section considers some relevant experimental design features not introduced 
in the discussion of design in Chapter Four.
5.5 Experimental Design Considerations
5.5.1 Period Durations
Two markets were conducted with CK period durations (CKPN1, CKPN2), 
two with VK durations (VKPN1, VKPN2) and two with VU durations (VUPN1, 
VUPN2). As discussed previously (Chapter Four subsection 4.5.2), the trading period 
durations in both CKPN1 and CKPN2 were held constant, at 240 seconds, across all 
15 trading periods, whilst in the other markets the durations varied between 120 and 
360 seconds, from period to period. The actual sequence ot trading period durations 
was randomly determined in advance by computer and two different parameter 
designs were adopted. The VKPN1 and VUPN1 markets both used the sequence of 
period durations from parameter set one, whilst VKPN2 and VUPN2 used the 
sequence from parameter set two (see Chapter Four Table 4.3) . All six market 
sessions were conducted between the 11th November 1996 and the 5 March 1997, 
inclusive.
18 T he use o f  on ly  tw o  p aram eter designs w as no t know n  by any partic ipan t. Partic ipan ts 
knew  on ly  th a t the seq u en ce  w as d e te rm ined  random ly  in advance  by com pu ter, thus , fo r all they  knew  
th e  seq u en ce  d iffe red  from  m ark e t to  m arket. T he  sam e is true  o f  the sequence  o f  sta tes o f  nature.
I l l
5.5.2 State Contingent Dividends
The state contingent dividend distributions across trader types were the same 
across all six markets, parameter set A (see Chapter Four Table 4.1, Panel A). The 
sequence of states o f nature did differ between the markets. CKPN1, VKPN1 and 
VUPN1 used the sequence in parameter set one, whilst CKPN2, VKPN2 and VUPN2 
used the sequence in parameter set two (see Chapter Four Table 4.3). Participants 
were drawn from the population of both undergraduate and postgraduate students. 
Thus there was minimal contact and interaction between participants within a given 
market session, let alone across different sessions conducted some months apart. 
Thus there was no possibility that participants could have known the sequence ol 
states of nature in advance.
5.5.3 Information Structure
The information structure adopted here is identical to that in Plott and Sunder 
(1982), as amended by Banks (1985). Insiders receive their private information via 
the distribution of clue cards that perfectly identify the state of nature that will exist 
throughout the period in question. For example, it the state is X then the clue card 
will simply contain an ‘X ’. Those individuals not so privileged (uninformed) only 
learn the identity o f the state o f nature with certainty at the end ot the trading period. 
So as to conceal the identity of the insiders from the uninformed clue cards are 
distributed to all traders. The clue cards distributed to the uninformed contain the 
word ‘blank’, thus offering them no information. This design incorporates a very 
simple informational structure. This facet of the design was chosen, despite the 
unrealistic simplicity and availability of more complex structures (see Plott and 
Sunder, 1988), so as not to cloud the impact of VK and VU period duration on market 
trading behaviour.
The number o f insiders each period was 6 in all markets. Two participants are 
chosen from each trader type group, but their identity is determined randomly within 
trader types (once more determined prior to the experimental session by computei). 
Randomly determining the identity of insiders within trader types should diminish the 
potential for the uninformed to guess the identity of the informed. This is a valid 
criticism levied at Plott and Sunder (1982) by Banks (1985). Random insider identity 
is necessary to ensure that the only public information utilised by uninformed traders 
to determine their trading behaviour are the bids, asks and transaction prices observed 
in the market. It is the role o f prices as disseminators of private information that the
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series o f experimental markets is designed to capture, not the ability to identify an 
insider.
Two traders from each o f the three trader type groups were chosen to be 
insiders to ensure that the trader type group with the highest dividend payment given 
the state o f nature is represented amongst the insiders. Such a design feature is 
necessary to provide the possibility for the asset price to be bid up to the highest 
dividend value, as is predicted by the FRE model. The number and random 
determination o f insiders each period was common knowledge in all markets. Also 
common knowledge was the fact that all traders would receive clue cards, even if they 
were ‘blank’, so as to conceal the identity of insiders in all periods. Flowever, the 
exact identity o f insiders each period was not common knowledge.
All other details of the experimental design are general to the thesis as a whole 
and were discussed in Chapter Four. The subsequent section reports the results of the 
investigation o f market performance for the six experimental markets in this group. 
The section begins with the discussion of a number of data issues arising from the 
influence o f outliers, the determination o f observations and the problem of 
dependence, and the choice of statistical test. The section then reports the results of a 
comparative evaluation of the performance of the FRE and PI models and concludes 
with the relative evaluation of the impact of period duration on market performance.
5.6 Results and Analyses
5.6.1 Data Considerations
The main sources of data used in this study are the sequence ot transaction 
prices generated each period, the volume of assets traded within a period, individual 
trader’s profits each period and the end of period allocation of assets . All the data 
sources are analysed both in their raw form and as various measures of performance 
(such measures of price convergence, gains from exchange realised, etc.) .
The use o f the sequence of transaction prices to compute a measure o f price 
convergence requires particular consideration because of the influence o f outliers on
19 In tho se  m arke ts  w here  an in fo rm ation  auction  is inc luded  in th e  design , the cost o f
in fo rm a tio n  p ro v id es  an ad d itiona l sou rce  o f  data.
20 T he  d iscussion  in th is  subsection  is equally  valid  fo r all fo u r g ro u p s  o f  experim en ta l 
m ark e ts , and  no t so le ly  o f  concern  fo r the six  m arkets investiga ted  in th is  chap te r. T o  e lim inate  
rep e titio n , fu tu re  chap te rs  w ill re fe r b ack  to the d iscussion  con ta ined  here.
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the measure adopted. The measure of convergence used in this study, and indeed 
most other experimental asset markets, is the root mean squared deviation (RMSD) of 
transaction prices in a period from the predicted equilibrium values of the FRE and PI 
models. The mean is regularly used as a measure of central tendency or location, 
however, it can be excessively influenced by the existence of outliers. One very large 
or small value can dramatically change the value of the mean of a distribution. 
Figures 5.3-5.8 display the sequence of transaction prices per period for each of the 
six markets investigated in this chapter. Analysis of the transaction prices will follow 
in the following subsections, of concern here is the identification o f a number of 
obvious outliers. Casual observation of these charts readily identifies a number of 
observations that can clearly be classified as outliers. In period 1 of VKPN1 the 
second observation is a price o f 5,000 emus, whilst the first observation in period 2 is 
a price o f 15,000 emus. Similar observations appear in periods 4 and 5 of VUPN1. 
These observations deviate from the predicted values by orders of magnitude far 
higher than all other observations in the same period. Clearly these observations will 
dramatically increase the RMSD of prices for the periods in which they occur.
However, identifying and dealing with outliers is problematic in market 
settings such as these. Whilst the observations identified above can safely be classed 
as outliers simply by casual observation, identification may not always be so simple. 
One solution may be to adopt statistical tests to determine whether an observation 
should be classed an outlier or not. Such methods include classifying as outliers any 
observations that lie outside three standard deviations from the mean of the 
distribution. This procedure would identify certain observations as outliers within a 
given period. For example, period 14 of VUPN2 includes one observation that is 
much lower than all others. However, can such an observation safely be classed as an 
outlier? Specifically, for period 14 of VUPN2, it looks to be an outlier, but many 
such observations occur in other periods in other markets, for example VKPN1 and 
VKPN2. Is it correct to class all these observations as outliers, or do they in fact
contain valuable information?
Leaving aside the problematic issue of identification, a related problem 
concerns the treatment of those observations classed as outliers. The deletion ot the 
outliers in periods 1 and 2 of VKPN1 and periods 4 and 5 ot VUPN1 could be 
justified ex post, along the lines: Despite participants having to confirm the price ol 
their bids/asks, the observations are the result of typing errors, with one (or more) too
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many zeros pressed. A similar justification, along the line of ‘too few zeros’, could be 
given if an observation was ‘inexplicably’ low. Thus, one option would be to delete 
all those observations statistically identified as outliers. However, for the following 
reason, this is not the solution adopted here. The investigation here concerns the role 
of prices as public signals of the underlying state of nature. That is, the ability ot 
prices to disseminate private information and thus perfectly reveal the state of nature. 
The only publicly available information to traders are bids, asks and prices, 
consequently, to simply delete any observation may not be sound practice. All prices 
(observations) form part o f traders’ information sets.
Instead, what is required is a more robust estimator than the simple mean, one 
that is not dramatically influenced by occasional outliers. One alternative would be 
the use of the median in place of the mean and the calculation of the root median 
squared deviation from predicted equilibrium values. This is not ideal, however, 
because the median is ultimately derived from only a single data point and ignores 
information inherent in the other observations. A better robust estimator, and the 
technique adopted, is to compute an M-estimator, which allocates weights to 
observations. The weights are assigned so that they decrease as the distance from the 
centre of the distribution increases.
—  V  W iX i  C ,
X  = % —  5.1
L Wi
Where:
X  = the weighted mean,
Wi= the weight applied to observation i , 
x/ = observation i .
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The method by which weights are assigned to cases can vary and there exist many 
different M-estimators. Four commonly used M-estimators were considered; 
Huber’s, Hampel’s, Andrew’s, and Tukey’s (see Hoaglin, Mosteller and Tukey, 1983, 
for a detailed discussion). The Huber M-estimator assigns a weight of one to all cases 
up to a critical point k (tuning constant), beyond this point the weights decline as the 
standardised distance from the estimate of location increases. The Hampel M- 
estimator uses a more complicated method for allocating weights, based on four 
different schemes. Like the Huber, the Hampel also assigns a weight of one to all 
cases up to a critical point, after which the value of the weight declines rapidly as the 
standardised distance from the estimate of location increases. Both the Andrew and 
the Tukey M-estimators do not include the abrupt changes in the value of the 
weighting scheme from an initial value of one. Instead the schemes begin by 
declining steadily, but with the rate of change in the weights increasing as the 
standardised distance from the estimate of location increases.
The choice of which M-estimator to use is a difficult one to make. The Huber 
M-estimator is efficient if  the distribution is approximately normal, but does not 
perform well in the presence of extreme values. Thus, despite its computational 
simplicity this method may not be viewed as ideal. The Hampel M-estimator does 
allow a great deal of flexibility given the four different weighting schemes employed, 
however, the abrupt change in the weight from an initial value of one could be
deemed undesirable. The choice between the Andrew and the Tukey M-estimators
21 22would seem to be an arbitrary one ’ .
21 T o g u aran tee  tha t the resu lts w ere  no t specific  to  the cho ice  o f  M -estim ato r, the ana ly s is  to  
fo llow  w as co n d u c ted  using  all fou r a lternatives, plus the o rig inal root m ean squared  dev ia tio n s w ithou t 
any ad ju s tm en t fo r ou tliers. T he values used fo r the param eters govern ing  the w eig h tin g  schem es for 
each o f  th e  fo u r M -estim ato rs w ere  the defau lt va lues in the SPSS statistical so ftw are  p ackage  and  are 
g iven in p a ren th eses  a fte r th e  nam e o f  the M -estim ator; H uber (1 .339), H am pel (1 .700 , _>.400, 8 .500), 
A ndrew  (1.34071: ) and  T ukey  (4 .6850). In the ensu ing  d iscussion  o f  the resu lts  the values as com puted  
using  the A ndrew  M -estim ato r w ill be the on ly  ones reported , how ever, the results a re  ro b u st to  the 
choice of, o r even  use of, M -estim ator. T hat is, the conclu s ions d raw n w ou ld  no t change  if  the resu lts 
from  any  o f  th e  M -estim ato rs  w ere  repo rted  o r if  the ana ly s is w as conducted  w ith o u t any  ad ju stm en t 
fo r ou tliers. T h ro u g h o u t the d iscussion  th e  use o f  the acronym  R M SD  can be taken  to  m ean  the root 
m ean squared  d ev ia tio n  from  pred ic ted  value w here  the ‘m e a n ’ has been com puted  using  the A ndrew  
M -estim ator. T he  d iscussion  w ill m ake c lea r w hen  th is  is no t the case.
22 O n a few  occasions th e  M -estim ato rs  co u ld  no t be com pu ted  because  ol the h igh ly
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Other data issues require consideration, it is to the definition of an observation 
for the use in statistical tests that the discussion now turns. This study deviates from 
the method of analysis adopted in earlier experimental asset market studies in that it 
analyses the data on a period by period basis, as opposed to aggregating period data 
into one single market observation. A problem for studies adopting this standard 
technique is the potential loss of a clean experimental design. This results if data is 
pooled into a single market observation and then compared across markets that differ 
with respect to more than one treatment variable. The impact upon trading behaviour 
of any one treatment variable is then difficult to infer individually. The experimental 
design in this study is a very clean one in the sense that it allows comparison of 
markets where only a single treatment differs or comparison across markets where the 
effect o f other treatments is blocked. The analysis to follow is carried out on a period 
by period basis. The reason for the adoption of a period as an observation stems Irom 
the impact of aggregating data and the resultant loss of information this entails. In the 
context of the present study an analysis of the data period by period is of tar more 
interest and provides greater insight into the impact of period duration than could 
possibly be gained from an analysis of data aggregated to the market level.
Unfortunately period by period data introduces a bias into the analysis because 
the results for different periods within the same market are not independent 
observations. This does not provide a problem for the descriptive statistics reported 
below in the comparative evaluation of competing models, however, it would bias any 
statistical significance levels reported for the evaluation o f the impact of period 
duration as a treatment variable. The transaction price data per period generated in 
each market obviously exhibits strong dependence as the public information 
incorporated in previous bids, asks and transaction prices is used to determine values 
for future bids and asks. However, in the analysis to follow this type of dependence is 
removed as the root mean (M-estimator) squared deviation (RMSD) of transaction 
prices per period from theoretically predicted equilibrium values is utilised in the 
comparison across markets. Some dependence will still remain however. The data in 
a particular market is generated by the same set of participants and so may possibly be
cen tra lised  d is tribu tion  o f  o b se rv a tio n s  around  the m ed ian . O n these  occasions the m ean  w as 
su b stitu ted  in p lace o f  th e  M -estim ato r. T h is cou ld  be acco m p lish ed  w ith  ou t b ias  because  the h igh ly  
cen tra lised  d is trib u tio n  ind ica ted  th e  absence  o f  ou tlie rs in th e  data  series.
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participant specific. However, the possibility of the results reported being participant 
specific is remote in this case due to the random assignment o f participants to a 
market. The only dependence to remain in the data is therefore the result of a 
‘learning effect’. To aggregate away such an effect by analysing market level data
would seem to be folly.
However, any dependence remaining in the data biases any statistical 
significance levels reported. In the presence of data dependence problems many 
previous studies have calculated significance levels regardless. Such studies (for 
example Forsythe et al, 1984, p.963) include a comment on the interpretation of the 
reported significance levels to the effect that, they ‘should be regarded more as 
descriptive statistics than as classical hypothesis tests. This situation is clearly not 
ideal.
The present study attempts to remove the dependence by adopting the 
covariate adjustment technique first introduced to the experimental asset market 
literature by Duxbury (1997). The technique (discussed in Boniface, 1995, chapter 7) 
uses one measurement (the covariate) to adjust another measurement (the dependent 
variable) in order to remove the influence of the covariate upon the dependent 
variable. In the current context, the dependent variables are the RMSD, volume, 
%GAIN, allocation and profit per period and the influence that requires removal is the 
‘learning effect’ resulting from increased experience. The period number is used as a 
proxy for the experience gained by trading. The higher the period number, the higher 
the experience. The equation used to adjust the dependent variable is given below.
AdjDV = D V - [  p {ActCov -  StCov)] 5.2
Where:
DV=  Unadjusted dependent variable (RMSD, Volume, etc.),
AdjDV = Adjusted dependent variable,
P = Slope coefficient from the linear regression of the dependent variable
against the covariate,
ActCov = Actual value o f the covariate measure corresponding to the DV,
StCov = Standardised value of the covariate measure.
In order to estimate the slope coefficient ( P ) a linear relationship is required between 
the dependent variable and the covariate. Graphical analysis of the relationships ot 
the various dependent variables (RMSD, etc.) with the period number suggested that
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the relationship may in fact be nonlinear. Transformation of the variables was 
required to provide a functional form for the relationship, which then permitted the 
use of linear regression. Two possible transformations of the independent variable 
(period number) that more accurately described the data were; a) log period number 
and b) inverted period number. Three regression models were estimated tor all 
dependent variables, across all time periods. The first model was a simple linear 
regression against the period number and the other two were regressions using the 
transformed log period and inverted period number2’. In order to choose between the 
three models their R2 values were computed. The model with the highest mean R- 
would be the preferred model. However, the linear, log and inverted models had 
mean R2 values o f 0.0825, 0.0819 and 0.0850, respectively. Whilst the mean R2 value 
for the inverted model is the highest, all three are very low. As they stand the models 
have very low explanatory power. To adjust the dependent variables based on P 
slope coefficients from these models would not be satisfactory. Observation of the 
Figures 5.3-5.8 suggests the poor mean R2 values were the result ot the dittering 
market performance across the three states of nature, X, Y and Z. Therefore, to 
improve the three models, two dummy variables were included in the regression 
models to capture the effect of the three states of nature. The resultant mean R 
values were vast improvements on the previous ones (0.7283, 0.7324, 0.7337 for 
linear, log and inverted models, respectively). The inverted model still offered the 
highest mean R2 value, however, the performance of the three models is difficult to 
differentiate based on the mean R2 values alone. This is because the two dummy 
variables are very highly significant in the majority of cases and account tor much of 
the higher mean R2 values. Thus the dummy variables swamp the impact of the three 
models. To better distinguish between the three models the average statistical 
significance levels o f the p slope coefficients were compared. This measures a 
model’s impact on the dependent variable, the lower the significance level, the higher
23 A cross th e  18 ex perim en ta l m arkets, the th ree reg ression  m odels w ere  estim ated  fo r each  o f  
th e  d ep en d en t v ariab les ; R M S D (45 , 60, 90, entire period) using  th e  m ean  and  all fo u r M -estim ato rs, 
V O L (45 , 60, 90 , N o rm alised ), % G A IN , a llocations, and  PR O F IT  o f  the in fo rm ed  and  un in fo rm ed  
(bo th  net and  g ro ss  o f  in fo rm ation  costs w here app licab le). T hus, the to ta l n u m b er o f  reg ression  
eq u a tio n s  e s tim a ted  w as  1,620 (3 m odels fo r each o f  30 d ep enden t variab les  acro ss each  o t the 18 
m arkets).
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the impact. The model with the lowest significance level would be deemed the better 
model. The average p values were 0.4363, 0.3950 and 0.3794 for the linear, log and 
inverted models, respectively. Thus, the inverted period number model was used to 
transform all the data to give a linear relationship between the dependent variables 
and the independent variable, inverted period number. These adjusted values are the 
ones used subsequently in the evaluation of the stated hypotheses, and the calculation 
o f the associated significance levels for the rejection of the null hypotheses of no 
statistical difference in mean values.
This brings the discussion to a final issue, the choice of statistical test. The 
statistical test used to compare mean values was the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed- 
rank test for matched pairs (subsequently referred to as the WSR test). The adjusted 
data was paired period by period across two markets at a time, with the explicit 
intention of controlling for any dependence remaining in the data. 1 he comparing of 
market performance across CK and VU markets permits a joint comparison ot both 
varying period duration and knowledge of period duration. However, this joint 
comparison can be broken down to isolate the two component parts. Comparison of 
CK with VK markets isolates the impact of simply varying the period duration. More 
interestingly, comparison of market performance across VK and VU markets provides 
a strict evaluation o f the knowledge of period duration to be isolated.
A word of caution is required here. The analysis is undertaken using three 
paired tests across a treatment variable that has three levels. On initial consideration 
the analysis seems to fall foul of Siegel and Castellan s (1988, p .168) warning 
concerning the testing o f paired samples, one at a time, when there are k>j related 
samples. Due to the influence of chance, the significance levels reported Irom such a 
comparison would be biased and so an overall test for differences in the means should 
be used. Due to the different levels of the treatment variable investigated in this 
study, the potential bias is not an issue. Period duration, the treatment variable, takes 
three different levels, however, as can be seen from the above discussion of joint 
effects, the levels do not differ in a given direction with respect to a given parameter. 
For example, in the evaluation o f the performance of a new drug, trials may be 
conducted for the drug at three different dosage levels (5 milligrams, 10 milligrams 
and 20 milligrams). Thus there can be seen to be a definitive increase in the ‘level’ of 
the dosage. The same can not be said for the level of the treatment variable period
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duration. Strictly speaking, the treatment variable period duration could be broken 
down into two distinct treatments, each with two levels; constant durations that were 
known and unknown (CK and CU) and varying durations that were known and 
unknown (VK and VU). Thus giving a two factor, with two levels design. However, 
to conduct the cell o f the design that corresponds to the constant and unknown (CU) 
treatment would be nonsensical because participants would learn the duration alter 
very few repetitions. It is for this reason that this cell of the design is omitted and 
period duration is regarded as a treatment variable with three levels. Paired 
comparisons are necessary to isolate the effect of varying the period duration and the 
effect o f knowing the period duration. No bias in the significance levels is introduced 
as a result.
On a final note of clarification, in all graphical representation ot the data, in 
the reporting of all preliminary descriptive statistics and in all comparative 
evaluations of the FRE and PI models, the unadjusted values are the figures utilised. 
It is only when statistical significance levels are reported that the adjusted data are 
used, to control for dependence.
5.6.2 FRE v PI: Comparative Performance Evaluation
The intention in this subsection is to compare the predictive accuracy of the 
FRE and PI models, to determine which model best explains the observed 
experimental data. The comparative evaluation will test the models predictions 
concerning transaction prices, allocations and profits, using the raw data sources 
without any adjustment for outliers or dependence in the data. The intention is to 
keep the data free from transformations whenever it is possible to conduct valid 
comparisons24, therefore, in this subsection the RMSD figures were calculated using 
the mean rather than the Andrew M-estimator and no adjustment to correct for 
dependence in the data is undertaken. Comparison o f the two models is undertaken 
within a period within a market, not across periods across markets. Thus, outliers and
dependence o f the data are not an issue.
The two competing models of FRE and PI predict that traders use dillerent
information sets in the determination of their expectations of transaction prices. 
Experimental parameters can be chosen so that the two models predict disparate 
equilibrium prices. The observed experimental data can then be compared to these
24 T he sam e is true  o f  all com p ara tiv e  evalua tions co n ta in ed  in fo r th co m in g  chapters.
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disparate predictions to determine which model best explains the data. Given the state 
contingent dividends governing these six market25, the FRE model predicts 
equilibrium prices of 350, 300 and 700 for states of nature X, Y and Z, respectively. 
The corresponding predicted prices for the PI model are 400, 400 and 700"6. Note 
that for state Z the two models make the same price prediction and so occurrences of 
this state can not be used to make comparative evaluations of the RMSD of prices 
from the equilibrium price of the two models.
The FRE and PI equilibrium predictions are included in Figures 5.3-5.8 as 
horizontal lines, towards which the convergence of transaction prices can be 
compared. In both CKPN markets the transaction prices are quite volatile in the first 
few periods, after which they settle down. In most periods, prices trade close to the 
FRE price or tend to show convergence towards the FRE price. The notable 
exception to this is the occurrence of state of nature Z (where the FRE and PI prices 
are equal). The markets do not seem to react to state Z and only show convergence on 
a couple o f occasions. In the VKPN markets the volatility of prices in early periods is 
far higher and takes longer to settle down, particularly in VKPN2. In general, prices 
exhibit convergence to the FRE price more so than the PI price, particularly in the 
VKPN1 market. Again, periods when the state of nature was Z do not exhibit 
convergence to the FRE=PI price. Prices in VUPN2 do not exhibit the same degree of 
volatility as other markets and generally trade close to, or show convergence towards, 
the FRE price more so than the PI price. As with the other markets the state Z prices 
do not exhibit convergence to the FRE=PI price. The volatility ot prices in VUPN1 is 
far higher than the other markets and does not reduce until half way through the 
market. In the final four trading periods prices bounce between the FRE and PI prices 
and do not exhibit any clear trend towards the FRE price. Despite this, prices 
converged closer to the FRE=PI price in the state Z periods than in any other market.
To directly evaluate the FRE and PI models’ predictions the RMSD of prices 
each period were computed for both and compared within a market on a period by 
period basis. Comparisons were made for the first 45, 60 and 90 seconds of trade in a 
period and over the entire trading period duration (RMSD45,60,90 and RMSD, 
respectively). Table 5.1 contains the outcomes of these comparisons, aggregated over
25 See T ab le  4 . 1, C h ap te r Four.
26 See A p pend ix  T h ree  fo r an ex p lana tion  o f  the FRE and PI equ ilib riu m  prices.
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the two parameter designs. Note that because of identical equilibrium predictions lor 
the FRE and PI models when the state is Z, those periods where the state is Z are 
omitted from the comparisons. It is apparent from Table 5.1 that the predictive 
accuracy of the price predictions of the FRE model is far higher than that of the PI 
model. Across the CKPN and VKPN markets the RMSD of the FRE model is less 
then that of the PI model in at least 86.96% of the periods for all comparisons. The 
percentages are not so high in the VUPN markets, however, when trade is taken over 
the entire period the FRE model beats the PI model in 60.87% of periods. The lower 
percentages in the first 45 and 60 seconds o f trade for the VUPN markets indicate that 
the FRE model improves over time. In the six markets as a whole, the FRE model s 
predictions are superior to the those of the PI model in 82.61% of periods over entire 
trading period durations.
Percentage Comparison (%>)
Market Performance RMSD45 RMSD60 RMSD90 RMSD
CKPN FRE < PI 91.30 91.30 91.30 95.65
FRE > PI 8.70 8.70 4.35 4.35
FRE = PI 0.00 0.00 4.35 0.00
VKPN FRE < PI 86.96 86.96 86.96 91.30
FRE > PI 13.04 13.04 13.04 8.70
FRE = PI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
VUPN FRE < PI 52.17 52.17 60.87 60.87
FRE > PI 47.83 43.48 39.13 39.13
FRE = PI 0.00 4.35 0.00 0.00
Overall FRE < PI 76.81 76.81 79.71 82.61
FRE > PI 23.19 21.74 18.84 17.39
FRE = PI 0.00 1.45 1.45 0.00
Table 5.1 Comparison of RMSD of Price Predictions for FRE and PI
The different assumptions concerning the information sets individuals use in 
the determination of their expectations concerning asset prices also mean that the I RE 
and PI models make divergent predictions concerning the end period allocation of 
assets. For the six markets investigated here the FRE model predicts that both the 
informed and uninformed traders in trader type 1, 2 and j> will hold the assets when 
the state o f nature is X, Y and Z, respectively. In contrast, the PI model predicts that 
the uninformed type 3 traders will hold the assets in states X and Y, and the informed 
type 3 traders will hold the assets in state Z27. The two models can, therefore, be
27 See A p p en d ix  T h ree  fo r an exp lan a tio n  o f  the FR E and PI en d -p e rio d  equilib rium
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evaluated based on a comparison of the number of assets misallocated when 
compared to their equilibrium predictions. It must be recognised, however, that the PI 
equilibrium requires a greater number of trades than the FRE equilibrium. If no trade 
took place in a given period then the number of assets misallocated according to the 
FRE model would be 16 whereas the corresponding figure for the PI model would be 
20. Thus, caution must be exercised when comparing misallocations so as not to 
succumb to the bias that his would introduce. The number of assets, in a given 
period, misallocated under the two models are compared by subtracting the number ol 
PI misallocations from the number of FRE misallocation, to give the measure d . If 
d <0 in a given period then this taken as an observation in support of the PI model 
(FRE>PI). If d >4 in a given period then this is taken as an observation in support ol 
the FRE model (FRE<PI). If 0 < 5 < 4 then the measure is deemed to fall within an 
indiscriminate region and the two models are deemed to have tied (FRE=PI). As 
displayed in Table 5.2, on average, the percentage of periods (number of observations 
equals 90) where the FRE model is superior to the PI model is 70.00%, and in no 
comparison at all can the predictions of the FRE model be classed as interior to the PI 
model. The evidence in favour of the FRE model is further strengthened by the fact 
that 27.78% of the time (25 out of the 90 periods) the d measure is in double figures
(obtaining a maximum of 5=15 in period 12 of CKPN2).
To summarise thus far, the six markets all exhibit, to a greater or lesser extent, 
transaction price convergence towards the FRE equilibrium price. In addition the 
RMSD of prices is higher for the PI model than the FRE model in 82.61% of 
occasions over an entire trading period. The RMSD45 is lower lor FRE than PI in 
76.81% of periods, indicating that convergence to FRE prices improves over time 
within a period. Comparison of the number of assets misallocated oilers conclusive 
evidence in support o f the predictive accuracy of the FRE model at the expense of the 
PI model. There is no occasion where the number o f assets misallocated by the FRE 
model is greater than that of the PI model. Taken together these two comparisons 
provide strong evidence in favour of the superior predictive ability o f the FRE model. 
Two further measures o f performance readily adopted in the experimental asset
market literature will now be considered.
The first o f these is a measure of trading efficiency that utilises the %GAIN
allocations.
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measure introduced as Equation 2.2 in Chapter Two28. Recall that, given the 
definition, the initial allocation of assets each period produces a %GAIN of 0% 
whereas the end period equilibrium allocation of the FRE model produces a %GA1N 
o f 100%. Table 5.3 illustrates that the level of %GAIN exhibits a large degree of 
variability across the six markets, from a maximum of 95.83%, through 0% to a 
minimum of -66.67% . The average %GAIN observed in the CKPN, VK.PN and 
VUPN markets are 43.33%, 38.89% and 36.88%, respectively.
Market Performance Percentage
Comparison
(%)
CKPN FRE < PI 86.67
FRE > PI 0.00
FRE = PI 13.33
VKPN FRE < PI 70.00
FRE > PI 0.00
FRE = PI 30.00
VUPN FRE < PI 53.33
FRE > PI 0.00
FRE = PI 46.67
Overall FRE < PI 70.00
FRE > PI 0.00
FRE = PI 30.00
Table 5.2 Comparison of Misallocation of Assets for FRE and PI
On the face of it, these low mean %GAIN figures could be interpreted as being 
more in favour of the PI model, because there are only a tew periods where the 
%GAIN approaches close to the 100% prediction of the FRE model. However, 
consideration must also be given to the gains from trade to be exploited under the PI 
model, relative to the zero trade gains. These gains depend on the end of period 
equilibrium allocations of the PI model. Thus the PI gains from trade are state 
contingent and take the values of 1,600, 1,200 and —1,600 emus under the states X, Y 
and Z, respectively. In 41% of periods (37 out of 90) the realised gains from trade are 
in excess (considerably so in many periods) of the predicted PI gains trom trade. This 
is construed as weak evidence in favour of the FRE model, because the predicted FRE 
gains from trade are always in excess of the predicted PI gains. However, the fact that
F or refe rence , °/oGciin = 7------------- 7 .
(TSE -  TSI)
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the PI model predicts a negative gain from trade under state Z can be exploited to 
provide excellent differentiation between the two models, because the FRE model 
predicts positive gains from trade under all three states of nature. For the 21 
occurrences o f the state Z across the six markets29 there was only 1 occasion where 
the realised gains from trade were negative. This simple test provides strong evidence 
in favour o f the FRE model over the PI model. In fact, the occurrence of the state Z
coincides with relatively high levels of %GAIN, as can be observed in Table 5.3.
Period CKPN1 VKPN I VUPN1 CKPN2 VKPN2 VUPN2
1 62.5000 6.2500 -6.2500 -66.6667 45.8333 39.5833
2 52.0833 64.5833 12.5000 25.0000 18.7500 43.7500
3 60.4167 8.3333 10.4167 37.5000 39.5833 39.5833
4 18.7500 -25.0000 12.5000 56.2500 31.2500 43.7500
5 56.2500 81.2500 31.2500 18.7500 31.2500 43.7500
6 12.5000 0.0000 0.0000 18.7500 68.7500 68.7500
7 31.2500 6.2500 12.5000 45.8333 20.8333 60.4167
8 75.0000 93.7500 56.2500 43.7500 68.7500 93.7500
9 54.1667 72.9167 8.3333 56.2500 66.6667 72.9167
10 62.5000 43.7500 43.7500 39.5833 31.2500 66.6667
11 25.0000 -6.2500 25.0000 75.0000 87.5000 93.7500
12 31.2500 6.2500 6.2500 56.2500 50.0000 95.8333
13 52.0833 43.7500 37.5000 83.3333 60.4167 33.3333
14 72.9167 75.0000 29.1667 50.0000 43.7500 68.7500
15 50.0000 -6.2500 0.0000 43.7500 37.5000 -37.5000
Mean 47.7778 30.9722 18.6111 38.8889 46.8056 55.1389
Table 5.3 Percentage of Gains from Trade Exhausted per Period
A final measure of the comparative performance of the FRE and PI models 
is provided by comparing the profit of the informed to that of the uninformed on a 
period by period basis. In the strongest interpretation of the FRE model the 
underlying state of nature is revealed instantaneously and the value of private 
information is zero, consequently there should be no difference between the profit of 
the informed and the uninformed. In contrast, private information retains value 
under the PI model and so a positive difference between the informed and 
uninformed traders’ profits would be predicted. Table 5.4 contains the average 
profit of the informed and the uninformed, in emus, for all six markets. Across the 
six markets the mean informed profit figure of 833.42 emus is convincingly higher
29 P eriods 1, 5 , 8 and  10 p lus p eriods 4, 8 11 fo r param ete r sets one and  tw o  respective ly .
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than the mean uninformed profit figure of 617.43 emus, providing evidence more in 
line with the PI model than the FRE model. This is the result of transactions 
between informed and uninformed traders that occur early in a period for prices 
below the FRE equilibrium price. These transaction take place before the 
information is disseminated and price signal reveals the state of nature, allowing 
informed traders to make high profits. It is for this reason that this weak evidence 
against the FRE model is not construed as fatally condemning.
Market Informed Uninformed
CKPN1 826.7444 606.5889
CKPN2 813.8444 591.4911
VKPN1 836.2000 728.8000
VKPN2 748.5556 607.4222
VUPN1 961.2778 565.9444
VUPN2 813.9000 604.3444
Mean 833.4204 617.4319
Table 5.4 Average Profit of Informed and Uninformed Traders
In conclusion, the majority of evidence from this comparative analysis 
supports the superior predictive abilities of the FRE model. The model is only really 
susceptible to criticisms of it in its strictest sense, where prices instantaneously reveal 
the underlying state of nature. The evidence tends to support the progressive 
convergence o f outcomes towards FRE predictions. Having established the 
superiority o f the FRE model the subsequent analysis of the treatment variable period 
duration across the CKPN, VKPN and VUPN markets will be conducted with
30
reference to the equilibrium predictions of the FRE model only .
5.6.3 Impact o f  Period Duration on Market Behaviour
This subsection begins with a preliminary investigation of observed market 
performance by way of graphical representation, thus making use of the unadjusted 
data. The discussion concludes with a direct evaluation o f the stated hypotheses and 
incorporates the data adjusted to remove dependence. The evaluation o f the impact of
30 Indeed , th e  ev a lua tion  o f  the trea tm en t variab le  w ith  re fe rence  to  PI eq u ilib rium  p red ic tions 
is redundan t. T he co m p ariso n  is undertaken  across m arkets on a  p e riod  by perio d  basis. T he FR E and 
PI p red ic tio n s  are b en ch m a rk s  against w hich  to  com pare  observed  ou tcom es. T he ch o ice  o f  w hich 
b en ch m ark  is irre lev an t so  long as the  sam e benchm ark  is adop ted  fo r all p eriods o f  all m arkets. Ih u s , 
the use  o f  on ly  the F R E  m odel to  investigate  the im pact o f  period  d u ra tion  does no t p resen t a problem .
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period duration on the market behaviour observed in experimental asset markets 
requires a comparison of relative performances across markets where the period 
duration differs. The influence of extreme observations in some markets but not in 
others now becomes important. The use of the acronym RMSD in the discussion to 
follow will, therefore, always refer to the root mean squared deviation of transaction 
prices where the mean is in fact replaced by Andrew’s M-estimator.
First, the volume of trade per period was compared across markets to 
determine whether period duration would influence the overall volume of trade. So as 
to control for the disparate period durations across the six markets the absolute 
volume o f trade each period was normalised by dividing the observed volume by the 
duration in seconds for each period in question. This procedure created the measure 
NORMVOL that could be compared across the markets, without being biased by the 
duration of trade in each period31. Figures 5.9 and 5.10 graph the normalised volume 
of trade per period for the markets grouped by parameter design. Comparison of the 
NORMVOL measure for the CKPN markets with either the VKPN or VUPN markets 
does not provide any clear interpretation. The NORMVOL measure tor CKPN 
markets is fairly erratic, sometimes higher and sometimes lower than the measure for 
the other two market types, with a mean of 0.0528. However, comparison ol the 
VKPN and VUPN markets is more informative. The NORMVOL measure for VUPN 
exceeds that for VKPN in 23 of 30 periods, the reverse is true in only one period. The 
mean NORMVOL of 0.0538 for VUPN markets convincingly exceeds that of 0.0431 
for VKPN markets. Preliminary analysis indicates that knowledge of the period 
duration, when isolated from the effect of varying period durations, may be an 
important factor in the timing of transactions. Preliminary consideration is now given 
to the prices at which assets trade and the deviation of these from the PRE predicted 
values.
31 T he p e rio d  d u ra tio n s  are  th e  sam e across the V K P N  and  V U PN  m arkets and  so the 
N O R M V O L  m easu re  is no t ac tua lly  requ ired  to  com pare  the  v o lu m e o f  trade  acro ss these  tw o m arket 
types. H ow ever, because  com parisons betw een  these tw o  m ark e ts  and  the  C K PN  m arkets requ ire  the 
N O R M V O L  m easu re , it w ill be u sed  th ro u g h o u t the analysis.
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Figure 5.9 Normalised Volume of Trade per Period -  PN1 Markets
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Figure 5.10 Normalised Volume of Trade per Period -  PN2 Markets
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Figures 5.3-5.8 graph the transaction price sequences per period for each of 
the six markets. Evidence of the convergence of prices to the FRE price is far from 
apparent in the early periods of any of the markets. The prices in the CKPN markets, 
however, appear far less volatile and settle at prices close to the FRE price sooner 
than in the other two market types. Comparison of the VKPN and VUPN markets 
indicates a higher volatility o f prices in the latter than the former, particularly in 
earlier periods. In later periods the VUPN prices tend to bounce between the FRE and 
the PI prices, while the VKPN prices do not generally exceed the FRE price. The 
VKPN prices appear to converge more closely to the FRE price in later periods than is 
evident in the VUPN markets. To better see the convergence of prices to FRE prices 
the Figures 5.11 and 5.12 illustrate the RMSD of prices per period, computed using 
the Andrew M-estimator, for the three markets in the two different parameter designs. 
For the CKPN and VKPN markets the RMSD is relatively low in all periods with the 
exception o f those periods when the state of nature was Z. The same can be said of 
VUPN2, however, VUPN1 exhibits a generally declining RMSD over time and is not 
unduly influenced by the occurrence of state Z. The RMSD in earlier periods of 
VUPN1 exceed those in later periods and the market exhibits a high degree of 
learning. The high degree of variability displayed in these figures make it dilficult to 
draw any conclusive inferences concerning the impact of period duration on the 
convergence o f prices to theoretically predicted FRE values. A more comprehensive 
investigation by way o f statistical testing is required to determine if any el feet is 
present. The results of such an evaluation are reported after the preliminary 
investigation is concluded.
The trading efficiency across the three market types is also compared to 
examine the impact of period duration. The %GAIN measure is once more used, 
however, because of the disparate period durations across the markets the measure 
requires normalising along the lines of the NORMVOL measure. Thus the 
NORM%GAIN measure is simply the %GAIN per period divided by the duration in 
seconds for the given period. The Figures 5.13-5.14 contain the NORM%GAIN per 
period for each of the three markets in the two parameter designs. For parameter set 
one the CKPN1 market generates a superior NORM%GAIN in 11 out of the 15 
periods, with a mean value of 0.1991, which exceeds the values of 0.1172 and 0.0771 
for VKPN1 and VUPN1, respectively. This is not repeated, and is in fact reversed, 
for the markets using parameter set two, with mean values o f 0.1620, 0.2104 and
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0.2377 for CKPN2, VKPN2 an VUPN2, respectively. The mean value of the 
NORM%GAIN for the VUPN1 and YUPN2 are markedly different, with the VUPN2 
value being far higher. There is no obvious explanation as to why this is the case. 
The VKPN markets give a similar but less pronounced change. Aggregating across 
markets from the two parameter sets results in values of the NORM%GAIN measure 
that are highest for CKPN markets and lowest for VUPN markets. Whilst it is not 
possible to draw any decisive conclusions from this analysis, it seems that varying the 
period duration reduces trading efficiency and that removing knowledge of the period 
duration reduces the level of efficiency attained still further.
The mean %GAIN values of 43.33, 38.89 and 36.88 for CKPN, VKPN and 
VUPN markets, respectively, can be investigated more closely to separate the 
efficiency loss between either intra- or extra-marginal trades (Rust, Miller and Palmer, 
1993). The efficiency loss can be associated with either a missed trade or an error 
trade. A missed trade (intra- marginal) occurs when an individual does not sell the 
assets in a given period as predicted by the FRE model. An error trade (extra­
marginal) occurs when an individual trades in the wrong direction as predicted by the 
FRE model (buys when predicted to sell and vice versa). In line with previous DA 
market results (Rust et al, 1993) both missed and error trades coexisted within many 
periods. The mean percentage efficiency loss associated with missed and error trades 
are reported in Table 5.5. The efficiency losses incurred in all markets are mainly the 
result o f missed trades, however, for all markets there were a significant number of 
periods where the efficiency loss associated with error trades was higher than that 
associated with missed trades. These conclusions are equally applicable to CKPN, 
VKPN and VUPN markets, therefore, period duration does not appear to directly 
impact upon the manner in which the efficiency loss arises.
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Figure 5.11 Root Mean (Andrew) Squared Deviation of Transaction Prices per
Period -  PN1 Markets
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Figure 5.12 Root Mean (Andrew) Squared Deviation of Transaction Prices per
Period -  PN2 Markets
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Market
Percentage of Efficiency Loss
Missed Trades Error Trades
CKPN1 59.57% 40.43%
CKPN2 52.35% 47.65%
VKPN1 58.29% 41.71%
VKPN2 72.10% 27.90%
VUPN1 50.53% 49.47%
VUPN2 62.87% 37.13%
Table 5.5 Mean Percentage of Efficiency Losses due to Missed and Error Trades
A final preliminary analysis of trading behaviour can be carried out by 
comparing the profits earned each period by informed (Inf) and uninformed (UInf) 
traders. As suggested previously, there should be no difference between the profit ol 
the informed and the uninformed traders if the price signal reveals the underlying state 
o f nature instantaneously, as is the case in the strictest interpretation ol the FRE 
model. In Figures 5.15-5.16 the data series for each market are constructed by 
subtracting the average profit earned in a period by the uninformed traders from the 
average profit that period earned by the informed traders, net ol any intormation 
costs3-. This difference in average profit is graphed against period number lor all six 
markets. A positive value indicates that the average profit of the informed exceeded 
the average profit o f the uninformed traders in that period, with a negative figure 
conveying the opposite interpretation. The Figures 5.15-5.16 group the markets by 
parameter design. For the PN1 markets there is very little difterence between CKI N1 
and VKPN1, however, VUPN1 exhibits a far larger difference in average profit in 
earlier periods and the measure exceeds that for the other two markets in 11 ol the 15 
periods. This can be interpreted as indicating a reduced level ol trading efficiency in 
VUPN1 relative to CKPN1 and VKPN1. Unfortunately the results from the PN2 
markets are far less conclusive due to the erratic nature ol the data series for all three 
market types.
32 N o te  th a t fo r those  m arkets in w hich no in form ation  auction  is co n d u c ted , as is th e  case for 
these  six  m ark e ts , th e  in fo rm ation  cost is zero  and there  is no  d iffe rence  b e tw een  th e  gross and net 
p ro fit ea rn ed  by  in fo rm ed  traders. T he  d is tinc tion  betw een  the gross and net p ro fit o f  in fo rm ed  traders 
is m ore  im p o rtan t in later chap te rs, w here  th e  resu lts o f  m arkets w ith  in fo rm atio n  auc tions are 
inves tiga ted .
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In summary, the analysis thus far indicates that knowledge of when a trading 
period will end impacts on the volume of trade observed in a period. Specifically, 
removal o f such knowledge results in an increased normalised volume of trade in 
VUPN markets, relative to VKPN markets. However, from the analysis so far it is not 
clear exactly how this impacts on observed market behaviour with respect to the 
prices at which transactions take place, the allocation of assets and the percentage ot 
gains from trade realised. Thus the analysis will continue with a direct evaluation of 
the hypotheses introduced previously. Note that because the statistical tests 
performed, generally the Wilcoxon-signed ranks test, require independent 
observations, the data used has been adjusted to remove any intra-market dependence 
o f observations. This is not so for the preliminary analysis reported above, which was 
conducted using the unadjusted data.
To directly address the predictions of lHo, 2.1 Ho and 2.2Ho three measures ot 
‘early’ in a trading period were defined; the first 45, 60 and 90 seconds of trade in a 
period. The volume of trade (VOL45, VOL6O and VOL90) and the associated root 
mean (Andrew M-estimator) squared deviation of transaction prices from theoretically 
predicted FRE values (RMSD45, RMSD60 and RMSD90) over these three time 
intervals were compared across the three market types. Figures 5.17-5.18 and 5.19- 
5.20 provide graphical interpretations of the VOL and RMSD data. The analysis ot 
the stated hypotheses begins with a brief commentary on these figures and concludes 
with the reporting of statistical significance levels for the rejection ot the null 
hypotheses (lH o, 2.1 Ho, 2.2Ho, 3.1 Ho and 3.2Ho).
Figures 5.17-5.18 show the volume of trade in the first 45 seconds, 60 seconds 
and 90 seconds for all 15 trading periods of the six markets. The figures, once more, 
group the markets by parameter set. For all three measures of early , in many of the 
periods the volume of trade is highest, or joint highest, in the VUPN markets. For 
VOL45, the volume of trade in the VUPN markets is highest, or joint highest, in 25 of 
the 30 periods. The corresponding figures for CKPN and VKPN are 14 and 12, 
respectively. For VOL6O, the volume of trade in the VUPN markets is highest, or 
joint highest, in 23 periods, with corresponding figures for CKPN and VKPN of 11 
and 7, respectively. For VOL90, the volume ot trade in the VUPN markets is highest, 
or joint highest, in 22 periods, with corresponding figures for CKPN and VKPN of 10 
and 7, respectively. Thus, for all three measures of early in a period the volume of
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trade in the VUPN markets is rarely below that in the CKPN and VKPN markets. 
Indeed, aggregated across the three measures, the volume of trade in the VUPN 
markets is the highest volume (excluding ties) in 42 of the 90 periods, almost 50% of 
the time. The corresponding values for the CKPN and VKPN markets are only 9 and 
6, respectively. A graphical analysis of the data clearly supports the belief that the 
volume of trade, early in a period, is dramatically influenced by the removal of
knowledge of the trading period duration.
Figures 5.19-5.20 show the RMSD for the first 45, 60 and 90 seconds ol trade
for all 15 trading periods of the six markets. The figures are once more grouped
according to the parameter set adopted. VKPN1 and VUPN1 each have one period
(periods 2 and 5, respectively) in which their RMSD45 and RMSD60 values arc
exceptionally high. VKPN2 also has an exceptionally high observation lor RMSD90
in period 8. This is despite the use of the Andrew M-estimator to limit the impact of
outliers. The low number of observations (transactions) mean that any ‘outliers’ will
have a strong influence even on the M-estimator. Excluding these exceptional
observations, the RMSD45, RMSD60 and RMSD 90 values for all six markets are
below 500. The RMSD values for all markets are fairly erratic and exhibit very little
trend other than higher RMSD values when the state of nature is Z. The exception is
RMSD90 for VUPN1, which declines erratically as the period number increases. It is
difficult to draw any firm conclusions concerning the impact of period duration early
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in a period from a graphical interpretation of the RMSD data - .
33 N o te  th a t app ly ing  the th ree  m easures o f  early  to  the  m easu re  N O R M % G A lN  is ne ither 
p oss ib le  no r desirab le . A ny a lloca tion  o f  assets p rio r to  the  end  o f  a g iv en  trad in g  period  m ay  be 
m ere ly  a tem p o ra ry  a llocation . T he  FR E  m odel m akes no p red ic tio n  ab o u t in tra-pe riod  allocations, 
on ly  en d -period  a llocations. N o r w o u ld  it m ake sense to  co m p are  the p ro fit o f  in form ed and 
u n in fo rm ed  trad ers  p rio r to  th e  end  o f  a period , because  if  a  trad e r buys and  ho ld s an  asse t the profit 
from  th is trade is no t reco g n ised  un til th e  end  o f  the period  w hen  it is redeem ed  fo r the associated
d iv idend .
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Panel A
Volume of Trade: 45 Seconds
Period
E3CKPN1 BVKPN 1 OVUPN1
Panel B
Volume of Trade: 60 Seconds
r
7 8 9 10 11 12
P eriod
E3CKPN1 BVKPN 1 DVUPN1
Panel C
Volume of Trade: 90 Seconds
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Period
E3CKPN1 BV KPN 1 DVUPN1
Figure 5.17 Volume of Trade in the First 45, 60 and 90 Seconds of Trade -  PN1
Markets
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Panel A
Volume of Trade: 45 Seconds
Panel B
Volume of Trade: 60 Seconds
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
P eriod
E3CKPN2 H VKPN 2 □V U P N 2
Panel C
Volume of Trade: 90 Seconds
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Period
E3CKPN2 B V K P N 2 D VU PN 2
Figure 5.18 Volume of Trade in the First 45, 60 and 90 Seconds of Trade -  PN2
Markets
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Panel A
RMSD 45 seconds (Andrew)
Panel B
a.
RMSD 60 seconds (Andrew)
RMSD 90 seconds (Andrew)
Panel C
Period
Figure 5.19 RMSD of Prices in the First 45, 60 and 90 Seconds of Trade -  PN1
Markets
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Panel A
RMSD 45 seconds (Andrew)
Period
—* -C K P N 2  VKPN2 — VUPN2
Panel B
RMSD 60 seconds (Andrew)
Period
— CKPN2 VKPN2 — VUPN2
Panel C
RMSD 90 seconds (Andrew)
P eriod
CKPN2 VKPN2 — VUPN2
Figure 5.20 RMSD of Prices in the First 45, 60 and 90 Seconds of Trade -  PN2
Markets
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Table 5.6 reports the level of statistical significance for which the null 
hypotheses, of no statistical difference in mean values across the two paired markets 
can be rejected. Attention is once more drawn to the fact that the data used in the 
following statistical tests has been adjusted in order to remove the intra-market 
dependence o f observations across periods. For the RMSD, VOL, NORMVOL and 
NORM%GAIN variables, the figures reported are the means of the unadjusted values, 
across all trading periods. For each variable, the figure in parentheses reports the 
mean o f the adjusted values. The number of paired observations utilised in each ol 
the statistical tests is 3034. The Wilcoxon signed ranks test (WSR) was used to 
compute two-tail significance levels for the comparisons between the three market 
types. Whilst it is reported for completeness of the analysis, the CKPN.VUPN 
comparison confounds the effects of both varying period durations and uncertainty 
over when a trading period will end. These joint effects can be isolated from one 
another via CKPN:VKPN and VKPN:VUPN comparisons. The results of the 
CKPN:VUPN comparisons will not, therefore, generally be discussed directly. The 
remainder o f this section will consider separately the impact oi period duration on the 
volume of trade early in a period, the informational efficiency and the overall 
allocational efficiency of the experimental markets CKPN, VKPN and VUPN.
34 T he sta tistica l tests pa ired  o bserva tions period  by period , ac ro ss tw o  m arke t types at a tim e. 
F or exam p le , co m p arin g  the m arke t p e rfo rm ance  across V K PN  and V U P N , the observa tion  from  
V K PN 1 period  1 is pa ired  w ith  the o b serva tion  from  V U PN 1 period  1 and  so  on until period  15. T hen, 
the observa tion  from  V K PN 2 period  1 is pa ired  w ith  the observa tion  from  V U P N 2 period  1 and so on 
until p e riod  15. T hus the total n u m b er o f  pa ired  observa tions u tilised  in each  sta tistica l tes t is 30.
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Variable Market Means (Adjusted Means) H SR Two-tail a-values
CKPN VKPN VUPN CKPN:
VKPN
CKPN:
VUPN
VKPN:
VUPN
VOL45 1.8000 1.6667 2.1333 0.0034 0.3876 0.0104
VOL6O
(1.8858)
2.5667
(1.6876)
2.2667
(2.1577)
3.0667 0.1499 0.0013 0.0022
VOL90
(2.6225)
4.0000
(2.3456)
3.7000
(3.1468)
4.6667 0.1414 0.0004 0.0001
NORMVOL
(4.0112)
0.0528
(0.0514)
(3.7007)
0.0431
(0.0445)
(4.7334)
0.0539
(0.0551)
0.1254 0.2329 0.0000
RMSD45 150.1291 486.0485 257.4541 0.0368 0.2289 0.1254
RMSD60
(146.8936)
149.4388
(174.2116)
1321.64444
(281.3040)
244.8518 0.0196 0.4779 0.0627
RMSD90
(145.6553)
132.3513
(148.7835)
173.8193
(265.8319)
160.8230 0.1779 0.9099 0.7189
RMSD
(130.9472)
130.7098
(129.0361)
(151.2606)
117.7417
(-237.9844)
(123.4888)
136.2241
(89.1797)
0.0087 0.5170 0.0157
NORM°/o GAIN 0.1806
(0.2228)
0.1638
(0.1847)
0.1574
(0.1783)
0.0545 0.0495 0.7577
Table 5.6 Summary Table of Market Means (Adjusted Means) and Wilcoxon Signed
Ranks Test Two-tail Significance Levels 
Volume of Trade
Comparison of the volume of trade between the CKPN and VKPN markets 
produces a significantly higher mean VOL45 value for the CKPN markets. 1 his 
would suggest that for the VKPN markets the long durations in some periods may 
have made traders more cautious. This is despite the average period duration being 
equal across the two market types. After the first 45 seconds of trade, however, 
varying period durations no longer impact on the volume of trade, with the other three 
volume measures resulting in insignificant differences in mean values across the 
CKPN and VKPN markets. Given that on average the duration per period is equal 
across the two market types, thus VKPN periods are sometimes longer and sometimes 
shorter than the 240 second CKPN periods, these results are to be expected. Of 
greater interest is the comparison of the measures of volume of trade across the 
VKPN:VUPN comparison. Such a comparison isolates the impact of knowledge of 
period duration on the volume of trade observed in experimental asset markets. 
VUPN exhibits a significantly higher volume of trade in all three measures of early in
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a trading period (a=0.0104, 0.0022 and 0.0001 for VOL45, 60 and 90, respectively), 
providing support for the rejection of lHo- The volume of trade early in a period is 
indeed higher in VUPN than in VKPN markets, given the three measures of early 
utilised in the analysis. It can be concluded, therefore, that the uncertainty introduced 
by the removal of the knowledge of period duration causes individuals to adopt a 
more aggressive trading strategy, with respect to the speed of trade. This result is 
further strengthened by the highly significant difference between the NORMVOL 
measures for the two market types (a=0.0000). The NORMVOL figures effectively 
measure the rate of trade across an entire period. Thus the rate of trade per period is, 
on average, far higher in VUPN markets than in VKPN markets. This is the market s 
response to the increased uncertainty faced in the VUPN environment.
Informational Efficiency
The issue now requiring consideration is the determination ot how the 
increased rate o f trade early in a period, as a result of uncertainty concerning period 
duration, impacts on the informational efficiency of VUPN markets relative to VKPN 
markets. It is possible that the rush to trade results in disequilibrium trades, the 
impact o f which is to reduce the informational efficiency of the market by clouding 
the public price signal. Alternatively the rush o f trade may facilitate the convergence 
of transaction prices to theoretically predicted equilibrium prices. Such a result may 
be due to a reduction in the length of time over which bartering over bid and ask 
prices takes place, which in turn may be a result of the uncertainty introduced by the
lack of period duration knowledge.
The investigation begins with an evaluation of hypothesis 2.1 Ho to determine
the extent o f any difference in transaction prices across the markets VKPN and 
VUPN. As reported in Table 5.6, for the three measures of early in a trading period, 
the mean RMSD does not differ statistically across the two market types. For the 
measures RMSD(45,60,90) the two-tail significance levels are all a>0.05 and the null 
hypothesis of no statistical difference (2.1 Ho) can not be rejected. Ihus, the higher 
early volume of trade in the VUPN markets does not impact on the level of 
informational efficiency attained early in a period, relative to the informational 
efficiency o f the VKPN markets over the same time periods. As a result, it would 
make no sense to formally evaluate hypothesis 2.2H0, because no difference exists in
the RMSD of early prices from the FRE model.
147
The VKPN and VUPN markets were further compared to see if  any difference 
existed between the RMSD of prices over an entire trading period. As reported in 
Table 5.6, the unadjusted mean RMSD of 136.2241 emus for the VUPN markets is 
greater than the value of 117.7417 emus for the VKPN markets (a=0.0157 calculated 
using a two-tail WSR test on the adjusted data). This result indicates that, over an 
entire trading period, the level of informational efficiency attained is reduced (relative 
to VKPN markets) as a result of the uncertainty over period duration. Thus, whilst 
the early volume of trade in a period does not impact on the early RMSD of prices, it 
is possible that the faster rate of trade over an entire period may impact on the overall 
RMSD measure. To this end the degree of correlation between the difference in 
normalised volume o f trade across the two market types and the difference in RMSD 
across the markets was computed. A significantly positive correlation would connect 
the higher rate o f trade observed in VUPN markets with the reduced convergence of 
asset prices to FRE values, relative to VKPN markets. Unfortunately, the correlation 
coefficient of 0.1684 computed using Spearman’s rank correlation test was not 
statistically significant (a=0.374). It is difficult to conclude decisively, therefore, that 
the higher rate o f trade is the cause of the loss of informational efficiency observed 
over the entire period in VUPN markets, relative to VKPN markets. However, the 
ability to reject 2.1H0 for RMSD over the entire period still offers evidence in favour 
of Friedman’s (1984) view that a predetermined, known trading period duration is one 
of a number o f features that enhances the informational efficiency of experimental 
markets.
The comparison o f the VKPN and VUPN markets provided the strictest test of 
the impact o f uncertainty concerning period duration on market behaviour. A further 
comparison between the CKPN and VKPN markets offers insight into the influence of 
varying the period duration on the RMSD observed early in a trading period. The 
mean RMSD45 and RMSD60 measures for the VKPN markets are statistically greater 
than the corresponding measures for the CKPN markets (a=0.0368 and a=0.0196, 
respectively). By the time 90 seconds of trade has elapsed there is no longer any 
statistically significant difference in the mean RMSD90 figures for the two market 
types. In fact, by the end of the period the trend has reversed with the mean RMSD of 
the CKPN markets statistically exceeding the mean RMSD for the VKPN markets 
(a=0.0087). These results can be interpreted as providing initial detrimental evidence
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against the relative level o f informational efficiency early in VKPN markets. Over 
time, however, as the period proceeds the VKPN markets are able to correct 
themselves and end with a higher level of informational efficiency, relative to the 
CKPN markets. This phenomenon is not due to any difference in early trading 
volume or overall rate of trade across the two market types. With respect to the 
adopted measures of volume, the only significant difference between the two market 
types occurs for VOL45, however, the correlation coefficient between the difference 
in VOL45 and the difference in RMSD45 across the markets is insignificant 
(a=0.566). It seems, therefore, that whilst varying the period duration does not have 
any major impact on the timing of transactions, it does impact, in opposite directions, 
on the relative informational efficiency attained both early in a period and over the 
entire trading period.
Allocational Efficiency
Having established that both varying period duration and knowledge of the 
period duration influence the level of informational efficiency observed in 
experimental asset markets, but that it is not possible to tie this to resulting differences 
in the timing o f transactions, it remains to determine the impact of the two treatments 
on the level o f allocational efficiency observed. The analysis fails to reject the null 
hypothesis (3.1H0, a=0.7577) o f no statistical between the mean NORM%GAIN of 
0.1638 for the VKPN and 0.1574 VUPN markets. Thus, whilst the increased 
uncertainty experienced due to the lack of knowledge concerning period duration 
results in a lower mean NORM%GAIN figure, this reduction is not statistically 
significant and so it is not possible to claim any impact on the relative level of 
allocational efficiency. It is, therefore, not necessary to formally evaluate hypothesis 
3.2H0 for the VKPN:VUPN comparison. In contrast to this result, however, both the 
CKPN:VKPN and CKPN:VUPN comparisons provide statistically significant 
differences between the mean NORM%GAIN figures for the compared markets 
(a=0.0545 and a=0.0495, respectively). It can be concluded, therefore, that the mean 
NORM%GAIN figure of 0.1806 for the CKPN markets significantly exceeds the 
corresponding figures for the VKPN and VUPN markets. Once more it not necessary 
to formally evaluate hypothesis 3.2Ho for either of these two comparisons, because in 
this case there is no statistically significant difference between the mean NORMVOL 
figure for the CKPN markets and the corresponding figures for the other two market
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types.
From the above analysis it can be concluded that varying the duration each 
period, with or without uncertainty concerning the actual period duration, has a 
negative impact on the level o f allocational efficiency observed in the experimental 
asset market investigated, relative to the control provided by the CKPN markets. In 
isolation, however, uncertainty over the actual period duration to be faced does not 
influence the level of allocational efficiency observed.
5.7 Discussion and Conclusions
This concluding section will summarise the results provided in this chapter, 
relating them to other experimental results, including the exploratory study by 
Duxbury (1997). To begin with a comparative analysis was conducted to determine 
the superiority o f either the FRE model or PI model with respect to their predictive 
accuracy. The two models were evaluated against a number of different performance 
measures. First, the RMSD of prices Irom the disparate theoretically predicted 
equilibrium prices of the two models were compared. Over all six markets the RMSD 
of transaction prices from the FRE price, over the entire trading period, was below 
that for the PI model in 82.61% of periods. Next, the two models were compared 
using a measure o f the misallocation of assets relative to their end-period allocation 
predictions. The number of misallocations under the FRE model were less than those 
for the PI model in 70% of periods, with the remaining 30% of periods falling within 
an indiscriminate region. In no period was the number of assets misallocated under 
the FRE model in excess of the number misallocated under the PI model. Thirdly, a 
measure of the percentage gains from trade exploited was used to discriminate 
between the competing models. Relative to the initial allocation ot assets, the 
predicted end-period allocations of the FRE and PI models predict positive and 
negative gains from trade, respectively, when the state of nature is Z. O f the 21 
occurrences of the state Z there was only 1 period where the realised gains from trade 
were negative. These three performance measures all provided strong support lor the 
predictive accuracy of the FRE model over the PI model. The only weakly negative 
performance measure for the FRE model was the comparison of the average profit 
earned by informed traders relative to uninformed traders. I his was only construed as 
evidence against the strict interpretation of the FRE model in which the price signal 
reveals private information instantaneously. The superiority o f the FRE model in
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simple experimental asset markets with perfect information structures is in line with 
the results of many o f the early experimental asset markets, such as Plott and Sunder
(1982) and Banks (1985).
The second stage of the investigation was a relative analysis ol the impact of 
period duration on observed market behaviour. The effect was separated between the 
impact of varying period durations (CKPN:VKPN) and the impact o f uncertainty 
concerning the period durations (VKPN:VUPN). Varying the period durations had 
little significant effect on the volume or rate of trade observed and had a mixed effect 
on the deviation of transaction prices from the FRE price. For the two measures of 
price deviation early in a period, RMSD45 and RMSD60, varying the period duration 
resulted in a higher deviation. By the end of a trading period this trend had been 
reversed and varying period durations were associated with lower price deviations and 
so the VK markets were deemed informationally more efficient. Contrary to this was 
the finding of a significant reduction in allocational efficiency as a result ot varying
period duration.
Uncertainty concerning the period durations had a major impact on market 
behaviour, significantly increasing the early volume of trade and the rate of trade 
observed in a period. The higher early volume of trade did not feed through to impact 
on the early RMSD(45,60,90) of prices from FRE values. The RMSD of prices over 
an entire period, however, did increase significantly as a result of the uncertainty 
regarding period duration and this was construed as reducing the overall level of 
informational efficiency attained. This reduction in informational efficiency, 
however, could not be directly linked to the higher rate of trade that resulted due to 
the increased uncertainty over period durations. The result provides support for 
Friedman’s (1984) suggestion that a predetermined, known period duration was a 
feature of experimental asset markets that enhanced the observed level o f market 
efficiency. Despite this loss of informational efficiency the markets with uncertain 
period durations (VUPN) did not suffer any significant reduction in allocational 
efficiency relative to the VKPN markets. These final two results, lower informational 
efficiency but no loss of allocational efficiency, support the exploratory results 
reported in Duxbury (1997). However, Duxbury (1997) also reports a loss of 
informational efficiency early in a trading period and is able to relate this directly to 
the higher early volume of trade observed. The results reported here do not support 
this conclusion.
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It is of worth noting, however, that had each cell of the design not been 
repeated and thus only the markets CKPN1, VKPN1 andVUPNl been conducted, the 
evidence from the relative analysis of market performance (VKPN1 :VUPN1) would 
have been directly in support of the results reported in Duxbury (1997). The early 
measures of RMSD for VUPN1 were significantly higher than the corresponding 
measures for VKPN1, with the exception of RMSD90, which was higher but 
insignificant. The end o f period RMSD figure was also significantly higher as were 
all the volume measures (VOL45,60,90 and NORMVOL). It is difficult to place 
much emphasis on these results with out falling foul of Roth's (1994) criticism ol the 
selective reporting o f experiments, discussed in Chapter Four. For this reason nothing 
more is made here o f these results from the PN1 markets, however, the discussion will 
return to this issue in the final results chapter in which a holistic approach to the 
analysis is taken.
In summary, the incorporation of uncertain period durations in DA markets 
resulted in an increase in the volume of trade both early in a period and across an 
entire period. The uncertain period duration also resulted in a reduction in the level of 
informational efficiency generated by the DA markets. 1 hese results have 
implications for the trade across on-line networks, which has developed as a result of 
the growth in virtual communities. If a vendor wishes to sell a higher volume ol a 
certain commodity the results reported here suggest that they should conduct auctions 
incorporating uncertain period durations instead of fixed, known durations. 
Unfortunately, however, uncertain period durations are associated with a reduction in 
informational efficiency. Assets trade at prices that do not represent their true 
economic worth. In the context o f on-line auctions, whether this represents a benefit 
to the vendor or the purchaser depends on whether the commodity trades at a price
above or below the true economic value.
Finally, the lack o f statistically significant results regarding the impact of 
uncertainty o f period duration on the early measures of RMSD may have been the 
result of noise generated in the data (particularly in market VUPN2 in light ol the 
above discussion). The evidence can not be regarded as conclusive one way or 
another. The experimental methodology lesson to be learned from the experience in 
this chapter is that repeated cell designs are essential if the results of an investigation 
are to be regarded as conclusive. If only the PN1 markets of this experimental design 
had been conducted the whole flavour o f the results would have been fundamentally
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altered. Fortunately, the strength of the experimental method lies in the ability to 
replicate previous experiments. With this in mind the next chapter reports the results 
o f six more experimental asset markets that essentially replicate the six studied in this 
chapter. The only difference stems from the introduction o f an imperfect information 
structure to the experimental design of all six markets. This change in the information 
structure is constant and controlled across all six markets, therefore, the treatment 
variable period duration (varying durations and uncertainty of durations) can once 
more be investigated without any confounding factors present.
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Chapter Six
6 I m p a c t  o f  P e r io d  D u r a t io n  on  E x p e r im e n t a l  A s s e t  M a r k et s  
w it h  Im p e r f e c t  In f o r m a t io n  S t r u c t u r e s
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6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter investigated the impact of period duration, as a treatment 
variable, on the market behaviour observed in experimental financial asset markets. 
The markets conducted adopted an intentionally simplistic information structure, 
providing perfect private information to six out of the twelve traders. This chapter 
also investigates the impact o f period duration on observed market behaviour, 
however, the markets conducted are more complex and provide only imperfect private
information to six out of the twelve traders.
The investigation of market performance in the presence of imperfect 
information is of substantive practical interest, because it more closely mirrors the 
situation in which individuals find themselves when conducting trade in real world 
markets. It is highly unlikely that a trader on any of the world’s financial markets 
would know with certainty the true fundamental value at which a particular 
company’s shares should be priced. The introduction of imperfect information to the 
experimental design increases the degree of uncertainty faced by traders and so offers 
a more demanding test of market performance. In comparison to the markets in the 
previous chapter, the markets investigated here are required not only to disseminate 
private information, but also to collect and aggregate the information first. I his is a
much more complex task to perform.
Once more two markets are conducted for each of the three levels of the 
treatment variable, CK, VK and VU markets. The only difference between this 
second group of markets and the first group studied in Chapter Five is with respect to 
the information structure. Thus, this second group o f markets adds another layer to 
the overall experimental design (see Table 4.4, Chapter Four). As the intention in this 
chapter is to once more investigate the impact of period duration on market behaviour, 
the hypotheses developed and tested in Chapter Five are equally relevant and 
applicable for the analysis of market behaviour observed in this second group of 
experimental sessions. A comparison of market efficiency across the two ditfeient 
information structures, perfect versus imperfect, is left until the holistic analysis
conducted in Chapter Eight.
The following section reviews the relevant experimental literature in which
asset markets with imperfect information structures have been studied. Section 6.3 
details the specifics o f the design, not included in the earlier general experimental
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design chapter, for this second group of markets, highlighting both how the markets 
differ to those in the previous chapter and how the similarities provide the necessary 
control for subsequent comparisons. Section 6.4 reports the results from the analysis 
of the experimental markets. As with Chapter Five, a comparative (within market) 
evaluation o f the FRE and PI models is performed first, to determine whether the FRE 
model is still able to provide superior predictions in a more complex trading 
environment, where traders face greater uncertainty. This comparative analysis is 
followed by a relative (across market) evaluation of the treatment variable, period 
duration, focusing on its impact in markets where information aggregation is required 
in addition to dissemination. The final section contains a summary and discussion ol 
the results.
6.2 Review of Relevant Literature
The FRE model predicts that in equilibrium prices fully reveal all private 
information. When private information concerning the state of nature (and 
consequently dividend value) is asymmetrically distributed between fully informed 
and uninformed traders the FRE model predicts that the private information will be 
disseminated throughout the market, permitting the uninformed to inler the state ol 
nature. The issue of information dissemination was the focus of the previous chapter, 
along with many o f the early experimental asset market studies (for example, Plott 
and Sunder, 1982). In addition to the dissemination o f private information the FRE 
model also predicts that markets are able to first aggregate diverse private information 
and then disseminate it throughout the market. Price acts as the signal for information 
aggregation and dissemination, without requiring any direct communication between 
traders.
This dual role of markets as aggregators and disseminators o f diverse, 
asymmetrically distributed private information via publicly available price signals was 
the focus of Plott and Sunder (1988). Eleven markets were conducted in which 
traders were given diverse, imperfect information concerning the state of nature. The 
information structure was such that no trader knew the state of nature with certainty, 
but if the market pooled the diverse information then this would reveal the state of 
nature. The information structure, therefore, incorporated aggregate certainty, fo r 
example, if  the state of nature was X, then half the traders would receive the message 
‘Not Y’ and the other half would receive the message ‘Not Z \  Plott and Sunder
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(1988) conducted three groups of markets. Series A markets traded a single asset 
between traders with diverse dividend distributions. Series B markets included a 
complete set o f state contingent claims, while series C markets traded a single asset 
between traders with uniform dividend distributions. Plott and Sunder (1988) were 
able to conclude that information aggregation, and so convergence to FRE 
equilibrium, was poor unless a complete set of state contingent claims markets and 
homogenous trader types were present in the design. Thus, their series A markets did 
not converge to FRE predictions.
Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) also conducted experimental markets that 
included imperfect information but with aggregate certainty. Flowever, their 
experimental design differed to Plott and Sunder’s (1988) in, amongst others, two key 
respects. First, all markets parameters were common knowledge, therefore, 
participants had complete information about all traders’ payoffs. Second, traders 
participated in markets in two consecutive sessions over which the market parameters 
were not altered, but the trader type (of which there were only two) was rotated. The 
importance o f these design changes were confirmed by Forsythe and Lundholm s 
(1990) results, which supported the conclusion that common knowledge of dividend 
payoffs and similar prior experience were sufficient to achieve a FRE equilibrium, but 
that rotating trader types was not necessary.
That convergence to a FRE equilibrium requires common knowledge of all 
traders’ dividend payoffs indicates that reduced uncertainty concerning other 
participants’ incentives to trade facilitates market efficiency. Lundholm (1991) 
pursued this point further, building on the previous experimental design by including 
an information structure in which insiders receive imperfect information but in 
aggregate this information does not reveal the state of nature, that is aggregate 
uncertainty. In the presence of aggregate uncertainty the equilibrium price will be 
contingent on traders’ risk preferences. Such preferences are unobservable and thus 
the ability of participants to identify other traders incentives to trade is removed. 
Lundholm (1991) compared the performance of aggregate uncertainty (AU) markets 
with the performance achieved in aggregate certainty (AC) markets. To achieve this 
the experimental design required four states of nature with either two or three clues 
depending on whether the market was AU or AC, respectively. The design was, 
therefore, more complex than those in the other two studies discussed above, in which 
three states and two clues were present. In an attempt to compensate tor this
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Lundholm (1991) incorporated a number of other design features aimed at facilitating 
the convergence to a FRE equilibrium, including common knowledge of all 
parameters and additional experience. Despite the inclusion of these aids to 
convergence Lundholm (1991) reports AC markets that exhibited lower convergence 
to the FRE equilibrium than equivalent markets reported in Plott and Sunder (1988), 
thus the increased complexity hindered convergence. The AU markets exhibited 
considerably worse convergence and thus less efficiency than the AC markets.
Relative to the markets investigated in the literature above, the experimental 
markets (VU) conducted in this research already include uncertainty concerning 
trading period duration. Rather than introduce a high degree of uncertainty 
concerning the state of nature, as would be the case with an imperfect information 
structure with aggregate uncertainty, the information structure introduced in these six 
markets will be o f the aggregate certainty type. It was felt that the VU markets were 
already required to conduct a complex trading task and that the level o f state 
uncertainty connected with aggregate uncertainty markets would be asking too much 
o f these markets. Furthermore, the next logical step in the experimental design, in 
terms of slowly increasing the complexity and uncertainty of the trading environment, 
is to move from markets with perfect information to markets with imperfect 
information but aggregate certainty. Details of the specifics o f the experimental 
design governing this second group of markets are given in the following section.
6.3 Experimental Design Considerations
6.3.1 Markets and Period Durations
As with the first group o f experimental markets reported in Chapter Five, two 
markets were conducted for each of the three levels o f the treatment variable, period 
duration. The CK markets are identified CKIN1 and CKIN2, the VK markets are 
identified VKIN1 and VKIN2 and the VU markets are identified VUIN1 and VUIN2. 
As expected the trading period durations in the CK markets were held constant, at 240 
seconds, across all 15 trading periods. In the VK and VU markets the durations 
varied between 120 and 360 seconds, from period to period. As previously, the actual 
sequence of trading period durations was randomly determined in advance by 
computer and two different parameter designs were adopted. Once again, for all three 
market types, the identifiers 1 and 2 refer to the parameter sets used in the particular
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market (see Chapter Four Table 4.3)35. The six markets comprising this second group 
were conducted during the period 13th November 1996 to the 12th February 1997, 
inclusive.
6.3.2 State Contingent Dividends
The state contingent dividend distributions across trader types were the same 
across all six markets. Parameter set A was used for all markets (see Chapter Four 
Table 4.1, Panel A). The sequence of states of nature did differ between the markets. 
CKIN1, VKIN1 and VUIN1 used the sequence in parameter set one, whilst CKIN2, 
VKIN2 and VUIN2 used the sequence in parameter set two (see Chapter Four Table 
4.3). As previously, the participants’ diverse backgrounds plus the minimal contact 
and interaction between them across different market sessions conducted some 
months apart, serves to ensure no participant could have been aware of the sequence 
of states o f nature in advance.
6.3.3 Information Structure
The information structure prevalent throughout these six markets is imperfect 
(I) in that insiders are given information that no longer identifies with certainty the 
state o f nature for a given trading period. Instead, insiders receive information that 
allows them to eliminate one of the possible states of nature, thus reducing the degree 
o f state uncertainty that they face. The procedures are similar to Plott and Sunder 
(1988) with one slight modification. In Plott and Sunder’s (1988) markets all 12 
traders received imperfect information concerning the state o f nature. There were, 
therefore, no uninformed traders (with ‘Blank’ clue cards) in their markets. In order 
to maintain strict experimental control and thus permit comparative evaluations across 
markets, across chapters, the experimental design utilised here maintains the 
convention from Chapter Five o f including six uninlormed traders ( Blank clue card)
36in the design o f the experimental markets .
35 A g ain , the use o f  on ly  tw o  param eter designs w as no t know n by any  partic ipan t. 
P artic ip an ts  k n ew  on ly  th a t the sequence w as d e te rm ined  random ly  in ad vance  by co m pu ter, thus, for 
all th ey  k n ew  the  sequence  d iffered  from  m arket to  m arket. T he sam e is true  o f  the sequence  o f  states 
o f  nature .
36 M ain ta in in g  both  th e  n u m b er o f  insiders and  un in fo rm ed  equal to  six  in all periods is not 
s tric tly  n ecessa ry  fo r th e  pu rpose  o f  th is chap te r, n am ely  an investiga tion  o f  th e  im pact o f  period 
d u ra tion  on m ark e t b eh av io u r in the p resence  o f  im perfec t in fo rm ation . A dequate  ex p erim en ta l contro l 
w o u ld  have  been  ach iev ed  sim ply  by h o ld in g  the n u m b er o f  insiders co n stan t, at any  level, across the
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The six randomly chosen insiders receive clue cards prior to the 
commencement of trade, which inform them o f one o f the three states ot nature that 
will not occur in the coming trading period. For example, if  the state o f nature for the 
coming period was X then three insiders would receive the clue ‘Not Y’ and the other 
three insiders would receive the clue ‘Not Z’. The information structure, therefore, 
provides for aggregate certainty. If the market is able to aggregate and disseminate 
the two different clues, via the price signal, the underlying state of nature will be 
revealed with certainty.
As with the markets studied in Chapter Five, two participants were chosen 
from each trader type group, with their identity determined randomly within trader 
types (once more determined prior to the experimental session by computer). 
Randomly determining the identity o f insiders within trader types diminishes the 
potential for the uninformed to guess the identity o f the informed. This will ensure 
that the only public information utilised by uninformed traders to determine their 
trading behaviour are the bids, asks and transaction prices observed in the market. 
The two traders, within a trader type group, chosen to be insiders were never given the 
same clue. For example, assuming the sate of nature is X, it traders 1 and 2 are 
randomly chosen to be insiders from trader type 1 and trader 1 receives the clue Not 
Y’ then trader 2 will receive the clue ‘Not Z’. This feature ensures that the trader type 
group with the highest dividend payment given the state of nature receives both of the 
clues, permitting them to identify the state of nature in aggregate. This feature ol the 
design provides for asset prices to be bid up to the FRE price.
As with the experimental asset markets of Chapter Five, the number and 
random determination o f insiders each period was common knowledge in all markets. 
Participants knew the nature o f information insiders would receive, thus that it would 
allow them to eliminate one of the three possible states of nature. Also common 
knowledge was the fact that all traders would receive clue cards, even it they were 
‘Blank’, so as to conceal the identity of insiders in all periods. The exact identity of 
insiders each period was not common knowledge.
six m ark e ts  stud ied  in th is chap te r. H ow ever, h o ld ing  th e  n u m b er co n stan t at six is essen tia l to  p rovide 
the con tro l n ecessary  fo r a  co m para tive  ana ly s is o f  th e  pe rfec t versu s im perfec t in fo rm ation  structures 
th a t is p e rfo rm ed  in the  ho listic  analysis  o f  C h ap te r E igh t. So  as to  p rov ide  fo r stric t experim ental 
co n tro l, all e ig h teen  ex p e rim en ta l m arkets co n d u c ted  in th is research  p ro g ram m e ad o p t th is convention .
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The six experimental markets studied in this chapter differ in design to the six 
markets of Chapter Five only with respect to the imperfect nature of the information 
structure. All other details o f the experimental design are general to the thesis as a 
whole and were discussed in Chapter Four. The subsequent section reports the results 
o f the investigation o f market performance for the six experimental markets in this 
second group. The section reports the results of a comparative evaluation of the 
performance o f the FRE and PI models and concludes with a relative evaluation of the 
impact o f period duration on market performance.
6.4 Results and Analyses
6.4.1 Data Considerations
There are no concerns over the data generated in the six markets conducted in 
this chapter that are specific to these markets and require comment. It should be 
noted, however, that the three data issues raised in Chapter Five (section 5.6.1) are all 
equally applicable here. The concerns expressed in Chapter Five regarding the 
existence o f outliers, data dependence and the use o f statistical tests are all equally 
valid for the markets conducted in this chapter. The same is true of the methods for 
dealing with these concerns and the justifications provided for the adoption of such 
methods.
6.4.2 FRE v PI: Comparative Performance Evaluation
The discussion within this subsection is centred around a comparative 
evaluation of the predictive accuracy of the FRE and PI models. The comparison is 
performed on the raw data generated by the experimental markets, including 
transaction prices, allocations and profits. For this period-by-period, within market 
comparative analysis the transformations to the data required to deal with outliers and 
dependence are not necessary.
As seen previously, the two competing models of FRE and PI predict that 
traders use different information sets in the determination of their expectations of 
transaction prices. The two models, therefore, make disparate predictions concerning 
equilibrium prices. Given the state contingent dividends governing these six 
market37, the FRE models predicts equilibrium prices o f 350, 300 and 700 for states of 
nature X, Y and Z, respectively. These are the same equilibrium prices as were
37 See T ab le  4 .1 , C h ap te r Four, param eter set A.
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predicted by the FRE model for the first group of experimental markets for which the 
information structure was perfect. This is because the state contingent dividend 
distributions used in the experimental design are the same for the first two groups of 
markets. The fact that the information structure is now imperfect does not influence 
the FRE equilibrium prices, because in aggregate the market is fully informed and in 
equilibrium the price signal fully reveals the underlying state of nature. The same is 
not true o f the price predictions of the PI model, as these will change as a result of 
moving from a perfect to imperfect information structure. Under the assumptions ol 
the PI model traders condition their price expectations on private information only, 
thus the PI equilibrium price is contingent upon the accuracy of the private 
information received. The PI model predicts equilibrium prices o f 500, 450 and 500 
for states of nature X, Y and Z, respectively .
38 See A p p en d ix  3 fo r an ex p lan a tio n  o f  th e  FR E  and  PI equ ilib rium  p rice ca lcu la tions.
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The FRE and PI equilibrium price predictions are included in Figures 6.1-6.6 
as horizontal lines, towards which the convergence of transaction prices can be 
compared. In both CKIN markets the transaction prices are reasonably stable even in 
early trading periods. There are a few periods, more noticeably in CKIN2, where a 
few transactions occur at very low prices that deviate from most of the other 
transaction prices within the same period. Across the 15 trading periods of both 
markets assets trade, on the whole, at prices within a narrow band between 250 and 
300 emus. As with the first group of markets, prices do not appear to be very 
responsive to the state of nature Z. For states X and Y the assets trade at prices much 
closer to the FRE price than the PI price. This is not so for those periods where the 
state was Z. In this second group of markets, in contrast to the first group, the two 
models predict disparate equilibrium prices under state Z and so these periods can be 
used to distinguish between them. The markets do not appear to react to the 
occurrence of the state of nature Z. The sequences o f transaction prices in the VKIN- 
market are very similar to those observed in the CKIN markets. However, in marked 
contrast, the transaction prices observed in VKIN1 are far more volatile. In many of 
the early periods the opening transactions occur at prices close to the PI price, 
however, over the period the transaction price converges towards the FRE price. In 
the later periods the transaction prices are clustered far closer to the FRE price irom 
the beginning of the period onwards. The only differences between these two markets 
are with respect to the sequence of period durations and the sequence of states of 
nature. It is offered, by way of conjecture only, that the occurrence of state Z in the 
first period of VKIN1, but not until period 4 in VKIN2, plays an important role in the 
observed sequences of transaction prices. Early trades at high transaction prices (lor 
example, 600 emus) in VKIN1 alerted traders to the fact that prices could in fact rise 
that high. The early trades at prices around 300 emus, close to the FRE price ol j>50, 
in VKIN2 did not provide traders with early experience of high (relative) prices. The 
volatility of prices in the VUIN markets exceed that of VKIN2 but do not exceed the 
observed volatility in VKIN1. The level of volatility declines as traders become more 
familiar with the experimental markets. The assets generally trade at prices close to 
the FRE price with the usual exception when the state is Z.
To directly evaluate the FRE and PI models’ predictions the RMSD ot prices 
each period were computed for both and compared within a market on a period by 
period basis. In this comparative analysis the normal arithmetic mean is used to
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compute the RMSD, the use of Andrew’s M-estimator is not necessary. Comparisons 
were made for the first 45, 60 and 90 seconds of trade in a period and over the entire 
trading period duration (RMSD45,60,90 and RMSD, respectively). Table 6.1 
contains the outcomes of these comparisons, aggregated over the two parameter 
designs. The percentages are calculated based on the total number of periods of 30. 
The predictive accuracy of the price predictions of the FRE model is far higher than 
that of the PI model. Aggregated across all three market types (Overall) the RMSD ot 
the FRE model is less than that o f the PI model in approximately three quarters of all 
the periods. For the CKIN and VUIN markets the only time that the PI model out 
predicts the FRE model is when the state of nature is Z. The same is true ol the 
VKIN2 market, however, for VKIN1 the PI model makes superior predictions in 6 of 
the 15 periods.
Market Performance
Percentage Comparison (%) 
RMSD45 RMSD 60 RMSD90 RMSD
CKIN FRE < PI 
FRE > PI 
FRE = PI
76.67
23.33
0.00
76.67
23.33
0.00
76.67
23.33
0.00
76.67
23.33
0.00
VKIN FRE < PI 66.67 70.00 76.67 76.67
FRE > PI 30.00 30.00 23.33 23.33
FRE = PI 3.33 0.00 0.00 0.00
VUIN FRE < PI 76.67 76.67 76.67 76.67
FRE > PI 23.33 23.33 23.33 23.33
FRE = PI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Overall FRE < PI 73.34 74.45 76.67 76.67
FRE > PI 25.55 25.55 23.33 23.33
FRE = PI 1.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 6.1 Comparison o f RMSD of Price Predictions for FRE and PI
The disparate predictions of the FRE and PI model regarding end-period 
allocations will now be used to compare their predictive abilities, fo r this second 
group of markets the FRE model predicts that both the informed and uninformed 
traders in trader type 1, 2 and 3 will hold the assets when the state of nature is X, Y 
and Z, respectively. As with the FRE equilibrium price predictions, the model s end- 
period allocations are not effected by the move from a perfect to imperfect 
information structure. In contrast, the PI model’s predictions are dependent upon the 
information structure, because they are dependent upon the private information 
messages that individual traders receive. For the imperfect information structure 
utilised in this second group o f markets the PI model predicts that informed type 3
167
traders receiving the ‘Not Y’ clue will hold the assets in states X and Z, and that 
informed type 3 traders receiving the ‘Not X’ clue will hold the assets in state Y. The 
two models can, therefore, be evaluated based on a comparison of the number ol 
assets misallocated when compared to their equilibrium predictions39. It must again 
be recognised that the PI equilibrium requires a greater number of trades than the FRE 
equilibrium. If no trade took place in a given period then the number of assets 
misallocated according to the FRE model would be 16 (as is the case in the first group 
o f markets) whereas the corresponding figure for the PI model would now be 22. 
Only one type 3 trader will receive the clue card identified above that corresponds to 
the PI prediction. Again, caution must be exercised when comparing misallocations 
so as not to succumb to any bias that his would introduce. The 5 measure introduced 
in Chapter Five is again used to avoid such bias, with one slight modification. I he 
size o f the indiscriminate region is increased to 0 < 5 < 6 ,  within which the two 
models are deemed to have tied. If d <0 in a given period then this taken as an 
observation in support of the PI model (FRE>PI). If d >6 in a given period then this 
is taken as an observation in support of the FRE model (FRE<PI). As displayed in 
Table 6.2, on average, the percentage of periods (number of observations equals 90) 
where the FRE model is superior to the PI model is 30.00%, as compared to 21.11% 
where the reverse is true. This is interpreted as providing weak support in favour ot 
the predictive accuracy of the FRE model over the PI model. The evidence in tavour 
o f the FRE model may be further strengthened by the fact that in 8 of the periods the 
8 measure reaches positive double figures (obtaining a maximum ot 3=16 in period 
8 o f VUIN1), whereas the measure reaches negative double figures in only 1 period 
(obtaining a minimum of d =-14 in period 9 of VUIN1).
39 See A p pend ix  3 fo r an exp lan a tio n  o f  th e  FR E  and PI en d -period  asse t a llocations.
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Market Performance Percentage
Comparison
(%)
CKIN FRE < PI 36.67
FRE > PI 33.33
FRE = PI 30.00
VKIN FRE < PI 33.33
FRE > PI 10.00
FRE = PI 56.67
VUIN FRE < PI 20.00
FRE > PI 20.00
FRE = PI 60.00
Overall FRE < PI 30.00
FRE > PI 21.11
FRE = PI 48.89
To summarise the results so far, the comparison of the RMSD of prices from 
the theoretically predicted equilibrium price predictions of the two models offers 
conclusive support in favour of the superiority of the predictions of the FRE model. 
Comparison o f the number o f assets misallocated provides weak support in lavour of 
the FRE model and certainly can not be construed as evidence in favour ol the 11 
model.
Two further measures of performance readily adopted in the experimental 
asset market literature can also be used to distinguish between the two competing 
models. The first o f these is the measure of trading efficiency, %GAIN. Recall that, 
given the definition, the initial allocation of assets each period produces a %GAIN ol 
0% whereas the end period equilibrium allocation of the FRE model produces a 
%GAIN of 100%. Table 6.3 illustrates that the level of %GAIN exhibits a large 
degree of variability across the six markets, from a maximum of 100.00%, through 
0% to a minimum o f -50.00% . The average %GAIN observed in the CKIN, VK.IN 
and VUIN markets are 16.81%, 13.33% and 10.63%, respectively.
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Period CKIN1 VKIN1 VlJINl CKIN2 VKIN2 VUIN2
1 25.0000 -12.5000 18.7500 20.8333 20.8333 '  -2.0833
2 45.8333 8.3333 33.3333 -18.7500 -12.5000 6.2500
3 43.7500 37.5000 2.0833 18.7500 35.4167 27.0833
4 -12.5000 -31.2500 -25.0000 25.0000 25.0000 6.2500
5 56.2500 -12.5000 56.2500 0.0000 -25.0000 -6.2500
6 -50.0000 -6.2500 -18.7500 -18.7500 -37.5000 -25.0000
7 -43.7500 -6.2500 -6.2500 45.8333 31.2500 18.7500
8 56.2500 6.2500 68.7500 56.2500 50.0000 6.2500
9 68.7500 50.0000 29.1667 22.9167 62.5000 52.0833
10 50.0000 18.7500 43.7500 6.2500 56.2500 -16.6667
11 -31.2500 -25.0000 -37.5000 50.0000 100.0000 43.7500
12 -50.0000 -18.7500 -37.5000 37.5000 45.8333 -6.2500
13 77.0833 52.0833 52.0833 22.9167 47.9167 6.2500
14 50.0000 33.3333 47.9167 -12.5000 -43.7500 0.0000
15 -12.5000 -18.7500 -18.7500 -25.0000 -31.2500 0.0000
M ean 18.1944 5.0000 13.8889 15.4167 21.6667 7.3611
Table 6.3 Percentage o f Gains from Trade Exhausted per Period
The low mean %GAIN figures could be interpreted as being more in favour oi 
the PI model, because there is only one period where the %GAIN achieves the 100/o 
prediction of the FRE model. However, consideration must also be given to the gains 
from trade to be exploited under the PI model, relative to the zero trade gains. These 
gains depend on the end-period equilibrium allocations o f the PI model. 1 hus the PI 
gains from trade are state contingent and take the values of 1,200, -800 and 8,000 
emus under the states X, Y and Z, respectively. Before continuing it must be 
recognised that the gains from trade under the FRE and PI models are equal when the 
state of nature is Z, because both predict type 3 traders to hold the assets. For this 
reason those periods where the state of nature is Z can not be used in the following 
comparative analysis. In 55.07% of periods (38 out of 69) the realised gains from 
trade are in excess of the predicted PI gains from trade. This is construed as weak 
evidence in favour of the FRE model, because the predicted FRE gains from trade are 
in excess o f the predicted PI gains for the states X and Y. However, the fact that the 
PI model predicts a negative gain from trade under state Y can be exploited to provide 
excellent differentiation between the two models, because the FRE model predicts 
positive gains from trade under all three states of nature. For the 33 occurrences of 
the state Y across the six markets there were 29 occasions where the realised gains 
from trade were negative. Thus contrary to the earlier conclusion in favour of the
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FRE model, this simple test provides strong evidence in favour of the PI model over 
the FRE model.
Finally, the performances of the FRE and PI models are evaluated by 
comparing the profit of the informed to that of the uninformed on a period by period 
basis. The FRE model would predict no difference in the average level of profit 
across the two kinds of traders, whereas the PI model would predict higher average 
profits of informed traders over uninformed traders. These predictions stem from 
the value of private information under the two models, which is zero and positive 
for the FRE and PI models, respectively. Table 6.4 contains the average profit of 
the informed and the uninformed, in emus, for all six markets. Across the six 
markets the mean informed profit figure of 654.4074 emus is only a little higher 
than the mean uninformed profit figure of 570.4578 emus, providing evidence more 
in line with the PI model than the FRE model. The difference in average profits is 
only slight, thus this only constitutes weak evidence against the FRE model and so is 
not construed as fatally condemning.
M arket Inform ed Uninformed
CKIN1 695.1778 609.8222
CKIN2 646.2556 573.0111
VKIN1 587.3333 539.8889
VKIN2 695.0000 584.9267
VUIN1 704.4333 578.3444
VUIN2 598.2444 536.7533
Mean 654.4074 570.4578
Table 6.4 Average Profit of Informed and Uninformed 1 raders
In conclusion, the evidence from this comparative analysis appears a little 
mixed. A comparison of the RMSD of prices from the equilibrium price predictions 
of the two models offers strong support in favour of the superiority ol the predictions 
o f the FRE model. Comparison of the number of assets misallocated, however, only 
provides weak support in favour of the FRE model, but certainly can not be construed 
as evidence in favour of the PI model. In contrast, a simple test based on sign of the 
predicted gains from trade when the state o f nature was Y, provided fairly 
condemning evidence against the superiority o f the FRE model. In the presence of 
increased state uncertainty due to imperfect information the FRE model does not 
dominate the PI model on most comparative measures as it did when the information
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structure was perfect (see Chapter Five).
6.4.3 Impact o f  Period Duration on Market Behaviour
The analysis in this subsection is concerned with an evaluation of the impact 
of VK and VU period duration on the trading behaviour observed in experimental 
asset markets incorporating an imperfect information structure. As with the 
investigation in the previous chapter, the analysis will be conducted relative to the 
benchmark provided by the FRE model. The discussion begins with a preliminary 
investigation o f observed market performance by way o f graphical representation, for 
which the unadjusted raw data is sufficient. The analysis concludes with a direct 
evaluation of the stated hypotheses (see Chapter Five) and incorporates the data 
adjusted to remove dependence and the influence of extreme observations. The use of 
the acronym RMSD in the discussion to follow will always refer to the root mean 
squared deviation of transaction prices where the mean is in fact replaced by 
Andrew’s M-estimator.
The preliminary analysis begins by comparing the volume of trade per period 
across markets to observe the influence of period duration. So as to control for the 
disparate period durations across the six markets the NORMVOL measure defined in 
Chapter Five is once more used for the comparisons to avoid any bias due to the 
duration of trade in each period. Figures 6.7-6.8 graph the normalised volume of 
trade per period for the markets grouped by parameter design. Comparison ol the 
NORMVOL measure for the CKIN markets with either the VKIN or VUIN markets 
does not provide any clear interpretation. The NORMVOL measure lor CKIN 
markets is fairly erratic, sometimes higher and sometimes lower than the measure for 
the other two market types, with a mean of 0.04666. Comparison of the VKIN and 
VUIN markets is equally uninformative. The NORMVOL measure for VKIN 
exceeds that for VUIN in 15 of the 30 periods, whilst the reverse is true in 9 periods. 
The mean NORMVOL o f 0.0420 for VUIN markets is marginally smaller than the 
value o f 0.0450 for VKIN markets. This preliminary analysis o f the influence of 
period duration on the rate of trade observed does not offer any clear interpretation. 
The results from a formal statistical test for significant differences in the mean values 
o f the NORMVOL measure across CKIN, VKIN and VUIN markets will be reported 
shortly, upon the completion of the preliminary analysis. In the meantime preliminary 
consideration is given to the prices at which assets trade and the deviation ol these 
from the FRE predicted values.
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Figures 6.1-6.6 display the sequence o f transaction prices per period tor eacl 
o f the six markets. Evidence o f the convergence o f prices to the FRE price is 
marginal at best in the early periods of any of the markets. In fact, in some early 
periods, particularly for the VKIN and VUIN markets, the sequence of transaction 
prices exhibit a tendency to diverge from the FRE price. Period 4 of market VUIN2 
provides an example of such a tendency. The volatility of prices in the markets are 
markedly different even across markets from the same period duration type. This is 
particularly evident for the VKIN markets, with VKIN1 exhibiting a far higher 
volatility throughout the 15 periods, which shows little sign of abating. In contrast, 
VKIN2 prices show much less volatility even in early periods, with only the 
occasional price deviating significantly from other prices in the same period. A 
similar, though not as marked, difference in observed volatility is apparent for the 
CKIN markets. The VUIN markets, however, both generate similar levels of 
volatility that are only exceeded by VKIN1 and that are present in most of the early 
trading periods. There is a slightly improved tendency towards the FRE price in the 
later periods of some markets, particularly CKIN2 and VKIN1. No market, however, 
could be said to exhibit a high degree of convergence to the FRE price. In all 
markets, with the exception of VKIN 1, the assets trade within a fairly narrow range ol 
prices and show little sign of responding to the state of nature. CKIN1 provides the 
best example o f this failure to recognise changes in the state. Despite this there art 
many periods where the sequence of transaction prices tend to cluster around the FRE 
price and on most occasions where this is not the case the transactions cluster aroui 
prices that are closer to the FRE equilibrium than the PI equilibrium (state of nature Z
is the exception).
In an attempt to better see the convergence of transactions to FRE prices the 
Figures 6.9-6.10 illustrate the RMSD of prices per period, computed using the 
Andrew M-estimator, for the three markets grouped by parameter sets. Unfortunately 
these functions are fairly erratic with the market type with the highest/lowest RMSD 
changing on a regular basis from period to period. It is very difficult, therefore, to 
draw any conclusions concerning the impact o f period duration on the informational 
efficiency o f the experimental markets simply from a graphical representation of the 
data. The only striking observation to be drawn concerns the failure of all market 
types to react to state o f nature Z, the occurrence o f which corresponds to all the peaks 
in RMSD displayed in the two figures. A more comprehensive investigation by way
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of statistical testing is required to determine if any effect of period duration is p re s e n t.  
The results of such an evaluation are reported after the preliminary investigation is 
concluded. Preliminary investigations of the trading efficiency and the profits e a rn e d  
by informed and uninformed traders are now considered.
The %GAIN measure was used to compare the trading efficiency across 
market types. The measure was normalised to control for disparate period durations, 
giving the measure NORM%GAIN. The Figures 6.11-6.12 display the 
NORM%GAIN figures per period for each market, grouped by parameter design. 
The NORM%GAIN figures for all three market types are very erratic and display no 
obvious pattern. On 11 occasions out of the 30 periods the CKIN markets generate 
the highest, or least negative, NORM%GAIN measure. The corresponding figures for 
the VKIN and VUIN markets are 9 and 5, respectively, with the remaining 5 periods 
witnessing ties between two markets. The CKIN markets seem to generate a slightly 
higher level o f NORM%GAIN than the VKIN markets and a much higher level 
compared to the VUIN markets. This is evidenced by the higher mean 
NORM%GAIN of 0.0700 for the CKIN markets (aggregated across parameter sets) 
compared to the values o f 0.0671 and 0.0394 for the VKIN and VUIN markets, 
respectively. It appears that on average the level o f trading efficiency attained is 
lowest under the VUIN markets. Whilst it is not possible to draw any decisive 
conclusions from this analysis, it seems that varying the period duration reduces 
trading efficiency and that removing knowledge of the period duration reduces the
level of efficiency attained still further.
The mean %GAIN values o f 16.81, 13.33 and 10.63 for CKPN, VKPN and
VUPN markets, respectively, can be investigated more closely to separate the 
efficiency loss between either a missed trade or an error trade. The mean percentage 
efficiency loss associated with missed and error trades are reported in Table 6.5. For 
four o f the markets the mean efficiency loss figures for error trades exceed those tor 
missed trades, indicating that in these markets efficiency losses are predominantly the 
result o f error trades. It is difficult to conclude from this analysis how, if at all, period 
duration impacts upon the manner in which the efficiency losses arise.
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RMSD Entire Period (Andrew)
Period
— CKIN1 ■*■■■■ VKIN1 — VUIN1
Figure 6.9 Root Mean (Andrew) Squared Deviation of Transaction Prices per
Period -  IN 1 Markets
RMSD Entire Period (Andrew)
Period
— CKIN2 ••••»•■ VKIN2 - * -V U IN 2
Figure 6.10 Root Mean (Andrew) Squared Deviation o f Transaction Prices per
Period -  IN2 Markets
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_  Percentage o f Efficiency Loss 
Market Missed Trades Error Trades
CKIN1 45.41% 54.59%
CKIN2 51.02% 48.98%
VKIN1 48.17% 51.83%
VKIN2 44.77% 48.56%
VUIN1 41.11% 58.89%
VUIN2 52.83% 47.17%
Table 6.5 Mean Percentage of Efficiency Tosses due to Missed and Error Trades
The final preliminary analysis of trading behaviour incorporates a comparison 
of the average profits earned by informed and uninformed traders on a period by 
period basis. The FRE model in its strictest interpretation would predict no difference 
in the average profits of the two groups of traders. Figures 6.13-6.14 display the 
difference between the average profit of the informed and uninformed traders for each 
of the markets on a period by period basis. A positive observation indicates excess 
informed profits and a negative observation indicates excess uninformed profits. 1 he 
functions from all six markets exhibit very little by way of trend, thus, it is difficult to 
draw strong inferences from the two figures. A comparison of the number ot periods 
in which a particular market type generates the largest (positive) difference between 
the average profit of the informed and uninformed reveals values of 6, 9 and 11 lor 
market types CKIN, VKIN and VUIN, respectively. The weak interpretation that can 
be drawn from this comparison is that the VUIN markets exhibit a slightly lower level 
o f trading efficiency than the other markets. Introducing varying period durations to 
the experimental design reduces trading efficiency, but incorporating uncertain period 
durations reduces the level still further.
The results of a more comprehensive investigation of the impact ot period 
duration on market behaviour by way of formal hypotheses testing will now be 
reported. The analysis of the stated hypotheses begins with a brief commentary of the 
Figures 6.15-6.16, which display the three measures for the volume ol trade early in a 
period (VC)L45,60,90) for the markets grouped by parameter design. This is followed 
by a commentary of the Figures 6.17-6.18, which graph the three measures ol RMSD 
early in a period (RMSD45,60,90). The analysis concludes by reporting and 
interpreting the statistical significance levels for the rejection of the null hypotheses
(1H0, 2.1H0, 2.2H0, 3.1H0 and 3.2H0).
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Figure 6.13 Difference between the Average Net Profit of Informed and 
Uninformed Traders per Period -  IN 1 Markets
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For all three measures of ‘early’, in most o f the periods the yolume 0f  trade is 
highest, or joint highest, in the VKIN and/or VUIN markets. Aggregated across the 
three measures of early, the volume of trade in the VKIN markets is the highest 
volume (excluding ties) in 22 of the 90 periods. The corresponding values for the 
CKIN and VUIN markets are only 5 and 16, respectively. A graphical interpretation 
o f the data supports the belief that the volume of trade, early in a period, is i n f l u e n c e d  
by both varying period durations and uncertain period duration, with both resulting m 
higher volumes of trade early in a period relative to the control provided by the CKIN 
markets. Unlike the results in the previous chapter the volume o f trade in the VU 
markets is below that observed in the VK markets. For the VU markets the additional 
uncertainty surrounding imperfect information, coupled with the uncertainty over 
period duration, results in a such a high level of uncertainty that trade early in a period 
is reduced relative to the VK markets, in which the level of uncertainty faced is less.
The erratic nature o f the RMSD for all three market types (Figures 6.17-6.18), 
for all three measures o f early in a period make it very difficult to draw any strong 
conclusions regarding the impact of period duration on the RMSD early in a trading 
period. The use of the Andrew’s M-estimator as a replacement for the simple 
arithmetic mean suggests that the erratic behaviour of these functions is not due to the 
influence of outliers. The only obvious interpretation from the data concerns the 
inability of all six markets to react to the state o f nature Z. The failure to draw any 
strong inferences of the influence of period duration on observed market behaviour 
from simple graphical representation necessitates a more formal approach. The 
investigation, therefore, will now turn to an explicit statistical evaluation of the stated 
hypotheses.
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Table 6.6 reports the level of statistical significance for which the null 
hypotheses of no statistical difference in mean values across the two paired markets 
can be rejected. Attention is once more drawn to the fact that the data used in the 
following statistical tests has been adjusted in order to remove the intra-market 
dependence of observations across periods. For all the performance measures the 
figures reported are the means o f the unadjusted values, across all trading periods. 
For each variable, the figure in parentheses reports the mean of the adjusted values. 
The Wilcoxon signed ranks test (WSR) was used to compute two-tail significance 
levels, based on 30 paired observations, for the comparisons between the three market 
types. Recall, from Chapter Five, that the CKIN:VUIN comparison confounds the 
effects o f both varying period durations and uncertain period durations. The two 
effects can be isolated and analysed separately via the CKIN:VKIN and VKIN:VUIN 
comparisons. The results of the CKIN:VUIN comparisons will not be discussed 
directly. The remainder o f this section will consider separately the impact ot period 
duration on the volume of trade early in a period, the informational efficiency and the
overall allocational efficiency of the experimental markets CKIN, VKIN and VUIN.
Variable Market Means (Adjusted Means) WSR Two-tail a- values
CKIN VKIN VUIN CKIN:
VKIN
CKIN:
VUIN
VKIN:
VUIN
VOL45 1.6667 1.8000 1.7667 0.0117 0.0058 0.0207
VOL6O
(1.6511)
2.2667
(1.9715)
2.6000
(1.8664)
2.5000 0.0002 0.0141 0.0062
VOL90
(2.2332)
3.4667
(2.8193)
4.0000
(2.5925)
3.7000 0.0053 0.0098 0.2655
NORMVOL
(3.4589)
0.0466
(0.0478)
(4.1870)
0.0450
(0.0475)
(3.9186)
0.0420
(0.0434)
0.7971 0.4653 0.0645
RMSD45 154.4757 110.7323 117.8292 0.0545 0.2059 0.7189
RMSD60
(144.7697)
150.3773
(125.0514)
112.2919
(126.5157)
116.9566 0.1204 0.5716 0.5038
RMSD90
(132.4749)
146.8968
(120.9447)
111.3953
(127.8973)
117.4065 0.0230 0.0822 0.2452
RMSD
(136.9056)
142.7678
(132.6657)
(117.2604)
117.3947
(124.8817)
(125.6091)
119.9761
(124.7529)
0.1717 0.1156 0.8774
NORM°/o GAIN 0.0700
(0.0839)
0.0671
(0.0834)
0.0394
(0.0524)
0.9590 0.1180 0.3812
Table 6.6 Summary Table of Market Means (Adjusted Means) and Wilcoxon Signed
Ranks Test Two-tail Significance Levels
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Volume of Trade
For all three measures of the volume of trade early in a period (VOL45,60,90) 
the VKIN markets generate a significantly hlgher mean volume than the CKIN 
markets (<*=0.0117, 0.0002 and 0.0053, respectively). This would suggest that for the 
VKIN markets the short durations in some tradmg periods may have made traders
more eager to trade early in a period, in order to avoid the disappointment of missing 
out on profitable trades. The average period duration is equal across the two market 
types, however, so such an effect would be expected to be cancelled out by the 
opposite effect in periods where the duration was in excess o f the 240 seconds 
experienced in the CKIN markets. Why this should not be the case is not clear. 
Taken over an entire trading period though, the mean rate of trade (NORMVOL) does 
not differ significantly across the two market types, suggesting that, on average, the 
impact of short and long period durations in VKIN markets cancel out. Of greater 
interest is the comparison of the measures of volume of trade across the VKIN: VUIN 
comparison. Such a comparison isolates the impact o f uncertainty concerning period 
duration on the volume of trade observed in experimental asset markets. For VOL45 
and VOL6O VUIN exhibits a significantly lower volume of trade than the VKIN 
markets (a=0.0207 and 0.0062, respectively). Thus, it is possible to reject 1H0 for 
these two measures of early in a trading period. By the time 90 seconds of trade have 
passed the mean VOL90 value for VUIN markets is still higher than that for the 
VKIN markets, but there is no longer a significant difference. The same is true for the 
volume of trade across an entire period, NORMVOL. It is possible that the 90 second 
measure of early in a trading period does not in fact constitute ‘early’ in many of the 
trading periods. For example, the overall duration in some trading periods is as low 
as 128 seconds (see Chapter Four, Table 4.3) and so 90 seconds constitutes 
approximately 70% of the total time available to trade. This is clearly not early in 
such periods. For this reason then, the result of insignificant difference in mean 
VOL90 values across the two market types is given less emphasis than the other two 
measures o f early. It can be concluded, therefore, that in markets incorporating 
imperfect information structures the uncertainty regarding period duration results in a 
reduction in the volume o f trade observed early in a period. The market's response to 
the increased uncertainty faced in the VUIN environment, in the presence ol 
uncertainty regarding the state o f nature due to the imperfect information structure, is
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to become more cautious and so trade less aggressively early in a period, relative to 
the less uncertain environment of VKIN. Recall that this is the reverse of the findings 
in the previous chapter where the markets incorporated perfect information structures. 
This would suggest that in simpler environments (perfect information) the uncertainty 
surrounding period duration causes more aggressive trading behaviour, whilst in more 
complex environments (imperfect information) it results in more cautious trading 
behaviour. This issue will be considered further in the holistic analysis of Chapter 
Eight.
Informational Efficiency
The issue o f interest now is how, if at all, the reduction in the volume of trade 
early in a period in VUIN markets impacts on the level of informational efficiency 
attained by these markets. It is conceivable that the reduced volume of trade will slow 
the convergence o f prices to the FRE equilibrium. Alternatively the more cautious 
approach to trade may mean fewer disequilibrium trades, therefore, less noise in the 
price signal and so consequently an increase in the informational efficiency of these 
markets.
The investigation begins with an evaluation of hypothesis 2.1H0 to determine 
the extent of any difference in transaction prices across the markets VKIN and VUIN. 
As reported in Table 6.6, for the three measures of early in a trading period, the mean 
RMSD, whilst being higher in the VUIN markets, does not differ statistically across 
the two market types. For the measures RMSD(45,60,90) the two-tail significance 
levels are all a>0.05 and the null hypothesis of no statistical difference (2.1 Ho) can 
not be rejected. Thus, the lower early volume of trade in the VUIN markets does not 
impact on the level of informational efficiency attained early in a period, relative to 
the informational efficiency o f the VKIN markets over the same time periods. As a 
result, it would make no sense to formally evaluate hypothesis 2.2Ho, because no 
difference exists in the RMSD of early prices from the FRE model.
The VKIN and VUIN markets were further compared to see if any difference 
existed between the RMSD of prices over an entire trading period. Table 6.6 reports 
an unadjusted mean RMSD of 119.9761 emus for the VUIN markets that is greater 
than the value of 117.3947 emus for the VKIN markets, but not significantly 
(a=0.8774 calculated using a two-tail WSR test on the adjusted data). This result 
indicates that, over an entire trading period, the level o f informational efficiency
187
observed in the VUIN markets relative to the VKIN markets is n o t  i n f l u e n c e d  by 
uncertainty concerning period duration. These results, therefore, offer no support for 
Friedman’s (1984) view that a predetermined, known trading period duration is one of 
a number o f features that enhances the informational efficiency o f experim ent 
markets incorporating imperfect information structures
The comparison of the VKIN and VUIN markets provided the strictest test of 
the impact of uncertainty concerning period duration on market behaviour. A further 
comparison between the CKIN and VKIN markets offers insight into the influence of 
varying the period duration on the RMSD observed early in a trading period. The 
results are mixed. The mean RMSD45 and RMSD90 measures for the VKIN markets 
are statistically lower than the corresponding measures for the CKIN markets 
(a=0.0545 and <x=0.0230, respectively). The RMSD60 and RMSD measures, 
however, do not differ statistically. For some measures, therefore, the level of 
informational efficiency observed in the VKIN markets is higher relative to the CKIN 
markets. It remains to be seen whether this can be related to any differences in the 
volume o f trade early in a period.
Recall that the three measures o f volume early in a period were all 
significantly higher under the VKIN markets than the CKIN markets. The correlation 
coefficient o f 0.1804 between the difference in VOL45 and the difference in RMSD45 
across the markets is insignificant (a=0.520). The correlation coefficient of 0.0884 
between the difference in VOL90 and the difference in RMSD90 across the markets is 
also insignificant (a=0.754). In light of the reported results for the correlation 
coefficients, it would be impossible to argue that the higher volume early in a period 
impacts in any comprehensive manner on the RMSD early in a period. It would also 
be problematic to explain why there is no difference in the RMSD60 measure across 
the CKIN and VKIN markets.
Allocational Efficiency
In this final analysis it remains to determine the impact of the two treatments 
(VK and VU) on the level of allocational efficiency observed in the experimental 
asset markets studied. The analysis fails to reject the null hypothesis (3.1 Ho, 
a=0.3812) o f no statistical between the mean NORM%GAIN of 0.0671 for the VKIN
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markets and 0.0394 for the VUIN markets40. Thus, whilst the increased uncertainty 
experienced due to the lack of knowledge concerning period duration results in a tar 
lower mean NORM%GAIN figure, this reduction is not statistically significant and so 
it is not possible to claim any impact on the relative level of allocational efficiency. It 
is, therefore, not necessary to formally evaluate hypothesis 3.2H0 lor the 
VKIN:VUIN comparison. Similar insignificant results are reported tor the other 
CKIN:VKIN and CKIN:VUIN comparisons. It can be concluded, therefore, that the 
treatment effects of varying period duration and uncertain period duration neither 
separately nor jointly impact on the level of allocational efficiency observed in 
experimental asset markets with imperfect information structures.
6.5 Discussion and Conclusions
After reviewing the evidence on the effect of imperfect information structures 
reported in previous experimental studies, the chapter proceeded to explain the 
specifics o f the experimental design utilised for the six markets investigated in this 
chapter. The discussion then moved on to report and discuss the results ol the 
analysis conducted. It is to a review of these results that the discussion in this final
section now turns.
Initially a comparative analysis was conducted to determine it either the FRE 
or PI models generated superior predictive accuracy. The two models were evaluated 
against a number o f different performance measures. First, the RMSD of prices from 
the disparate theoretically predicted equilibrium prices of the two models were 
compared. Over all six markets the RMSD of transaction prices from the FRE price, 
over the entire trading period, was below that for the PI model in 76.67/o of periods. 
This was interpreted as providing strong support for the superiority o f the FRE model. 
This was followed by a comparison of the number of assets misallocated relative to 
the two models’ predictions regarding end-period allocations. The number of 
misallocations under the FRE model were less than those for the PI model in 30% of 
periods, whilst the reverse was true for 21.11% of periods. The difference in the 
number o f assets misallocated for the remaining 48.89% of periods fell within an 
indiscriminate region, 0 < a  < 6 . The evidence weakly supported the FRE model
40 N o te  th a t the unad justed  m eans are  reported  in th e  d iscussion , but th a t it is the ad justed  data 
th a t is u sed  to  com pu te  th e  sta tistical s ig n ifican ce  levels.
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over the PI model. Thirdly, a measure o f the percentage gains from trade exploited 
was used to discriminate between the competing models. Relative to the initial 
allocation of assets, the predicted end-period allocations o f the FRE and PI models 
predict positive and negative gains from trade, respectively, when the state of nature is 
Y. O f the 33 occurrences of the state Y there were 29 periods where the gains from 
trade were negative, providing strong support for the predictive accuracy ol the PI 
model over the FRE model. Finally, a comparison o f the average profit earned by 
informed traders relative to uninformed traders was undertaken. On average, there 
was only a small difference between the two figures. This was construed as weak 
evidence against the strictest interpretation of the FRE model, in which the price 
signal reveals private information instantaneously, and so was not considered latally 
condemning.
The asset markets conducted in this chapter represent a more complex trading 
environment than those investigated in Chapter Five. The implication of this 
increased complexity and uncertainty seems to be a weakening ol the superiority ol 
the FRE model over the PI model. The former offers better predictions ol equilibrium 
asset prices, whilst the later predicts observed trading efficiency (%GAIN) more 
accurately. The weakening of the superiority of the predictive accuracy oi the FRL 
model in markets with imperfect information structures is in line with the findings ol 
earlier experimental studies such as Plott and Sunder (1988) and Forsythe and 
Lundholm (1990).
The second stage of the investigation was a relative analysis of the impact ot 
period duration on observed market behaviour. The effect was separated between the 
impact of varying period durations (CKIN:VKIN) and the impact ot uncertainty 
concerning the period durations (VKINiVUIN). Varying the period durations resulted 
in a significant increase in the volume of trade early in a period. By the end ot the 
period, however, there was no significant influence on the rate of trade. There were 
mixed results regarding the effect on the deviation o f transaction prices from the FRE 
price. For two of the measures of price deviation early in a period, RMSD45 and 
RMSD90, varying the period duration resulted in a lower deviation. No significant 
effect was found, however, for the measures RMSD60 or RMSD over the entire 
trading period. It is difficult to conclude decisively, therefore, that the higher volume 
of trade early in a period impacted in any comprehensive manner on the observed 
informational efficiency. There was no significant impact of varying the period
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duration on the overall level of allocational efficiency observed in the experimental 
markets.
Uncertainty concerning the period durations had a mixed effect on observed 
market behaviour. There was a significant reduction in the volume o f trade for two of 
the measures of early, VOL45 and VOL6O. This is in stark contrast to the evidence to 
the contrary reported in Chapter Five. The increase in the level of uncertainty faced 
as a result of imperfect information regarding the state of nature together with 
uncertainty surrounding the period duration appears to make traders more cautious 
about trading. There is little impact, however, of this caution on the level ot 
informational or allocational efficiency achieved in the VUIN markets relative to the 
VKIN markets. The evidence from experimental markets incorporating imperfect 
information structures fails to provide support for Friedman’s (1984) suggestion that a 
predetermined, known period duration was a feature o f experimental asset markets
that enhanced the observed level of market efficiency.
In the context of the on-line auctions that have emerged with the growth ot 
virtual communities the evidence reported in this chapter fails to offer any guidance 
concerning the choice of trading environment to be used to conduct trade across 
electronic networks. Complex trading environments characterised by imperfect 
private information appear to render the choice of fixed and known or uncertain 
period durations irrelevant. This is in contrast to the evidence from the previous 
chapter in which it was suggested that the presence on uncertain period durations 
would result in an increase in the volume of trade, but a reduction in the informational 
efficiency observed in on-line auctions. It seems that further evidence is required to 
guide the development of new business models for the conduct of trade in virtual
communities across electronic networks.
In conclusion, the evidence from this chapter and the previous one regarding 
the impact of uncertain period durations on observed market behaviour, particularly 
volume of trade and informational efficiency, is far from conclusive. In particular, the 
evidence concerning the volume of trade early in a period is actually contradictory. 
Fortunately, the strength o f the experimental method lies in the ability to replicate 
previous experiments. With this in mind the next chapter reports the results of six 
more experimental asset markets that essentially replicate the twelve studied so far. 
The only difference stems from the introduction of costly private information. Prior 
to trade in each period an information auction is conducted, with the six highest
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bidders receiving the private information. Three markets, one for each of the three 
period duration types (CK, VK and VU), are conducted with perfect information 
structures (group three) and three markets with imperfect information structures 
(group four). The introduction of an information auction is the only way that the 
group three markets differ from the group one markets and the group four markets 
differ from the group two markets. Therefore, these two additional groups of markets 
provide two more opportunities to investigate the impact of period duration on market
behaviour.
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Chapter Seven
7 I m p a c t  o f  P e r io d  D u r a t io n  o n  E x p e r im e n t a l  A s s e t  M ark ets  
w it h  In f o r m a t io n  A u c t io n s  p l u s  P e r f e c t  a n d  Im pe r fe c t  
In f o r m a t io n  St r u c t u r e s
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7.1 Introduction
The intention in this chapter is to provide additional evidence concerning the 
impact of period duration on the observed market performance in experimental asset 
markets. Collectively the results reported in the previous two chapters do not permit 
decisive conclusions to be drawn regarding the impact of both varying period 
durations and uncertain period durations, in isolation or jointly, on observed market 
performance. To this end six more experimental asset markets are conducted. Rather 
than simply replicating exactly the experimental design of the previous markets, the 
trading environment is slightly modified to permit another feature of experimental 
markets to be investigated. The new design feature incorporated in these markets is 
the inclusion of a pre-trade information auction. All six markets studied in this 
chapter include the information auction, therefore, it is still possible to investigate the 
impact of period duration on the performance of these markets whilst controlling for 
any confounding effects at the same time. Three markets, one for each of the three 
period duration types (CK, VK and VU), are conducted with perfect information 
structures (group three) and three markets with imperfect information structures 
(group four). With the exception of participants’ experience levels, the introduction 
o f an information auction is the only way that the group three markets differ from the 
group one markets and the group four markets differ from the group two markets. 
Thus, two additional layers are added to the overall experimental design (see Table
4.4, Chapter Four).
The inclusion of an information auction prior to trade in any period means that 
the allocation of private information becomes a process endogenous to the 
experimental markets themselves. This is in contrast to the markets in Chapters Five 
and Six in which the allocation was determined exogenously in advance by a random 
procedure. The competing models of theoretical equilibrium (FRE and PI) make 
disparate predictions regarding the value of private information. These disparate 
predictions provide another means with which to discriminate between the FRE and 
PI models and evaluate their predictive accuracy. The FRE model predicts that the 
value of private information is zero, whilst the PI model predicts that such 
information retains value. The inclusion o f information auctions in the experimental 
design provides an additional measure of performance on which the predictive 
accuracy of the two models can be evaluated.
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The incorporation of costly information acquisition is an additional facet of 
the experimental design that brings it more into line with the situation faced by traders 
in real world markets. The acquisition of private information generally involves some 
form of cost to the acquirer. Even if there is no financial cost associated with the 
purchase o f information there will be some form of search cost in the form of an 
individual’s time spent obtaining the information. The pre-trade information auctions, 
therefore, not only provide an additional performance measure for the evaluation of 
the FRE and PI models, but also bring the experimental design more in line with real
world environments.
A break down of the structure of the chapter is now offered. The following
section reviews the few experimental asset market studies that incorporate an 
information auction in their experimental design. Section 7.3 details the specifics of 
the design, not included in the earlier general experimental design chapter, for the 
markets, highlighting both how the markets differ to those in earlier chapters and how 
the similarities provide the necessary control for subsequent comparisons. Section 7.4 
reports the results from the analysis of the experimental markets. A comparative 
(within market) evaluation o f the FRE and PI models is performed first and includes 
the performance measurement based on the value o f private information. The 
comparative analysis is followed by a relative (across market) evaluation of the 
impact of the treatment variable, both in terms of varying period durations and 
uncertain period durations. The final section contains a summary and discussion of
the results.
7.2 Review of Relevant Literature
The majority o f studies of experimental asset markets investigate the 
aggregation and dissemination of costless, asymmetrically distributed private 
information. The competing models of theoretical equilibrium make disparate 
predictions regarding the value of such private information. A small number of 
experimental studies have conducted markets that allow this method of discrimination 
to be exploited. The following discussion will review the results ol these studies.
Copeland and Friedman (1992) extends on Copeland and Friedman (1987) by 
incorporating a pre-trade auction for information in which traders bid to receive their 
news message before each trading period opens. Messages are given anonymously to 
the three highest bidders, at the fourth highest bid price, in a umform-pnce sealed-bid
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auction. Consequently, the identity of those traders who receive information is 
determined endogenously, this is in contrast with such studies as Plott and Sunder 
(1982, 1988) in which the identity is determined exogenously. In Copeland and 
Friedman’s (1992) markets with simple environments, incorporating the simultaneous 
arrival of homogenous news messages, the market value of information declines and 
tends to zero over time. However, in the more complex setting of the of markets with 
heterogeneous news messages, the market value remains positive providing evidence
in favour o f the PI model.
Sunder (1992) is another study in which a market for information is conducted
prior to trade in a period. Two different designs for the information auction were 
conducted. In Sunder’s (1992) series A markets the supply of information is fixed at 
four traders with the price determined by the market (i.e. fifth highest bid price), 
whilst in the series B markets the price is fixed and the number of buyers is 
determined endogenously. Series A results show a decrease in the cross-sectional 
standard deviation of net profit and thus convergence to the equality of profit across 
traders over time. These results provide support for the FRE prediction that the price 
of information in equilibrium is zero and there is no difference between gross and net 
profit. The results of the series B markets are less supportive. The distribution of 
profit does not converge to the full revelation (FRE) benchmark even with experience 
and all market observables point towards the lower informativeness ot the series B 
markets relative to series A. Despite this the net profit of informed and uninformed
traders were statistically indistinguishable.
In those studies above that have incorporated information auctions prior to
trade the private messages bid for always revealed the payoff state with certainty 
(perfect information), thus these studies have only addressed the question of 
information dissemination. It seems probable that the increased complexity 
introduced by incorporating imperfect signals into the design, via the need for the 
aggregation of information, will have some bearing on the efficiency of the 
experimental market and on the convergence of the price of information to zero. 
Ackert et al (1997) incorporate costly, imperfect information in their experimental 
design and directly address the value of imperfect information plus the dissemination 
and aggregation o f the imperfect information. They conducted 12 markets each of 
which consisted of 12 or 11 traders divided among two trade types with disparate state 
contingent dividends. Half the markets were conducted with inexperienced tradeis
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and the other half with experienced traders. The markets were conducted under the 
rules of oral double auctions, with a single asset traded at a time. Two states ol nature 
were possible, X and Y, drawn randomly from a deck of 50 cards, comprising j 0 X 
and 20 Y. A market for information is conducted prior to trade under the rules ol a 
sealed-bid auction with the four highest bidders acquiring the clues at the tilth highest 
bid price. Clue accuracy was determined by the draw o f a card from a deck of 40, 
labelled A for accurate and I for inaccurate. Clue accuracy was manipulated to lie 
between 0.60 and 0.90 to determine the sensitivity o f the market to the chosen 
parameter values. At the end of each trading period the state of nature and clue 
accuracy (accurate or inaccurate) were revealed to all participants.
In seven out of the twelve markets prices converged to predicted Bayesian 
prices. O f the remaining five markets, four experienced under-reaction and one 
market generated prices that over-shot the Bayesian price (over-reaction). Price 
convergence was found to be affected by clue accuracy with all five cases ot failure to 
converge occurring under clue accuracy of 0.60 and 0.75. Those markets with the 
least uncertainty (0.90) never failed to converge. The results support at least partial 
dissemination o f information with prices moving away from those predicted by a 
naive benchmark (reflecting only prior probabilities) in nine out ol the twelve
markets.
Ackert et al (1997) report that the value of the imperfect information decreases 
over time and tends to zero in some markets. Information value is lower in 
experienced markets than inexperienced markets, in one of which prices strangely 
increased over time. Overall, however, prices converge to a value that is above zero 
and below a computed upper bound (based on an assumption concerning the number 
of assets an individual buys). Thus Ackert et al (1997, p.71) conclude, ‘.... traders 
perceive imperfect information has value’ and this is consistent with imperfect 
information being slowly disseminated through the market. Like Sunder (1992), the 
study compares the profit of informed and uninformed traders. Comparing the 
average gross profit of the two, Ackert et al (1997) find that the uninformed 
outperformed the informed. Though not explicitly reported, this result would have 
been further exacerbated if the comparison had been on a net ol information 
acquisition cost basis. Ackert et al (1997) relate this difference in average gross profit 
to the degree o f clue accuracy, reporting that informed traders were able to earn a 
greater profit in those markets with a high degree of clue accuracy than in the low
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c lu e  a c c u r a c y  m a r k e ts  in  w h ic h  t h e n  a b i l i ty  to  t r a d e  p r o f i t a b ly  s u f fe re d .
Ackert et al (1997) is the only published study tQ dat£ in which in fo rm ^ "
a u c t io n s  a r e  c o n d u c te d  f o r  im p e r f e c t  in f o r m a t io n .  I n d e p e n d e n t ly  o f  th is  s tu d y  t e 
c u r r e n t  r e s e a r c h  p r o g r a m m e  d e s ig n e d  a n d  c o n d u c te d  e x p e r im e n ta l  a s s e t  m a rk e ts  
w h e r e  p r e - t r a d e  in f o r m a t io n  a u c t io n s  f o r im p e r f e c t  in f o r m a t io n  w e r e  in c o rp o ra te d  m  
th e  e x p e r im e n ta l  d e s ig n .  T h e  in f o r m a t i o n  s t r u c tu r e  in  th e  m a r k e ts  s tu d ie d  h e re  w a s  
n o t  im p e r f e c t  in  th e  s e n s e  a d o p te d  in  A c k e r t  e t  a l  ( 1997)  T h a t  is ,  th e  in f o rm a tio n  w a s  
n o t  im p e r f e c t  in  th e  s e n s e  t h a t  i t s  a c c u r a c y  w a s  s o m e  p r o b a b i l i ty  p a r a m e te r  less th a n  
u n i ty .  I n s te a d  th e  in f o r m a t io n  s t r u c tu r e  u t i l i s e d  in  C h a p te r  S ix  w a s  e m p lo y e d  m  th e  
im p e r f e c t  i n f o r m a t io n  a s s e t  m a r k e ts  i n v e s t ig a te d  in  th i s  c h a p te r .  T r a d e r s  b id  fo r  c lu e s  
t h a t  d id  n o t  r e v e a l  th e  s ta te  o f  n a tu r e  w i th  c e r ta in ty ,  b u t  a l lo w e d  th e m  to  e l im in a te  o n e  
o f  th e  th r e e  p o s s ib le  s ta te s  o f  n a tu r e .  N o t  w i th s t a n d in g  th e  r o le  o f  r e p l i c a t io n  w ith in  
e x p e r im e n ta l  e c o n o m ic s ,  th e  d i f f e r e n t  w a y s  th e  tw o  s tu d ie s  o p e r a t io n a l is e  th e  
im p e r f e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n  s t r u c tu r e s  r e n d e r  th e m  c o m p l im e n ta r y .  C o n f i r m a t io n  o f  th e
results in Ackert et al (1997) under different imperfect information structures can only
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strengthen the conclusions regarding the value of imperfect private information, 
markets from the two studies also differ in other ways. For example, Ackert et al 
(1997) conduct information auctions where the four highest bidders receive
o f
private information and asset markets where there are only two possible states 
nature. In contrast, with the intention of maintaining strict experimental control 
across all eighteen markets o f this research programme, the six highest bidders m the 
information auction receive the private information and there are three possible states 
of nature in the asset markets. Unfortunately, therefore, if  the evidence of the current 
analysis is contradictory to the findings in Ackert et al (1997) it will be difficult to 
infer exactly why that should be the case.
7.3 Experimental Design Considerations
7.3.1 Information Markets and Information Structures
For all six o f the asset markets studied in this chapter every trading perio is 
preceded by an information auction. The information auctions were conducted under 
the rules of a sealed-bid uniform-price auction, permitting traders to s u b m i t  bids to 
purchase information concerning the state of nature that would be in existence in the 
forthcoming period.
The information auctions proceeded as follows. All participants entered a bid
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price at which they were willing to buy information. The six participants offering to 
buy at the six highest prices won the information auction and received the information 
for that period. The cost of the information was equal to the seventh highest bid price.
All six purchasers were charged for the cost of the information at the end of the 
trading period. The distribution of clue cards that had been the norm in the earlier 
experimental asset markets was no longer desirable. The identity of the six insiders 
was determined endogenously and as such was no longer under the control ol the 
experimenter. For this reason it was not possible to pre-order the clue cards in 
advance of the experimental session, as had been the case in the earlier experimental 
markets. To wait for the outcome of the information auction each period and then to 
order the clue cards accordingly would have been extremely time consuming, adding 
excessively to the overall length of the experiment. This was deemed undesirable and 
an alternative method for distributing the private information to traders was adopted. 
After the final bid had been received all participants were informed ot the price at 
which information had been purchased for the coming period. They were then able to 
press a designated key on the keyboard to reveal their own private information for a 
fraction of a second on the computer screen. To prevent individuals observing other 
participants’ private information the length of time that the information was displayed 
for was purposefully short. Should a participant wish to they could redisplay their 
own private information by repressing the designated key. To further prevent the loss 
of control of private information the messages were displayed on the computer
screens in a dull colour and a small font size.
The six participants that do not purchase information were not charged the
information cost. Those individuals received the message ‘Blank' via the computer 
screen when they requested their private information. In the event o f tied bids to buy 
the information the tie was resolved with reference to the time at which the bid was 
received. The earliest received bid was deemed to be the winner. If an individual did 
not wish to enter an offer to purchase private information they entered a bid price of
zero in the information auction.
Three of the experimental asset markets incorporated the perfect information
structure adopted in the design of the markets studied in Chapter Five, one for each of 
the three levels o f the treatment period duration. The private information that 
participants bid for perfectly revealed the forthcoming state of nature. I he three other 
markets reported here adopt the imperfect information structure utilised in the design
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of markets studied in Chapter Six. Due to the endogenous determination of insider 
identity in the three markets studied in this chapter the convention from Chapter Six 
of never giving traders within the same trader type identical messages could not be 
adhered to. Instead, the six insiders each randomly received one of the two possible 
private information messages. However, if  for example the state of nature was X, the 
convention of distributing three messages each o f the type ‘Not Y' and the type Not 
Z ’ was maintained. The number of insiders, the manner in which they were 
determined and their concealed identities, along with the nature of private information 
available, were all common knowledge.
7.3.2 Markets and Period Durations
As with the previous two groups o f experimental markets reported in Chapters 
Five and Six, two markets were conducted for each of the three levels of the treatment 
variable, period duration. As usual the trading period durations in the CK markets 
were held constant (240 seconds) across all 15 trading periods. In the VK and VU 
markets the durations varied between 120 and 360 seconds, from period to period. As 
previously, the actual sequence o f trading period durations was randomly determined 
in advance by computer. Parameter sets 3a and 3b were used for the perfect and 
imperfect information structure markets, respectively. Note, however, that the 
sequences o f period durations are the same for the two parameter sets (see Chapter 
Four Table 4.3). The constant, varying and uncertain markets durations for those 
governed by perfect information structures are identified CKPM, VKPM and VUPM, 
respectively. These markets comprise the third group of markets studied. The 
corresponding acronyms identifying the imperfect information structure markets are 
CKIM, VKIM and VUIM, respectively. These markets comprise the fourth group of 
markets studied. The group three and four markets were conducted during the period
13th May to the 28th May 1998, inclusive.
Recall that in an attempt to ease the recruitment problem experienced for the 
first and second groups of experimental sessions, the participants recruited for groups 
three and four were experienced. That is, the participants were recruited from the 
pool of participants that had taken part in one o f the asset markets from either group 
one or two. With the exception of participants’ experience levels, the introduction of 
an information auction is the only way that the group three markets differ from the 
group one markets and the group four markets differ from the group two markets. 
The impact of experience on observed market behaviour, and the confounded effect of
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information markets, will be considered in the holistic analysis of Chapter Eight.
7.3.3 State Contingent Dividends
The state contingent dividend distributions across trader types were the same 
across all six markets. Parameter set B was used for all markets (see Chapter Four 
Table 4.1, Panel B). Due to participants’ prior experience the state contingent 
dividends for these two groups of markets had to be changed from the ones used in 
the previous experimental markets. The sequence o f states of nature did differ 
between the markets. CKPM, VKPM and VUPM used the sequence in parameter set 
3a, whilst CKIM, VKIM and VUIM used the sequence in parameter set 3b (see 
Chapter Four Table 4.3). As previously, the participants’ diverse backgrounds plus 
the minimal contact and interaction between them across different market sessions 
conducted some time apart, serves to ensure no participant could have been aware of
the sequence of states of nature in advance.
The group three and group four markets studied in this chapter differ in design 
to the group one and group two markets, respectively, from the earlier chapters with 
respect to the incorporation of an information auction and the experience level of 
participants. All other details o f the experimental design are general to the thesis as a 
whole and were discussed in Chapter Four. The subsequent section reports the results 
of the investigation o f market performance for the two groups of experimental 
markets. The section reports the results of a comparative evaluation of the 
performance o f the FRE and PI models and concludes with a relative evaluation of the 
impact o f period duration on market performance. The analyses are conducted 
separately for each of the two groups of markets.
7.4 Results and Analyses
7.4.1 Data Considerations
The concerns expressed in Chapter Five (section 5.6.1) regarding the existence
of outliers, data dependence and the use of statistical tests are all equally valid for the
markets conducted in this chapter. The same is true o f the methods for dealing with
these concerns and the justifications provided for the adoption of such methods. In
addition, there are a number of issues specific to the markets investigated in this
chapter, which require consideration.
The first issue arises as a result of the three measures of early adopted 
throughout this research programme. These measures are the first 45, 60 and 90
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seconds of trade within a period. It conceivable that the first trade in a period could 
occur at a time in excess of either 45, 60 or 90 seconds. That is, any of the measures 
VOL45. 60 or 90 may be zero. If this was indeed the case for a certain trading period 
the three measures RMSD(45,60,90) would not be defined for that period. Whilst this 
phenomenon did not occur in any of the experimental markets of previous chapters, it 
did occur on a few occasions in four of the markets studied in this chapter . It should 
be recalled that much of the analysis of market performance is based on matched, 
paired comparisons on a period by period basis. The inability to compute 
RMSD(45,60,90) for a particular period of a given market would prove problematic. 
This could be remedied by a variety of ways. Firstly, the use o f the WSR test of 
differences in mean values of paired samples could be sacrificed and replaced by the 
Mann-Whitney U test for independent samples. However, the use ol statistical tests 
based on paired observations offers far higher statistical power than is achievable with 
equivalent tests based on independent data. Furthermore, the pairing of observations 
on a period by period basis provides greater experimental control. An alternative 
remedy may be to drop all those paired observations where the measures 
RMSD(45,60,90) were not defined for one of the markets in the comparison. Neither 
of these options is ideal. Thus, an alternative remedy is adopted. Whenever one of 
the measures of RMSD(45,60,90) is not defined for a particular period of a given 
market the information inherent in the bid-ask spread at that point in time (either 45, 
60 or 90 seconds) is utilised. As has been the convention in other experimental 
studies (for example Duxbury, 1997) the mid-point of the bid-ask spread is used as a 
proxy for the transaction price, thus permitting the relevant RMSD measure to be 
computed. This solution avoids dropping relevant observations and still allows the
use o f statistically more powerful paired analyses.
A second issue arises due to technical problems encountered in two of the 
markets studies here. For both the markets CKIM and VUIM technical problems 
caused the computer programme on which the experimental sessions where being 
conducted to freeze during period 11. The problem occurred after 120.5 seconds of 
trade in CKIM and after 139.7 seconds of trade in VUIM. On both occasions the
41 T he first trade  d id  no t occur un til post-45  seconds in period  14 o f  C K P M , period  7 o t 
V K P M  and  p eriods 8 and  10 o f  V K IM , w h ils t the first trade d id  no t o ccu r un til po st-6 0  seconds in
p e rio d  7 o f  V K IM .
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programme waited until the end of the trading period before enacting the transaction 
initiated just prior to the programme freezing. From the moment the programme froze 
until the end o f the period the participants were unable to input any bids or asks. 
After the period had timed out the programme circled through the usual post-period 
computer screens and reinitialised ready for the start o f period 12. There were no 
subsequent problems encountered in either market. This technical problem will have 
obvious problems for some of the measures utilised in the analysis ot market 
performance, but will not influence others. The programme froze post-90 seconds ot 
trade in a period, therefore, there are no concerns for the measures VOL(45,60,90) 
and RMSD (45, 60, 90). The volume over an entire trading period is normalised 
(NORMVOL) to control for disparate period durations anyway, thus replacing the 
intended period duration with the time at which the programme froze in the two 
periods avoids any problems. The same is true for the NORM%GAIN measure. The 
RMSD measure over the entire trading period may have been influenced by the 
premature cessation o f trade. Observation of the sequence of transaction prices in 
period 11 for both markets, however, reveals prices that are very stable and uniform 
and very close to the FRE price by the time the programme froze (see Figures 7.1-7.6 
below). For these reasons it is believed that the technical problem did not impact in 
any obvious manner on the RMSD over the entire period. The number of assets 
misallocated and the break down of the efficiency losses between missed and error 
trades may both have been affected. The two measures, however, both form part of 
the comparative analysis of the FRE and PI models, for which there are a number ot 
other measures adopted in the analysis that are not affected (for example, 
NORM%GAIN) and so can be relied upon to give unbiased representations. Whilst 
undesirable, the technical problem did not result in any problems that could not be 
remedied or avoided and so it is concluded that the results to be reported in the next 
two subsections are robust to this unfortunate occurrence.
7.4.2 FRE v PL. Comparative Performance Evaluation
Asset Markets
The discussion here is centred on a comparative evaluation o f the predictive 
accuracy of the FRE and PI models with respect to asset market performance. The 
comparison is performed on the raw data generated by the experimental asset markets, 
including transaction prices, allocations and profits. For this period-by-period, within 
market comparative analysis the transformations to the data required to deal with
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outliers and dependence are not necessary.
As discussed previously, the two competing models of FRE and PI predict that 
traders use different information sets in the determination o f their expectations of 
transaction prices. The two models, therefore, make disparate predictions concerning 
equilibrium prices. For the perfect information markets, CKPM, VKPM and VUPM, 
the FRE model predicts equilibrium prices, given the state contingent dividends42, ot 
250, 400 and 950 for states of nature X, Y and Z, respectively. The FRE model 
predicts that both the informed and uninformed participants in the trader types 1, 3 
and 2 will hold the assets at the end of the period in the states X, Y and Z, 
respectively. Note that the corresponding equilibrium predictions for the imperfect 
markets, CKIM, VKIM and VUIM are identical. This is because the parameter set 
governing the state contingent dividends is the same as for the PM markets. I he same 
is not true of the price predictions of the PI model, which will change as a result of 
moving from a perfect to imperfect information structure. For the perfect information 
markets, assuming a uniform distribution of private information, the PI model predicts 
equilibrium prices o f 500, 500 and 950 for the states X, Y and Z, respectively. For 
the imperfect markets the corresponding equilibrium prices are 575, 650 and 650 tor 
states X, Y and Z, respectively. For the PM markets, under the uniform distribution 
of private information, the PI model s end of period asset allocation predictions are 
uninformed trader type 2 for states X and Y and informed trader type 2 tor state Z. 
For the IM markets the corresponding predictions are trader type 2 receiving the clue 
‘Not Y ’ for state X and trader type 2 receiving the clue ‘Not X' for states of nature Y 
and Z4j.
The endogenous determination of insiders does not, however, guarantee that 
the private information is distributed uniformly among the three trader types. In order 
to determine the PI model’s equilibrium predictions reference must be made to the 
actual distribution of private information. For the vast majority of periods in the six 
markets the distribution o f private information is such that the PI equilibrium price is 
not altered. Table 7.1 displays the PI model’s equilibrium price and allocation 
predictions for those periods where the predictions are altered. These price and 
allocation predictions will be used in the comparative analysis o f the FRE and PI
42 See T ab le  4 .1 , C h ap te r F our, param eter set B.
43 See A p pend ix  3 fo r an  ex p lana tion  o f  the FR E  and  PI eq u ilib rium  calcu la tions.
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models that follows.
M arket Periods PI Price PI Allocation
CKPM 2, 7, 8, 9,10, 
13, 14, 15
400 Uninformed trader type 3
VKPM 9 400 Uninformed trader type 3
CKIM 8 500 Uninformed trader type 2
VUIM 4 575 Trader type 2 receiving 
the message Not Y
Table 7.1 Equilibrium Predictions of the PI Model when the Uniform Distribution ol
Private Information is Not Applicable
The FRE and PI equilibrium price predictions are included in Figures 7.1-7.6 
as horizontal lines, towards which the convergence of transaction prices can be 
compared. All three PM markets display a tendency to converge to the FRE price 
from period 2 onwards. This is true even for state of nature Z in which the FRE price 
of 950 emus is far higher than the price predictions in the other two states. The 
degree of convergence is most marked in the VKPM market, closely followed by the 
CKPM market. The VUPM market exhibits slightly less tendency to converge, which 
is most noticeable for state of nature Z. Despite this all three markets display a level 
o f convergence to the FRE price that is far higher than was witnessed in any of the 
previous perfect information markets of Chapter Five. All three PM markets clearly 
react to the state of nature and exhibit high levels of informational efficiency. The 
three PM markets studied in this chapter differ in design to the previous perfect 
information markets on two counts, the incorporation of a pre-trade information 
auction and the experience level o f participants. Due to the confounding effects of the 
two experimental design changes it is difficult to determine decisively which one is 
responsible for the dramatic improvement in informational efficiency. It is 
conjectured that the improvement is the result of the increased experience level ot 
participants for the following reason. The information auction favoured the trader 
type with the highest expected dividend value in the absence o f private information. 
Given the state contingent dividend distributions trader type 2 had the highest 
expected dividend value. These traders may have valued the information more highly 
and, therefore, purchased the private information more frequently than the other trader 
type groups. This is substantiated by Table 7.2, which reports the frequency with 
which traders purchased information. On many occasions when the state of nature is
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X or Y, therefore, there will be many periods where less than two traders 
representing the FRE equilibrium allocation group (trader type 1 & 3 respectively) 
will purchase the private information. A priori this would be expected to reduce the 
competition for assets within the trader type group with the highest dividend valuation 
and so possibly impair the convergence towards the FRE equilibrium price. For states 
X and Y the presence of an information auction may impair the informational 
efficiency of the markets, however, this is not evidenced by the observed market 
behaviour. Convergence under states X and Y is observed for all three PM markets. 
Thus the increase in participants’ experience levels must be responsible for the 
improved informational efficiency. By way of an example, the individuals purchasing 
information in periods 11 and 13 of the VKPM market are traders 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. 
None of the FRE predicted holders of the assets (type 1 traders) had private 
information and yet the observed sequences of transaction prices cluster precisely
around the FRE price of 250 emus.
The IM markets exhibit significantly reduced levels o f convergence to the
FRE equilibrium price than the PM markets. Nevertheless, the sequences of 
transaction prices cluster more closely to the FRE price than the PI price in most 
periods. These markets display more reaction to the states of nature than was 
observed in the previously studied imperfect information asset markets ot Chapter 
Six. Again, the increased experience level of participants appears to have improved 
the convergence to FRE prices even in an imperfect information regime. Prom simple 
observation it is difficult to determine which, if any, o f the three markets CKIM, 
VKIM or VUIM exhibits the greatest degree o f convergence.
44 In the p rev ious asse t m arke ts  fo r  w h ich  no  in fo rm ation  auction  w as conducted  there w ere 
a lw ays tw o  trad ers  from  each trad e r ty p e  g ro u p  w ith  p riva te  inform ation .
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Trader CKPM CKIM VKPM VK1M VUPM VUIM
1 0 5 0 0 3 3
2 2 0 1 0 2 0
3 8 0 0 1 1 1
4 3 1 1 10 1 0
5 13 15 1 15 15 15
6 15 15 8 14 8 15
7 15 10 15 12 4 14
8 14 10 15 9 12 7
9 4 14 11 15 4 12
10 11 4 10 2 11 0
11 5 1 13 12 14 13
12 0 15 15 0 15 10
Table 7.2 Frequency with which Traders Purchase Information in the Pre-trade
Information Auction.
To directly evaluate the FRE and PI models’ predictions the RMSD of prices 
each period were computed for both and compared within a market on a period by 
period basis. In this comparative analysis the normal arithmetic mean is used to 
compute the RMSD, the use of Andrew’s M-estimator is not necessary. Comparisons 
were made for the first 45, 60 and 90 seconds of trade in a period and over the entire 
trading period duration (RMSD45,60,90 and RMSD, respectively). Table 7.3 
contains the outcomes of these comparisons for the two information structure types. 
The percentages are calculated based on the total number of periods for which the two 
models predicted disparate equilibrium prices 5. The predictive accuracy of the price 
predictions o f the FRE model are far higher than that of the PI model for both the PM 
and IM markets. Aggregated separately across all three markets in the PM and IM 
environments (Overall) the RMSD of the FRE model is less than that of the PI model 
in 88.89% and 82.22% of periods, respectively. The comparison also provides 
evidence o f the superiority of the FRE model for all three measures of early in a 
period.
45 N o te  tha t, b ecau se  o f  the recalcu la tion  o f  th e  PI p rice  in periods w here  the pred iction  
changed  due to  non -u n ifo rm  d istribu tion  o f  p riva te  in fo rm ation , th e  FR E  and  PI p rices m ay be 
eq u iv a len t in ce rta in  periods. A s w ith the o ccu rren ce  o f  sta te  Z in the PM  m arkets, these  periods can 
no t be  used in th e  co m p ara tiv e  analysis. T he p e rio d s in question  are 2 , 7, 8, 9 and  14 in C K PM  and 
period  9 in V K PM .
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Percentage Comparison(%)
Market Performance RMSD45 RMSD60 RMSD90 RMSD
CKPM FRE<PI 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
FRE>PI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FRE=PI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
VKPM FRE<PI 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
FRE>PI 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
FRE=PI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
VUPM FRE<PI 76.67 76.67 76.67 76.67
FRE>PI 23.33 23.33 23.33 23.33
FRE=PI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Overall FRE<PI 88.89 88.89 88.89 88.89
FRE>PI 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11
FRE=PI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CKIM FRE<PI 73.33 73.33 73.33 73.33
FRE>PI 26.67 26.67 26.67 26.67
FRE=PI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
VKIM FRE<PI 66.67 66.67 66.67 66.67
FRE>PI 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33
FRE=PI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
VUIM FRE<PI 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
FRE>PI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FRE=PI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Overall FRE<PI 80.00 80.00 80.00 82.22
FRE>PI 20.00 20.00 20.00 17.78
FRE=PI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 7.3 Comparison of RMSD of Price Predictions for FRE and PI
The disparate predictions of the FRE and PI models regarding end-period 
allocations are now used to compare their predictive abilities. The two models can be 
evaluated based on a comparison of the number o f assets misallocated when 
compared to their equilibrium predictions46. In this analysis it is possible to make use 
o f all 15 periods, because the two models never make the same prediction. It must 
again be recognised that the PI equilibrium requires a greater number of trades than 
the FRE equilibrium. Caution must be exercised when comparing misallocations so 
as not to succumb to any bias that this would introduce. The 8 measure introduced in 
Chapter Five is again used to avoid such bias. The size of the indiscriminate region 
depends on whether the information structure is perfect of imperfect, taking the values
46 See A p p en d ix  3 fo r an exp lan a tio n  o f  the FR E  and  PI en d -p e rio d  asse t allocations.
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0 < d < 4 and 0 < d < 6 , respectively. As displayed in Table 7.4, aggregated over all 
the PM markets, the FRE model makes superior allocation predictions in 68.89% of 
periods. In these markets the PI models never misallocates fewer assets than the FRE 
model. In contrast, the PI model is superior in the IM markets, though not as 
strikingly, with fewer misallocations in 33.33% of periods compared to a 
corresponding figure o f 6.67% for the FRE model. For the majority of periods, 
60.00%, the comparison of the number o f assets misallocated falls within the 
indiscriminate region.
Market Performance Percentage M arket Perform ance Percentage
ComparisonComparison
Table 7.4 Comparison of Misallocation of Assets for FRE and PI
To summarise the results so far, the comparison of the RMSD of prices from 
the theoretically predicted equilibrium price predictions o f the two models offers 
conclusive support in favour of the superiority of the predictions of the FRE model, 
particularly in the PM markets. Comparison of the number of assets misallocated 
provides strong support in favour of the FRE model in PM markets, but weaker
support for the PI model in IM markets.
Two further measures of performance readily adopted in the experimental
asset market literature can also be used to distinguish between the two competing
models. The first of these is the measure of trading efficiency, %GAIN. Recall that,
given the definition, the initial allocation of assets each period produces a %GA1N ol
0% whereas the end period equilibrium allocation of the FRE model produces a
%GAIN o f 100%. Table 7.5 illustrates that the level o f %GAIN for the PM markets
exhibits a degree of variability, from a maximum of 100.00%, through 0% to a
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minimum of -6.25%. The average %GAIN observed in the CKPM, VKPM and 
VUPM markets are 58.92%, 71.49% and 53.53%, respectively. The corresponding 
average %GAIN figures for the CKIM, VKIM and VUIM markets are much lower at 
16.71%, 15.34% and 17.22%, respectively. The IM markets also exhibit far higher 
variability from a maximum %GAIN of 81.58%, through 0% to a minimum o f -  
50.00%.
VUPM
1 73.6842 59.8684 4.6053 42.7083 -14.5833 -4.1667
2 29.1667 70.8333 79.1667 20.8333 33.3333 50.0000
3 12,5000 37.5000 6.2500 58.5526 56.5789 19.7368
4 43.7500 50.0000 -6.2500 81.5789 4.6053 21.0526
5 84.2105 100.0000 63.1579 -31.2500 18.7500
-6.2500
6 79.6053 92.1053 81.5789 62.5000 62.5000 70.8333
7 20.8333 100.0000 95.8333 -37.5000 -37.5000 0.0000
8 54.1667 4.1667 54.1667 -43.7500 -25.0000 -37.5000
9 0.0000 66.6667 41.6667 76.9737 76.9737 67.7632
10 81.2500 100.0000 75.0000 -50.0000 -31.2500
-50.0000
11 87.5000 100.0000 56.2500 -8.3333 20.8333 29.1667
12 79.6053 57.8947 47.3684 33.3333 29.1667
29.1667
13 68.7500 50.0000 43.7500 26.3158 33.5526
41.4474
14 75.0000 95.8333 79.1667 -18.7500 -31.2500 -6.2500
15 93.7500 87.5000 81.2500 37.5000
TZTTTt
33.3333 33.3333
17 ????
Table 7.5 Percentage of Gains from Trade Exhausted per Period
The low mean %GAIN figures for the IM markets could be interpreted as 
being more in favour o f the PI model than the FRE model. However, consideration 
must also be given to the gains from trade to be exploited under the PI model, relative 
to the zero trade gains. These gains depend on the end-period equilibrium allocations 
of the PI model. Thus the PI gains from trade are state contingent and take the values 
0f  _400, 0 and 7,600 emus under the states X, Y and Z, respectively, for both PM and 
IM markets assuming the uniform distribution of private information. Before 
continuing it must be recognised that the gains from trade under the FRE and PI 
models are equal when the state of nature is Z, because both predict type 2 traders to 
hold the assets. For this reason those periods where the state of nature is Z cannot be 
used in the following comparative analysis. Note also that the endogenous 
determination o f insiders impacts on the PI model’s allocation predictions and so 
consequently on the gains from trade predicted. For the periods 2, 7, 8, 9 and 14 of 
CKPM (state Y) the PI model’s allocation predictions change and become identical to
213
the FRE model’s, thus these periods cannot be used in the comparison. The allocation 
prediction for period 9 o f VKIM alters, resulting in gains from trade of -400 for this 
occurrence o f the state Y. For all other periods the gains from trade detailed above 
are applicable.
In the PM markets the number o f periods where the realised gains from trade 
are negative when the state is X is 0 out of 19 discriminating periods (18 state X plus
1 state Y) offering overwhelming support for the FRE model. When the state is Y the 
PI model predicts zero gains from trade, however, in 9 out o f 9 discriminating periods 
the realised gains from trade were positive for the PM markets. Again, overwhelming 
support for the FRE model. For the IM markets, however, there are 13 out of 15 
discriminating periods where the realised gains are negative, offering support in 
favour of the PI model. In contrast, there are 15 out o f 18 discriminating periods 
where the realised gains from trade are positive in state Y periods, providing strong 
evidence in favour o f the FRE model. For the IM markets it is not possible to claim
the superiority of one model over another.
Finally, the performance of the FRE and PI models are evaluated by 
comparing the profit o f the informed to that o f the uninformed on a period by period 
basis. The FRE model would predict no difference in the average level ot profit 
across the two kinds o f traders, whereas the PI model would predict higher average 
profits of informed traders over uninformed traders. These predictions stem trom the 
value of private information under the two models, which is zero and positive for the 
FRE and PI models, respectively. Table 7.6 contains the average profit ol the 
informed and the uninformed, in emus, for the PM and IM markets. I he gross profits 
of the informed exceed those for the uninformed by considerable amounts in both PM 
and IM markets. Net of information costs the figures are much closer as would be 
expected, however, the informed still earn excess profits on average. The ditterence 
in average profits constitutes weak evidence against the strictest interpretation of the 
FRE model in which price signals instantaneously reveal the state the nature, 
therefore, it is not construed as fatally condemning.
Gross Profit
Market Informed Uninformed
Net P r o f i t _____________
Informed U n u fo w K
Table 7.6 Average Profit (Gross and Net) of Informed and Uninformed Tra
In conclusion, the evidence from this comparative analysis of the PM ma 
very strongly supports the superiority of the FRE model over the PI model tor 
majority of the comparative measures reported. In contrast the evidence from 
markets is mixed. A comparison of the RMSD of prices from the equilibrium p 
predictions of the two models offers strong support in favour of the superiority ot t e 
predictions of the FRE model. Comparison of the number o f assets misallocate 
however, provides weak support in favour of the PI model. In the prcsen 
increased state uncertainty due to imperfect information the FRE model does not 
dominate the PI model on most comparative measures as it clearly does whe
information structure is perfect.
Information Markets
The pre-,rade information auction can also provide discriminatory 
comparisons o f the predictive accuracy of the two models. The FRE model predicts 
that the private information is worthless and so should not command a market price. 
In contrast, the PI model predicts the private nitormalion will retain posit 
because the price signal does not reveal the underlying state o f nature. The data 
generated by the information markets will now be exploited to discriminate between 
the two competing models. The purchase price is used as a measure ot the private
information's value.
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The Figures 7.7-7.S display the purchase price paid for private information 
against the period number, for the PM and IM markets. The purchase price remains 
positive for all periods, but does, however, decline as low as 1 emu in period 8 of 
VKPM. The erratic nature of the information cost per period makes it difficult to 
draw any firm conclusions in favour o f one model over another. The exception is 
VUPM where the cost shows no sign of declining and so provides support in favour 
of the PI model. More comprehensive analyses are required to come to a conclusion.
Sunder (1992) uses the p slope coefficient form an OLS regression of 
information cost against period number to determine whether the information cost 
shows any tendency to decline over time towards the FRE prediction of zero. Table 
7.7 reports p coefficients and associated levels o f statistical significance for the 
markets studied here. A negative p coefficient that is statistically significant is 
construed as strong evidence in favour of the FRE model, a negative coefficient that is 
not statistically significant provides week evidence in favour of the FRE model, 
whilst a positive p coefficient would be construed at strong evidence in support of the 
PI model. All reported P coefficients are negatively signed offering weak support for 
the FRE model (though the VUPM coefficient is only very marginally negative). 
Two o f the markets generate p coefficients that are statistically significant from zero 
at, or below, the 5% level. This is interpreted as providing strong evidence in support 
of the FRE model. In no market is the p coefficient positively signed, therefore, the 
evidence does not support the PI model. Using linear regression it is possible to 
estimate the number o f periods (independent variable) required for the information 
cost (dependent variable) to decline to zero. The estimated number of periods are 32, 
13, infinity, 52, 88 and 68 for the markets CKPM, VKPM, VUPM, CKIM, VKIM and 
VUIM, respectively. The VUPM information cost is effectively a constant of 
approximately 150 emus and is independent of period number. With the exception of 
VUPM, the information cost in all markets would tend to zero if there were a 
sufficient number of periods (experience).
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M arket P coefficient a  -values
CKPM -9.0500 0.1172
VKPM -23.7964 0.0001
VUPM -0.4750 0.1631
CKIM -2.9036 0.0257
VKIM -1.6821 0.6115
VUIM -2.3571 0.0709
Table 7.7 p Slope Coefficient of Information Cost Regressed Against Period Number
Sunder (1992) also reports a comparison of the mean information cost early in 
an experimental session with the mean cost late in an experimental session. The null 
hypothesis is of no statistical difference in the mean early information cost and the 
mean late information cost. The alternative hypothesis is that the mean early 
information cost is greater than the mean late information cost (in favour of the FRE 
model). Table 7.8 reports the results of a similar comparison for the markets studied 
here, where the first seven periods comprise the measure o f early and the last seven 
periods comprise the measure o f late. Period 8 is used as cut off to discriminate more 
cleanly between the two measures. The interpretation of the WSR test significance 
levels is problematic because o f the dependence in the data that arises from increasing 
experience as the period number increases. It would not make sense to incorporate 
the adjustment process used elsewhere in this research to remove the dependence 
from the period by period data because the technique renders the effect of any 
treatment a purely levels effect. The comparison of mean information costs both early 
and late requires the trend component to be retained and present in the data. Thus 
caution must be exercised in the interpretation o f the significance levels. For this 
reason little more is made o f the results reported in Table 7.8 than to suggest that, 
aggregated across all six markets, the mean early information cost may well exceed 
the mean late information cost. If true this would be evidence in support of the FRE 
model.
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M arket WSR Test One-tail 
cl-values
CKPM 0.1036
VKPM 0.0900
VUPM 0.4270
CKIM 0.0574
VKIM 0.1990
VUIM 0.0089
Overall 0.00005
Table 7.8 Comparison of Mean Early and Mean Late Information Costs
In summary, the use o f the data from the information auctions does not offer 
definitive evidence in favour o f the FRE model, however, neither is the evidence 
particularly favourable for the PI model. Five of the six markets display clear 
evidence of information costs tending to zero. This result is in line with the findings 
reported in Sunder (1992) and Ackert et al (1997).
7.4.3 Impact o f  Period Duration on Market Behaviour
The analysis in this subsection is concerned with an evaluation of the impact 
of both varying period durations and uncertain period durations on the trading 
behaviour observed in experimental asset markets that are preceded by a pre-trade 
information auction. The analysis will be conducted relative to the benchmark 
provided by the FRE model’s equilibrium predictions, as has been the convention in 
the two previous chapters. The discussion begins with a preliminary investigation of 
observed market performance by way of graphical representation, for which the 
unadjusted raw data is sufficient. The analysis concludes with a direct evaluation of 
the stated hypotheses (see Chapter Five) and incorporates the data adjusted to remove 
dependence and the influence of extreme observations. The use of the acronym 
RMSD in the discussion to follow will always refer to the root mean squared 
deviation o f transaction prices where the mean is in fact replaced by Andrew s M- 
estimator.
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The preliminary analysis begins by comparing the volume of trade per period 
across markets to observe the influence o f period duration. So as to control for the 
disparate period durations across the six markets the NORMVOL measure previously 
defined (see Chapter Five) is once more used for the comparisons to avoid any bias 
due to the duration of trade in each period. Figures 7.9-7.10 display the normalised 
volume of trade per period for the markets grouped by information structure. The 
NORMVOL measure for the CKPM market exceeds those for the other two PM 
markets in 8 o f the 15 periods. Thus it appears that the CKPM market generates the 
fastest rate o f trade, with a mean of 0.0575 in comparison to the figures of 0.0524 and 
0.0483 for VKPM and VUPM, respectively. The evidence is supported by the IM 
market results with CKIM’s NORMVOL measure highest in of 9 out of the 15 
periods. The mean CKIM rate of trade is 0.0619, exceeding the measures of 0.0443 
and 0.0476 for VKIM and VUIM, respectively. The comparison between the VKPM 
and VUPM NORMVOL measures results in the former exceeding the latter in 9 
periods, whereas the reverse is true in only 4 periods. Thus the uncertainty over 
period duration, relative to varying period durations appears to result in a less 
aggressive trading when the information structure is perfect. In contrast, the reverse is 
true for the VKIM and VUIM comparison, with the former exceeding the latter in 
only 3 periods, whereas the reverse is true in 9 periods. Thus the uncertainty over 
period duration, relative to varying period durations appears to result in a more 
aggressive trading when the information structure is imperfect. A more 
comprehensive analysis o f the impact o f uncertain period durations on the rate ol 
trade in a period is reported shortly.
Figures 7.1-7.6 display the sequence o f transaction prices per period for each 
of the six markets. All three PM markets display a tendency to converge to the FRE 
price from period 2 onwards. The degree of convergence is most marked in the 
VKPM market, closely followed by the CKPM market. The VUPM market exhibits 
slightly less tendency to converge, which is most noticeable for state of nature Z. T he 
IM markets exhibit significantly reduced levels o f convergence to the FRE 
equilibrium price than the PM markets. From simple observation it is difficult to 
determine which, if  any, o f the three markets CKIM, VKIM or VUIM exhibits the 
greatest degree o f convergence. It appears, however, that the VUIM market is more 
responsive to the state of nature than the other two markets.
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Figure 7.11 Root Mean (Andrew) Squared Deviation of Transaction Prices per
Period -  PM Markets
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Figure 7.12 Root Mean (Andrew) Squared Deviation o f Transaction Prices per
Period -  IM Markets
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In an attempt to better see the convergence o f transactions to FRE prices the 
Figures 7.11-7.12 ill us, rate th e  RMSD of prices per p e r io d , c o m p u te d  using the 
Andrew M-estimator, for the three markets grouped by information structure. 
Unfortunately these functions are fair,y en.atic wjth ,he market type with the
highest/lowest RMSD changing on a regular basis from period to period. It is very 
difficult, therefore, to draw any conclusions concerning the impact o f period duration 
on the informational efficiency o f the experimental markets simply from a graphical 
representation o f the data. T h e  only striking observation to be drawn co n c e rn s  the 
failure o f  all IM markets to fully react to state o f nature Z, the occurrence of which 
corresponds to all the peaks in RMSD displayed in the two figures. A more 
comprehensive investigation by way of statistical testing is required to determine if 
any effect o f period duration is present. T h e  results o f such an evaluation are reported 
after the preliminary investigation is concluded. Preliminary investigations of the 
trading efficiency and the profits earned by informed and uninformed traders are now 
considered.
The %GAIN measure was used to compare the trading efficiency across 
market types. The measure was normalised to control for disparate period durations, 
giving the measure NORM%GAIN. Figures 7.13-7, ,14 display the NORM%GAlN 
figures per period lor each market, grouped by information structure. The 
NORM%GAIN figures for the PM markets are generally relatively high. On 6 
occasions out of the 15 periods the CKPM markets generate the highest, 
NORM%GAIN measure. The corresponding figures for the VKPM and VUPM 
markets are 7 and 2, respectively. The VKPM markets seem to generate a slightly 
higher level of NORM%GAIN than the CKPM markets and a much higher level 
compared to the VUPM markets. This is evidenced by the higher mean 
NORM%GAIN of 0.3032 for the VKPM markets compared to the values of 0.2455 
and 0.2145 for the CKPM and VUPM markets, respectively. It appears that on 
average the level of trading efficiency attained is lowest under the VUPM markets. 
The mean NORM%GAIN figures for the IM markets (0.0673, 0.0784 and 0.0950 for 
CKIM, VKIM and VUIM, respectively) are generally much lower than the PM 
market figures and display a greater tendency for negative realised gains from trade. 
The NORM%GAIN figures for all three IM markets are very erratic and so it is 
difficult to draw any decisive conclusions regarding any impact of period duration on 
these markets.
Normalised % Gains
Norm  
% Gain
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The mean %GAIN values reported in Table 7.6 can be investigated more 
closely to separate the efficiency loss between either a missed trade or an error trade. 
The mean percentage efficiency loss associated with missed and error trades are 
reported in Table 7.9. For five of the six markets the mean efficiency loss figures for 
missed trades exceed those error trades, with the effect most pronounced in the PM 
markets. The exception is the CKIM market. It is difficult to conclude from this 
analysis how, if at all, period duration impacts upon the manner in which the 
efficiency losses arise.
Market
Percentage o f  Efficiency Loss
Missed Trades Error Trades
CKPM 89.89% 10.11%
VKPM 68.75% 4.58%
VUPM 82.89% 17.11%
CKIM 39.79% 60.21%
VKIM 57.26% 42.74%
VUIM 59.52% 40.48%
Table 7.9 Mean Percentage o f Efficiency Losses due to Missed and Error Trades
The final preliminary analysis of trading behaviour incorporates a comparison 
o f the average profits earned by informed and uniformed traders on a period by period 
basis. The FRE model in its strictest interpretation would predict no difference in the 
average profits of the two groups of traders. Figures 7.15-7.18 display the difference 
between the average (gross or net) profit of the informed and uninformed traders for 
each o f the markets on a period by period basis. A positive observation indicates 
excess informed profits and a negative observation indicates excess uninformed 
profits.
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Uninformed Traders per Period -  IM Markets
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The gross profit functions from a„ six market§ y£ry Uttle by way of
trend, thus, it is difficult to draw strong inferences from the two figures. In terms of 
the impact of period duration, the same is true of the net profit functions. These 
functions, however, do provide one interesting insight. With the exception of the state 
of nature Z, the net profit of the uninformed exceeds that of the informed in most 
other periods. This is true irrespective o f information structure. It is possible to 
conclude from this that the informed traders are paying too much for the private 
information they receive47. This result has implications for the comparative analysis 
of the FRE and PI models carried out above on the information auction data. The 
FRE model predictions the zero worth o f private information, insiders may, however, 
have ‘overvalued' the information thus biasing the analysis against the FRE model 
and in favour o f the PI model. This can only strengthen the case for the FRE model. 
Figures 7.17-7.18 below display the excess average net profit of the informed traders 
over the uninformed. The majority of periods display a negative value for this 
measure, providing evidence to support the belief that the informed traders are paying 
too much for the private information.
The results o f a more comprehensive investigation of the impact of period 
duration on market behaviour by way of formal hypotheses testing will now be 
reported. The analysis o f the stated hypotheses begins with a brief commentary of the 
Figures 7.19-7.20, which display the three measures o f the volume of trade early m a 
period (VOL45,60,90) for the markets grouped by parameter design. This is followed 
by a commentary on the Figures 7.21-7.22, which graph the three measures of RMSD 
early in period (RMSD45,60,90). The analysis concludes by reporting and 
interpreting the statistical significant levels for the rejection of the null hypotheses 
(1H0, 2.1 H0, 2.2H0, 3.1H0 and 3.2H0).
47 A fo rm  o f  w in n e r’s cu rse .
228
Panel A
Volume of Trade: 45 Seconds
Panel B
Period
□  CKPM B V K P M  Q VUPM
Volume of Trade: 60 Seconds
Panel C
Volume of Trade: 90 Seconds
Figure 7.19 Volume of Trade in the First 45, 60 and 90 Seconds of Trade -  PM
Markets
Panel A
PanelB
229
Volume of Trade: 45 Seconds
Volume of Trade: 60 Seconds
9 10 11 12 13 14 15
□  CKIM BVKIM DVUIM
Panel C
Volume of Trade: 90 Seconds
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Period 
E3CKIM HVKIM DVUIM
Figure 7.20 Volume o f Trade in the First 45, 60 and 90 Seconds of Trade -  IM
Markets
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Figure 7.21 RMSD of Prices in the First 45, 60 and 90 Seconds of Trade -  PM
Markets
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Figure 7.22 RMSD of Prices in the First 45, 60 and 90 Seconds o f Trade -  IM
Markets
For all three measures of W n , ’ ™ is veryearly the volume of trade in the PM markets
erratic, with the market with the highest volume changing on a regular basis from 
period to period. No clear indication of the impact o f period duration can be inferred. 
For the IM markets this is not the case. The volume o f trade across the three markets 
is not as erratic. Across all three measures o f early the CKIM markets appear to 
generate a volume o f trade in excess o f the VKIM market in a number o f periods. 
Whilst there appears little to differentiate between the CKIM and VUIM markets, the 
later market also seems to generate higher volumes o f trade in some periods, relative 
to the VKIM market. A graphical interpretation of the IM data supports the b e l i e f  that 
the volume o f trade, early in a period, is influenced by the period duration with the 
VUIM market generating a higher volume o f trade. The results o f statistical tests of 
the impact are reported shortly.
Graphical representation of the RMSD early in a period is provided by Figures 
7.21-7.22. For all three measures o f early in a period the RMSD measures are fairly 
erratic for the PM markets, with the market with the highest/lowest value changing on 
a regular basis. In contrast the IM markets all exhibit very similar functions for all 
three of the measures RMSD(45, 60, 90). It is impossible to arrive at any strong 
conclusions concerning the impact o f period duration on the RMSD of prices from the 
FRE price.
The failure to draw any strong inferences of the influence of period duration 
on observed early market behaviour (VOL or RMSD) from simple graphical 
representation necessitates a more formal approach. The investigation, therefore, will 
now turn to an explicit statistical evaluation of the stated hypotheses.
Tables 7.10 and 7.11 report the level of statistical significance for which the 
null hypotheses, of no statistical difference in mean values across the two paired 
markets can be rejected for the PM and IM market, respectively. Attention is once 
more drawn to the fact that the data used in the following statistical tests has been 
adjusted in order to remove the intra-market dependence of observations across 
periods. For the RMSD, VOL, NORMVOL and NORM%GAIN variables, the 
figures reported are means o f the unadjusted values, across all trading periods. For 
each variable, the figure in parentheses reports the mean o f the adjusted values. I he 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test (WSR) was used to compute two-tail significance levels, 
based on 15 paired observations, for the comparisons between the three market types. 
Recall that the CK:VU comparison confounds the effects of both varying period
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durations and uncertain period durations. The two effects can be isolated and 
analysed separately from one another via the CK:VK and VK:VU comparisons. The 
results of the CK:VU comparisons will not, therefore, generally be discussed directly. 
The remainder of this section will consider separately the impact of period duration on 
the volume o f trade early in a period, the informational efficiency and the overall 
allocational efficiency of the experimental markets CK, VK and VU. The analysis is
performed separately on the PM and IM markets.
Variable Market means (Adjusted Means) WSR Two-tail a-values
CKPM VKPM VUPM CKPM:
VKPM
CKPM:
VUPM
VKPM:
VUPM
VOL45 1.6667 1.7333 1.800 0.3343 0.5321 0.1556
VOL6O
(1.8299)
2.2000
(1.6413)
2.8000
(1.8959)
2.4667 0.9096 0.9096 0.6909
VOL90
(2.4743)
3.8667
(2.7330)
4.1333
(2.5420)
3.800 0.4603 0.4265 1.0000
NORMVOL
(4.1440)
0.0575
(0.0545)
(4.0030)
0.0524
(0.0509)
(3.8244)
0.0483
(0.0485)
0.4955 0.3635 0.2805
RMSD45 111.6958 147.9507 171.9100 0.4603 0.7333 0.4603
RMSD60
(127.2370)
119.4077
(119.1727)
133.4501
(143.9317)
170.6865 0.2330 0.6496 0.3635
RMSD90
(131.1053)
113.1627
(105.6831)
111.8327
(142.4290)
163.9640 0.1118 0.5701 0.0995
RMSD
(130.4018)
90.7525
(102.4972)
(92.7783)
87.1397
(65.6754)
(134.9071)
135.3720
(106.9726)
0.0268 0.6496 0.1728
NORM% 0.2455 0.3032 0.2145 0.6092 0.7764 0.0884
GAIN (0.2678) (0.2891) (0.2577)
Table 7.10 Summary Table of Market Means (Adjusted Means) and Wilcoxon Signed
Ranks Test Two-tail Significance Levels.
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Variable Market means (Adjusted Means) >% ? [1. ? 
1
■values _
CKIM VKIM VUIM CKIM:
VKIM
CKIM:
VVIM
VKIM:
VUIM^_
VOL45 2.0000 1.2667 2.0000 0.0007 0.2330 0 .002^
VOL6O
(2.0320)
2.7333
(1.1327)
2.0667
(1.9326)
2.5333 0.0007 0.0609 0.0409
VOL 90
(2.6529)
4.4000
(1.8363)
3.4000
(2.3940)
4.1333 0.0012 0.0995 0.0090
NORMVOL
(4.4042)
0.0619
(3.0939)
0.0443
(4.1217)
0.0476 0.0199 0.1556 0.0409
(0.0591) (0.0432) (0.0479)
RMSD45 206.8142 195.1038 279.4136 0.9096 0.2330 0.3066
RMSD60
(205.6309)
205.4429
(200.7549)
197.4537
(302.9129)
198.3139 0.8203 0.3066 0.6906
RMSD90
(203.9369)
203.4377
(202.5641)
194.5666
(190.5495)
199.1760 0.8203 0.3635 0.6496
RMSD
(198.0157)
195.5250
(199.0151)
189.3137
(190.2554)
196.2242 0.8203 0.7764 0.7764
(191.2118) (193.2263) (188.6278) .__
NORM% 0.0673 0.0784 0.0950 0.0268 0.0468 0.4265
GAIN (0.0083) (0.0820) (0.0927)
Table 7.11 Summary Table of Market Means (Adjusted Means) and Wilcoxon Signed
Ranks Test Two-tail Significance Levels 
Volume of Trade
Beginning with the PM market comparisons, the mean volume of trade in the 
VKPM markets, for all three measures of early (VOL 45, 60, 90), do not differ 
statistically from the corresponding values for the CKPM markets (ct—0.4603,
0.23330 and 0.1118, respectively). In perfect information markets the mean volume 
o f trade early in a period is not influenced by the varying of period durations. By the 
end of the trading period the mean rate of trade in the CKPM and VKPM markets 
does not differ significantly. Analysis of the IM markets reveals a totally different 
interpretation. The mean volume o f trade in the CKIM market is significantly higher 
than that in the VKIM market for all three measures VOL(45,60,90) with significance 
levels o f cx=0.0007, 0.0007 and 0.0012, respectively. By the end of the period the 
mean rate of trade of 0.0591 for the CKIM markets is still statistically higher than the 
value o f 0.0432 for the VKIM markets (a=0.0199). As argued in a previous chapter, 
there is no obvious reason for varying period durations to influence either the early 
volume or rate of trade in a market because the average period duration is identical for
both the CK and VK markets It is unclear  ^ therefore! why the early volume and rate
of trade in the CKIM markets should be so significantly higher than those observed m 
the VKIM market.
he comparison of the VKPM and VUPM markets reveals no impact of th 
uncertain period duration on any of the volume measures. Thus the conclusion from 
Chapter Five o f more aggressive trading behaviour as a result of uncertainty 
concerning period durations, is not supported. In contrast, the evidence from the IM 
markets reveals significantly higher mean values for all three measure o f early volume 
in the VUIM market relative to the VKIM market. The mean values of 1.9326,
2 .j940 and 4.1217 for the measures VC>L(45,60,90) significantly exceed the 
corresponding figures of 1.1327, 1.8363 and 3.0939 for the VKIM market (a= 0 .0022,
0.0090 and 0.0409, respectively). In addition, the rate o f trade o f 0.0479 witnessed m 
the VUIM market is significantly higher than the rate o f trade of 0.0432 in the VKIM 
market (a=0.0409). In the more complex environments (imperfect information) of 
the IM markets the increased uncertainty over period duration results in mote 
aggressive trading behaviour. This is entirely the opposite conclusion arrived at in 
Chapter Six markets with imperfect information structures, which exhibited 
significantly more cautious trading behaviour. There is no obvious reason why this 
should be the case. The holistic analysis of Chapter Eight will attempt to reach a 
definitive conclusion.
Informational Efficiency
As with the previous two chapters the formal analysis continues with an 
investigation o f the informational efficiency observed in the experimental asset 
markets. The investigation begins with an evaluation o f hypothesis 2.1 Ho to 
determine the extent of any difference in transaction prices early in a period across the 
three markets, within an information structure. As reported in Tables 7.10 and 7.11, 
there are no significant differences in mean RMSD values for any of the three 
measures o f early. This is true for all market comparisons in both the PM and IM 
markets. The null hypothesis 2.1 Ho can not, therefore, be rejected. As a result, it 
would make no sense to formally evaluate hypothesis 2.2Ho for any of the PM or IM 
comparisons because no difference exists in the RMSD of early prices from the FRE 
model.
The markets were further compared to see if any difference existed between
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the RMSD of prices over an entire trading period. The only significant difference is 
reported in Table 7.10 for the comparison of the mean RMSD for the CKPM market 
and the VKPM market. The latter is significantly lower than the former, indicating a 
higher degree of informational efficiency (a=0.0268). Once again it would make no 
sense to formally evaluate hypothesis 2.2H0 because there is no significant difference 
in the mean NORMVOL measures o f the two markets.
The results reported in this chapter provide no evidence in support of 
Friedman’s (1984) view that a predetermined, known trading period duration is one of 
a number o f features that enhances the informational efficiency of experimental 
markets, irrespective of information structure.
Allocational Efficiency
In this final analysis it remains to determine the impact of the two treatments 
(VK and VU) on the level of allocational efficiency observed in the experimental 
asset markets studied. For the PM markets the analysis fails to reject the null 
hypothesis 3.1H0 o f no statistical difference between the mean NORM%GAlN 
figures in any of the paired comparisons. Therefore, in markets with perfect 
information structures there is no impact on the allocational efficiency of the markets 
as a result of the treatment period duration. In contrast, the results reported in Chapter 
Five for both the CKPN: VKPN and CKPN: VUPN comparisons provide statistically 
significant differences between the mean NORM%GAIN figures. It can be inferred, 
therefore, that the increase in experience level of the participants in the PM markets 
results in an increase in the allocational efficiency o f both the VKPM and VUPM 
markets relative to the CKPM market.
The results reported for the CKIM: VKIM and CKIM: VUIM comparisons 
provide evidence of statistically significant differences in mean NORM%GAIN 
figures. Once more this is in contrast to early results, this time reported in Chapter 
Six. O f particular interest is the significantly higher mean NORM%GAIN figure tor 
the VUIM market compared to the CKIM market (a=0.0468). In the complex 
environment o f imperfect information the uncertainty over period durations appears to 
facilitate the level of allocational efficiency attained.
7.5 Discussion and Conclusions
The chapter initially reviewed the few experimental asset market studies that 
included a pre-trade auction for the costly acquisition of private information. Section
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7.3 moved on to an explanation o f the specifics o f the experimental design employed 
for the six markets investigated in this chapter. Section 7.4 moved on to report and 
discuss the results of the analysis conducted. It is to a review of these results that the 
discussion in this final section now turns.
The comparative analysis of the FRE and PI models provided additional 
opportunities to evaluate the predictive accuracy of each model. The results from the 
three PM markets provided strong additional evidence in line with that reported in 
Chapter Five concerning the superiority of the FRE model. This was particularly 
evident from an analysis o f the prices at which assets trade. In contrast, the evidence 
in favour o f the FRE model is weaker in the IM markets. This too is in line with 
previous results, this time reported in Chapter Six. Casual comparison of the PN and 
IN markets with the PM and IM markets shows a significant improvement in all 
measures o f convergence to FRE equilibrium predictions. These improvements were 
attributed to the increased level of experience o f participants in the PM and IM 
markets.
Whilst not conclusive the results from the information auctions conducted 
could be construed as evidence in favour o f the FRE model over the PI model. The 
purchase price o f information shows signs o f convergence to zero in most of the 
markets studied. The fact that the value o f private information did not actually 
converge to zero could be due to a tendency to ‘overpay’ for the information on the 
part of the informed traders. The higher net profit o f the uninformed over that of the 
informed in many periods replicated the results in Ackert et al (1997) and was deemed 
evidence o f a kind of winner’s curse. The use of the purchase cost to proxy the value 
o f private information introduces a positive bias into the measure, to the detriment of 
the FRE model.
The results reported in the investigation of the impact o f period duration on 
observed market behaviour did not provide any decisive conclusions. For many of the 
comparisons the evidence reported in this chapter was contradictory to that reported in 
Chapters Five and Six for perfect and imperfect information structures, respectively. 
This is true o f many comparisons of the volume of trade plus the informational and 
allocational efficiency in all PM and IM markets. It is difficult to conclude whether 
uncertainty regarding period duration has a beneficial or detrimental effect on 
observed performance in DA markets. It is, therefore, not possible to generalise and 
infer the effect for the on-line auctions that have developed with the growth in virtual
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communities. In an attempt to provide definitive conclusions regarding the effect of 
period duration the following chapter will exploit the statistical power of the 3x2x2 
full factorial design of the entire experiment via a holistic analysis of the data.
239
Chapter Eight
8 H o l i s t i c  A n a l y s e s
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8.1 Introduction
The previous three chapters reported the results o f various analyses ot market 
performance grouped by experimental design. In the perfect information markets of 
Chapter Five the FRE model was clearly superior to the PI model. Uncertainty 
concerning period duration played a role in these simple markets, with a resultant 
increase in the both the early volume and the rate of trade observed, plus a reduction 
in the level o f informational efficiency displayed over an entire trading period. The 
complexity o f the trading environment was increased in the Chapter Six markets with 
the incorporation of imperfect information structures. The obvious superiority of the 
FRE model was no longer as apparent, with the PI model making better predictions 
under a number o f performance measures. Furthermore, contrary to the results 
reported for the PN markets, the coupling o f increased state uncertainty with period 
duration uncertainty resulted in a reduction in the volume of trade early in a period. 
There was little effect, however, on the level o f informational efficiency. The markets 
in Chapter Seven replicated those in Chapters Five and Six, with the inclusion of a 
pre-trade information auction and increased experience as slight modifications to the 
experimental design. The perfect information markets clearly displayed the 
superiority o f the FRE model, whereas the imperfect markets only offered weak 
evidence in the model’s support. Unfortunately the reported results were 
contradictory with respect to the effect o f uncertain period durations for many of the 
measures of market performance adopted.
The purpose of this chapter is to offer an overall analysis of all 18 
experimental asset markets conducted in an attempt to derive clear conclusions 
concerning the performance o f the FRE model and the influence o f uncertain period 
durations on observed market performance. The experimental design also allows 
other interesting effects to be investigated, including the impact of the information 
structure and the confounded effects of information auctions and experience level. To 
this end the analysis to follow will exploit the strength of the 3x2x2 full factorial 
experimental design that is constructed when the four groups o f experimental asset 
markets are combined layer upon layer. Table 4.4 o f Chapter Four summarises how 
the four groups are combined to create the full factorial experiment. The benefit of 
analysing all four groups o f markets collectively is an increased number of paired 
observations, providing greater discriminatory power to the statistical tests employed.
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The benefit derived from the use of a full factorial design is the ability to block out 
confounding effects, which provides for the analysis o f a single treatment effect in 
isolation. The result is a heightened conviction in the results reported from such an 
analysis.
The chapter is separated into sections investigating different aspects of market 
performance and the influence o f different treatment effects. The structure of the 
chapter is as follows. The next section reports the results of a comparison of the 
predictive powers o f the FRE and PI models. Section 8.3 reports the results of the 
investigation o f the impact o f period duration on observed market behaviour. This 
issue is the main focus o f this research. The subsequent section reports the results 
from an analysis of the impact o f information structure on observed market behaviour. 
Section 8.5 offers a discussion concerning the effect o f the confounded factors, 
information auction and experience level. The concluding section offers a summary 
and draws conclusions.
8.2 FRE v PI: Com parative Performance Evaluation
The results from previous chapters support the belief that the FRE model is 
clearly a superior predictor of market performance in the simple, perfect information 
markets. The evidence from the more demanding imperfect information markets is 
not so decisive one way or another, but offers the conclusion that the performance of 
the FRE model is at least weakened. The analysis here will attempt to draw definitive 
inferences concerning the superiority o f one model over another. The various 
performance measures adopted in previous chapters will once more be employed.
Firstly, the RMSD of transaction prices from the equilibrium predictions of the 
FRE and PI models across all the 270 trading periods (18 markets each with 15 
trading periods) were computed and compared over the first 45, 60 and 90 seconds of 
trade plus an entire period’s trade. O f the 270 trading periods, however, the price 
predictions o f the two models were identical on 39 occasions, thus preventing any 
discrimination between the two models. These periods were not included in the 
analysis, which was based on the remaining 237 trading periods. For the four 
measures RMSD45, RMSD60, RMSD90 and RMSD entire period the percentage of 
periods in which the RMSD of prices from the FRE prediction is lower than for the PI 
prediction are 74.68%, 75.11%, 76.79% and 78.06%, respectively. The evidence 
supports the view that the FRE model is clearly superior to the PI model. In addition,
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whilst slight, there is a clear increase in the percentage o f  periods in which the FRE 
model is superior as the duration o f trade increases. This is interpreted as evidence of 
an adaptive component in trading behaviour towards the FRE equilibrium price, 
within a period.
The second performance measure employed is the number o f assets 
misallocated with respect to the FRE and PI models’ end period allocation 
predictions. The number o f periods upon which this analysis is based is all 270, 
because there are no periods where the two models make the same predictions 
concerning the allocation o f assets. In 45.93% of periods the number o f assets 
misallocated by the FRE model is lower than the figure for the PI model, whilst the 
reverse is true in a only 12.59% o f periods. Recall that in order to prevent any bias in 
the misallocation comparison an indiscriminate region, d ,  was defined. A total 
41.48% of periods fall into this indiscriminate region. Similar comparisons were 
performed across all perfect information markets and all imperfect information 
markets. The percentage o f periods in which the FRE model makes fewer 
misallocations is 62.96% and 28.89% for the perfect and imperfect markets, 
respectively. The corresponding percentages for the PI model are 5.19% and 20.00%, 
respectively. Therefore, even in the more demanding imperfect information 
environment the FRE model performs better than the PI model. The evidence 
regarding the misallocation o f assets is more favourable to the FRE model than the PI 
model and so is interpreted as supporting the superiority o f the FRE model.
Previous chapters made use o f a simple test to discriminate between the FRE 
and PI models based on the sign of the predicted gains from trade. The predicted 
gains are always positive for the FRE model, whereas the PI model predicts negative 
or zero gains from trade in some periods. The results from the previous chapters will 
be aggregated here to give an overall indication o f this measure. Across all 18 
markets there were 105 occasions where the PI prediction was either negative or zero. 
On only 46 occasions (43.81%) were the realised gains from trade either negative or 
zero. Therefore, on the majority o f occasions (56.19%) this simple test favours the 
FRE model over the PI model.
A final measure reported in previous chapters is the degree of excess profits 
earned by informed traders over uninformed traders. The FRE model would predict 
this measure to be zero in equilibrium, whilst the PI model would predict a positive 
value. On many occasions this measure was interpreted as weak evidence against the
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FRE model. Aggregated over all 270 trading periods, the percentage o f periods where 
the measure was positive is 62.59%, which again offers weak support o f the PI model. 
This is only interpreted as weak support because the FRE prediction of zero excess 
profit would require the price signal to reveal the state o f nature immediately upon the 
commencement of trade. This interpretation of the FRE model is excessively strict. 
As indicated in the RMSD comparisons above, the observed market behaviour 
appears to be adaptive towards the FRE equilibrium rather than instantaneous. For 
this reason this measure of comparative performance is given less emphasis than the 
other ones employed.
To conclude this comparative analysis o f the predictive performances of the 
FRE and PI models, the evidence reported above, which utilises all 18 asset markets, 
is interpreted as providing much greater support in favour of the FRE model than it 
generates for the PI model. Whilst trading behaviour may not instantaneously adhere 
to the prescriptions of the FRE model, it does, however, converge to these equilibrium 
predictions over time. The role of experience, both within a period and within a 
market, is clearly important. The importance o f experience was alluded to in Chapter 
Seven when the performance in the PM markets relative to the FRE benchmark far 
exceeded that in the PN markets in which participants were less experienced.
8.3 Period Duration
This section employs the data from all 18 experimental asset markets to 
analyse the impact of period duration on the observed market behaviour. The effect is 
separated between the influence of varying the period durations (VK markets) and the 
effect of uncertainty concerning the period durations (VU markets). The data 
analysed has been adjusted to remove the influence of outliers and dependence. The 
data is aggregated across the CK, VK and VU markets in a number of paired 
comparisons. The observations are paired across markets where the only difference in 
experimental design is the period duration type (that is, CK, VK or VU), therefore, the 
impact o f all other confounding treatment effects is blocked out and thus controlled. 
The measures VOL(45,60,90), NORMVOL, RMSD(45,60,90), RMSD over the entire 
period and the NORM%GAIN are used to compare the observed market behaviour. 
Table 8.1 reports the two-tail statistical significance levels for which the null 
hypothesis o f no difference in mean values can be rejected for all the paired 
comparisons, based on the WSR test on the data aggregated across the CK, VK and
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VU markets. The number of paired observations employed in each test is n=90.
The comparison of the CK and VK markets for the measures o f the volume of 
trade provide evidence of a statistically significant reduction in the mean VOL45 and 
NORMVOL measures as a result o f incorporating varying period durations. In 
contrast the uncertainty over period duration clearly has a major significant influence 
on the observed volume. The VK:VU comparison reveals higher mean values for the 
VU markets, which are highly significant for all measures with the exception of the 
VOL6O measure. This measure is only marginally insignificant and would have been 
classed a significant result had one-tail tests been employed. The uncertainty over 
period duration clearly results in a more aggressive trading behaviour.
A comparison of the measures o f RMSD for the CK:VK pairing also results in 
significant differences in mean values. The mean RMSD45 measure for the VK 
markets is significantly higher than the mean CK value, however, by the time 60 
seconds of trade in a period has passed the mean VK values are significantly lower 
than the corresponding values for the CK markets. The VK markets, therefore, are 
informationally more efficient than the CK markets. For the VK:VU markets the 
comparison reveals little by way o f significant results for the three measures of early 
in a period. By the end of a trading period, however, the mean RMSD in the VU 
markets significantly exceeds that witnessed in the VK markets. It can be concluded 
that the uncertainty over period duration results in a reduced level o f informational 
efficiency observed over an entire trading period.
The three market types do not differ with respect to the level of allocational 
efficiency generated. This is evidenced by the insignificant differences in mean 
NORM%GAIN figures. Despite the lower mean NORM%GAIN figure in the VU 
markets it can not be concluded that the uncertainty over period duration impacts on
48the allocational efficiency in experimental asset markets .
48 A  s im ila r  analys is  w as  p e r fo rm ed  to  co m p are  the  m ean  in form ation  cost  across the three 
d if fe ren t m arke t  types, C K , V K  and  VU. It is poss ib le  tha t vary ing  o r  uncerta in  period  duration m ay 
in f luence  the  cost paid to pu rchase  in form ation . N o  statistical d if ferences in m ean  in form ation  costs 
w e re  fo u nd  for  any  o f  the  pa ired  com par isons .
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Variable Market Means (Adjusted Means) WSR Two-tail a-values
CK VK VU CK: VK CK: VU VK:VU
VOL45 1.7800 1.6200 1.9300 0.0427 0.2604 0.0110
(1.8226) (1.6820) (1.9795)
VOL6O 2.4400 2.4300 2.6400 0.9920 0.0335 0.0873
(2.5031) (2.4832) (2.7358)
VOL9Q 3.9300 3.8100 4.0800 0.2676 0.0082 0.0054
(3.9148) (3.8120) (4.2084)
NORMVOL 0.0547 0.0462 0.0479 0.0418 0.3537 0.0432
(0.0520) (0.0463) (0.0489)
RMSD45 155.7800 234.9600 206.6500 0.0037 0.7613 0.0705
(152.0324) (153.0756) (210.4140)
RMSD60 156.1700 441.2100 182.6800 0.0027 0.5746 0.0711
(148.5504) (141.2839) (186.7395)
RMSD90 148.9600 147.9600 160.3400 0.0079 0.1238 0.4315
(144.0205) (138.1392) (137.2264)
RMSD 139.9400 127.9000 146.9500 0.0011 0.1707 0.0498
(136.1854) (5.4494) (120.5776)
NORM XGAIN 0.1357 0.1406 0.1172 0.9055 0.1856 0.4514
(0.1483) (0.1513) (0.1353)
Table 8.1 Summary Table of Market Means (Adjusted Means) and Wilcoxon Signed
Ranks Test Two-tail Significance Levels - Period Duration Comparison
8.4 Information Structure
Many of the previous experimental studies find that an imperfect information 
structure weakens the predictive ability o f the FRE model compared to the PI model. 
The analysis to follow compares the market performance across the two information 
structures, perfect (P) and imperfect (I). The data analysed has been adjusted to 
remove the influence of outliers and dependence. The data is aggregated across the P 
and I market types and observations are paired across markets where the only 
difference in experimental design is the information structure (that is, P or I), 
therefore, the impact of all other confounding treatment effects is blocked out and 
thus controlled. The measures VC)L(45,60,90), NORMVOL, RMSD(45,60,90), 
RMSD over the entire period and the NORM%GAIN are used to compare the 
observed market behaviour. Table 8.2 reports the two-tail statistical significance 
levels for which the null hypothesis of no difference in mean values can be rejected 
for all the paired comparisons, based on the WSR test on the data aggregated across 
the P and I markets. The number of paired observations employed in each test is
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Whilst the mean volume of trade early in a period does not differ across the 
information structure types for the two measures VOL45 and 60, the mean VOL90 
and NORMVOL measures are both significantly higher for the P markets than the I 
markets. This is evidence that the increased state uncertainty inherent in the imperfect 
information markets causes traders to be more cautious over their trading strategies.
The reported caution in response to the more complex and uncertain trading 
environment does not effect the informational efficiency observed early in a period. 
This is evidenced by the failure to reject the null hypothesis o f no statistical difference 
in mean values between the P and I markets for the three measures RMSD(45,60,90). 
By the end of a trading period, however, the mean RMSD in the I markets is 
significantly higher than the mean figure for the P markets. The increased state 
uncertainty and associated cautious trading behaviour ultimately results in a lowering 
of informational efficiency attained by the asset markets. This evidence provides 
direct support for many of the findings in other experimental studies incorporating 
imperfect information structures (for example, Plott and Sunder, 1988).
Again in line with earlier findings, the evidence from this holistic analysis of 
the P and I markets provides conclusive evidence o f a dramatic reduction in the level 
of allocational efficiency observed in imperfect information markets. This conclusion 
is strongly supported by the highly significant difference in the mean NORM%GAIN 
figures for the two information structures, with the P market figure far higher than the 
I market figure ( a  =0 .0000).
n=l 80.
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Variable Market Means (Adjusted 
Means)
WSR Two- 
tail a-values
P / P:I
VOL45 1.8000 1.7500 0.7146
(1.8699) (1.7861)
VOL6O 2.5600 2.4500 0.0661
(2.6643) (2.4837)
VOL90 4.0300 3.8500 0.0544
(4.0958) (3.8610)
NORMVOL 0.0513 0.0479 0.0016
(0.0507) (0.0475)
RMSD45 220.8600 177.3900 0.2163
(177.2399) (166.4413)
RMSD60 356.5800 163.4600 0.1678
(166.6397) (151.0760)
RMSD90 142.6600 162.1500 0.3252
(129.9423) (149.6485)
RMSD 116.3200 160.2000 0.0008
(26.1787) (148.6296)
NORM%GAIN 0.1963 0.0660 0.0000
(0.2207) (0.0692)
Table 8.2 Summary Table o f Market Means (Adjusted Means) and Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks Test Two-tail Significance Levels - Information Structure Comparison
8.5 Information Auction and Experience Levels
The PN and IN markets differ from the PM and IM markets in two respects. 
The latter markets incorporate a pre-trade information auction plus individuals that 
had previously participated in one of the PN or IN markets and are, therefore, more 
experienced. Given the experimental design it is not possible to differentiate between 
the effect o f these two changes in design. The confounding effect of one of the 
changes in design can not be separated from the other change in design by blocking. 
Recall that the reason for using experienced participants in the PM and IM markets 
resulted from the recruitment problems experienced in the PN and IN markets. It had 
not originally been the intention to use experienced participants in any of the markets 
studied. It was only after half o f the experimental design had been conducted that the 
decision was taken to recruit experienced participants. At this point it was too late to 
adjust the experimental design to block the effect of experience from the effect of 
incorporating pre-trade information auctions.
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A priori, there is no obvious reason to believe that the incorporation of an 
information market will impact in any systematic manner on observed market 
performance. The endogenous determination of insiders does not guarantee the 
uniform distribution of private information across trader types. Indeed, as discussed 
in Chapter Seven, the information auction favoured the type 2 traders because they 
had the highest expected dividend value in the absence o f private information. This 
point was supported by the actual distribution o f private information, which clustered 
around the type 2 traders. The implication is a number o f periods where the 
information is distributed to less than two traders from the trader type group predicted 
by the FRE model to hold the assets by the end of the period. There were a number of 
periods where none of the predicted traders received private information, see Chapter 
Seven for the discussion of examples. Despite this fact many of the markets exhibited 
strong convergence to the FRE equilibrium. The incorporation of information 
markets would be expected to impede the level o f efficiency attained. Comparison of 
the PN with PM markets and of the IN with IM markets, however, shows this not to 
be the case. The only logical conclusion to draw is that the increased experience level 
in the markets with information auctions results in an increase in market efficiency.
Due to the confounding effects o f experience and information auctions the use 
o f statistical tests (WSR test) and the interpretation of significance levels to provide 
evidence o f the effect o f experience on market behaviour would not be 
methodologically sound practice. For this reason the results from such an analysis are 
not reported. However, it is possible to support the conjecturc with reference to less 
formal evidence. The Figures 7.1-7.6 of Chapter Seven provide evidence of the 
improved informational efficiency relative to the corresponding figures for the 
Chapter Five and Six markets. The mean %GAIN figure of 38.20% across all M 
markets exceeds that of 26.64% for all N markets providing evidence o f the improved 
allocational efficiency. The positive effect o f experience on observed market 
behaviour is in line with the evidence reported in numerous other experimental studies 
(for example, Forsythe and Lundholm, 1990) that have designed experiments where 
the effect o f experience is isolated and formally tested.
8.6 Discussion and Conclusions
The results reported in this chapter were based on a holistic analysis of the 
data generated by all 18 asset markets conducted in this research programme. The
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choice of a full factorial design permitted the investigation o f individual treatments in 
isolation of any other confounding effects. The use o f observations paired on a period 
by period basis provided for the strict control o f all changes in the experimental 
design other than the one designated treatment effect, by blocking out confounding 
effects. The benefits associated with the use o f all 18 markets in this holistic 
investigation were discussed in section 8.1. This was followed by a comparative 
evaluation o f the performances o f the two equilibrium models in section 8.2. The 
impact on market performance of period duration was investigated in section 8.3. 
This was followed by an investigation of the effect o f type of private information 
available, perfect or imperfect. Section 8.5 reported the joint effect on market 
performance of information auctions and increased participant experience. This final 
section now summarises the results reported in the earlier sections.
The comparative holistic analysis of the two equilibrium models, based on 270 
period observations, provided strong and conclusive support for the superiority of the 
FRE model over the PI model. The major focus o f this research programme, 
however, was an investigation of the effect of period duration on market performance. 
The holistic analysis reported in section 8.3 provided evidence that uncertainty over 
period duration influenced both the early volume of trade and the rate of trade over an 
entire period. The uncertainty (VU markets compared to the control VK markets) 
resulted in relatively more aggressive trading behaviour. It was also evident that 
uncertainty over period duration lowered the relative level of informational efficiency 
over an entire trading period, but had no effect on the level o f allocational efficiency. 
These results are generally in line with the results from the pilot analysis reported in 
Duxbury (1997).
The evidence from the holistic analysis regarding the effect of the type of 
information structure was conclusive. The move from a perfect to an imperfect 
information structure reduced the rate o f trade observed over an entire period. The 
levels o f informational and allocational efficiency obtained over an entire period were 
also significantly impaired. The increased uncertainty surrounding the state of nature 
impeded the convergence to FRE equilibrium predictions.
By way of conjecture it was also argued that the level o f participant experience 
was an important factor on observed market performance. Indirect evidence was 
offered in support of the facilitating influence o f increased experience on the 
convergence o f  market behaviour to FRE equilibrium predictions. Increased
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experience levels improve both informational and allocational efficiency.
To conclude, there is a significant impact of uncertain period duration on 
observed market performance, in particular the volume of trade and informational 
efficiency. In general, uncertain period durations result in a higher volume of trade 
and a lower level of informational efficiency in markets governed by the rules of 
exchange of the DA institution. This evidence directly supports Friedman’s (1984) 
conjecture regarding the influence of predetermined, known period duration on the 
convergence tendency of transaction prices to competitive equilibrium outcomes in 
DA markets. The robust convergence of transaction prices to FRE predicted 
equilibrium values reported in previous experimental asset market studies from Plott 
and Sunder (1982) onwards, may partly be a product o f the constant and known 
period durations employed in the experimental design o f those markets. In the 
markets with uncertain period durations studied here the price signal does not reveal 
the same amount of information regarding the underlying state o f nature as is 
observed in markets with known period durations. Despite this, there is no significant 
difference between the level of allocational efficiency and gains from exchange 
exhausted by the two market types.
The results have implications for the rules o f exchange developed to govern 
trade across electronic networks. If the vendors o f commodities are the designers and 
implementers o f the institutional rules of exchange it may be in their interest to 
incorporate on-line auctions with uncertain period durations. The effect of which 
would be an increase in the volume o f trade. It is not clear whether the inefficient 
pricing o f commodities would benefit vendors or customers. It would depend on 
whether the assets traded at prices above or below their true economic worth. Further 
research is required to provide a definitive conclusion.
Chapter Nine
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9 S u m m a r y  o f  R e s u l t s  a n d  C o n c l u s io n s
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9.1 Introduction
The efficient functioning of the world’s financial asset markets in the 
allocation o f scarce capital among competing investment alternatives is central to the 
economic well being of society in general. The generation of economic wealth via 
gains from exchange is essential for economic prosperity. Just how efficient the 
financial markets are, therefore, is an issue of paramount importance. To date the 
academic literature has yet to come to a consensus, and the jury is still out. Whilst 
there does not appear to be a consensus on the issue of market efficiency the 
institutional rules governing trade clearly play a key role in the price formation 
process and consequently the overall efficiency of the financial markets. The double 
auction (DA) is a trading institution used the world over, from the London Stock 
Exchange to the New York Stock Exchange. The wide spread adoption of the DA as 
the institution of exchange results from the high levels of informational and 
allocational efficiency that it generates. This research programme has attempted to 
shed light on why the rules governing trade under the DA are so efficient, paying 
particular attention to the influence of known period duration.
The purpose o f this concluding chapter is double focused. Firstly, a briel 
summary is offered of the contributions made by the previous chapters, paying 
particular attention to the results of the analyses conducted in Chapters Five to Eight. 
The second focus o f the chapter is reflective, drawing inferences and interpretations 
from the evidence reported in earlier chapters. The structure of the chapter is as 
follows. Section 9.2 reiterates the motivation and restates the objectives of the current 
research programme. Also included is a brief review of the research method adopted 
to achieve those objectives. Section 9.3 then summarises and interprets the main 
results generated by the investigation o f the experimental asset markets conducted. 
The concluding section voices the lessons to be learned from this research.
9.2 Research Objectives
Despite the wide ranging evidence documenting the rapid and relatively robust 
convergence tendencies o f the double auction (see Chapter Three for a comprehensive 
literature review), no consensus has emerged on why the double auction institution 
performs so efficiently. Also, despite recent advances the theoretical literature has 
failed to produce a generally accepted model o f the bid, ask and transaction price
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behaviour observed under the DA market. The intention here was to aid further 
theoretical refinement by conducting a series o f boundary experiments designed to 
investigate the importance of prior knowledge of period duration on the tendency ot 
experimental asset markets to converge to a FRE equilibrium (Chapter Two 
introduced the theoretical equilibrium models). The few studies attempting to 
develop dynamic models o f the DA market generally incorporate, either explicitly or 
implicitly, known period duration (for example, Friedman, 1984, 1991). Knowledge 
of period duration may be a key variable in the determination of the price adjustment 
process and the convergence to competitive equilibrium in the double auction 
institution. Chapter Five offered a comprehensive discussion of the issues motivating 
this research programme and introduced a number of hypotheses designed to facilitate 
the investigation into the effect of period duration on trading behaviour.
A number o f experimental asset markets were designed with the specific 
intention o f isolating and observing the effect of period duration, as a treatment 
variable, on market behaviour. The experimental design adopted was similar to the 
earlier design of Plott and Sunder (1982), as adapted by Banks (1985) and further 
developed by Sunder (1992). The novel feature of the experimental design adopted is 
the introduction of varying period durations and uncertain period durations. Other 
treatment variables investigated included perfect versus imperfect information 
structures and costless versus costly private information. Chapter Four detailed the 
specifics of the general experimental design adopted and provided justification tor the 
design’s choice.
9.3 Summary o f Results
Chapters Five, Six and Seven reported the results from the four groups ot 
experimental asset markets conducted, whilst Chapter Eight exploited the benefit of 
the combined 3x2x2 full factorial design to report the results from a number of 
holistic analyses. The holistic analyses allowed a number of strongly supported 
conclusions to be drawn concerning the superiority of the FRE model over the PI 
model and the effects o f period duration and information structure type on observed 
market performance. The evidence also supported the conjecture that participants 
experience levels were important for the convergence of market behaviour to FRE 
equilibrium. It is to a review o f these conclusions that the discussion now turns.
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9.3.1 Superiority o f  the FRE Model
The results from Chapter Five support the view that the FRE model is clearly a 
superior predictor of market performance in simple, perfect information markets. The 
evidence from the more demanding imperfect information markets of Chapter Six, 
however, is not so decisive, but offers the conclusion that the performance of the FRE 
model is at least weakened. Overall the evidence from the holistic analysis reported 
in Chapter Eight was strongly in support of the FRE model. For the four measures 
RMSD45, RMSD60, RMSD90 and RMSD over an entire period, the percentage of 
periods in which the RMSD of prices from the FRE prediction is lower than for the PI 
prediction were 74.68%, 75.11%, 76.79% and 78.06%, respectively. The results, 
therefore, support the view that the FRE model is clearly superior to the PI model. In 
addition, whilst slight, there is a clear increase in the percentage of periods in which 
the FRE model is superior as the duration of trade increases. This was interpreted as 
evidence of an adaptive component in trading behaviour towards the FRE equilibrium 
price, within a period.
The number of assets misallocated with respect to the FRE and PI models end 
period allocation predictions were also compared. In 45.93% of periods the number 
of assets misallocated by the FRE model is lower than the figure for the PI model, 
whilst the reverse is true in only 12.59% of periods. The evidence regarding the 
misallocation of assets was more favourable to the FRE model than the PI model. 
Again this was interpreted as supporting the superiority o f the FRE model.
The results from a simple test to discriminate between the FRE and PI models 
based on the sign o f the predicted gains from trade were also more supportive of the 
FRE model. Across all 18 markets there were 105 occasions where the PI prediction 
was for either negative or zero gains from trade. On only 46 occasions (43.81%), 
however, were the realised gains from trade either negative or zero, whilst for the 
majority o f periods (56.19%) the gains were positive providing further evidence in 
support o f the FRE model over the PI model.
The only measure for which the PI model was the superior predictor was the 
comparison o f gross profits across the informed and uninformed traders. To offer 
support in favour of the FRE model, however, this measure would require the 
instantaneous convergence o f transaction prices to the FRE equilibrium price. Such 
an interpretation is excessively strict and so the measure is effectively biased in favour 
o f the PI model. It was for this reason, therefore, that little emphasis was placed on
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the results of this test.
In conclusions, the evidence from all 18 asset markets was interpreted as 
providing much greater support in favour o f the FRE model than for the PI model. 
Whilst trading behaviour may not instantaneously adhere to the prescriptions of the 
FRE model, it does, however, converge to these equilibrium predictions over time.
9.3.2 The Effect o f  Period Duration on Market Performance
The effect of period duration on observed market behaviour formed the central 
issue of consideration for this research programme. The effect was separated between 
the influence o f varying the period durations (VK markets) and the effect of 
uncertainty concerning the period durations (VU markets). The observations were 
paired across markets where the only difference in experimental design was the period 
duration type (that is, CK, VK or VU), therefore, the impact o f all other confounding 
treatment effects were removed.
The comparison o f the CK and VK markets for the measures of the volume of 
trade provide mixed evidence. There was some indication of a reduction in the 
volume figures as a result of varying period duration. The evidence, unfortunately, 
was not conclusive. In contrast the uncertainty over period duration clearly had a 
major significant impact on the volume of trade. The VK:VU comparison reported 
higher mean values for the VU markets, which were highly significant for all 
measures with the exception o f the VOL6O measure. The uncertainty over period 
duration clearly resulted in a more aggressive trading behaviour and was associated
with a higher volume of trade.
The prices at which assets traded will now be considered. A comparison of 
the measures of RMSD of transaction prices from the FRE predictions for the CK:VK 
pairing resulted in significant differences in mean values. By the time 60 seconds of 
trade in a period had passed the mean VK values were significantly lower than the 
corresponding values for the CK markets. This was interpreted as an increase in 
informational efficiency as a result of varying period durations. For the VK:VU 
markets there was no effect on the informational efficiency reported for the three 
measures o f early in a period. By the end of a trading period, however, the mean 
RMSD in the VU markets significantly exceeded that witnessed in the VIC markets. 
This was interpreted as evidence that uncertainty concerning period durations resulted 
in a reduction in the level of informational efficiency obtained over an entire trading 
period. In contrast, there were no significant differences in the level of allocational
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efficiency generated in any of the three market types.
In conclusion, the uncertainty surrounding period duration resulted in a 
relatively more aggressive trading behaviour. It was also evident that uncertainty over 
period duration lowered the relative level o f informational efficiency over an entire 
trading period, but had no effect on the level o f allocational efficiency. The results 
were generally in line with the results from the pilot analysis reported in Duxbury 
(1997).
9.3.3 The Effect o f  Information Structures on Market Performance
Many of the previous experimental asset market studies find that an imperfect 
information structure weakens the predictive ability of the FRE model compared to 
the PI model. Markets with imperfect information structures generally exhibit a 
reduced level of both informational and allocational efficiency relative to perfect 
information markets. The experimental asset markets studied here were also able to 
address the effect o f information structure on the trading behaviour observed in DA 
markets.
Whilst the mean volume of trade early in a period did not differ across the 
information structure types for the two measures VOL45 and 60, the mean VOL90 
and NORMVOL measures were both significantly higher for the P markets than the I 
markets. The increased state uncertainty inherent in the imperfect information 
markets, therefore, caused traders to be more cautious over their trading strategies.
Over an entire trading period the mean RMSD of transaction prices from FRE 
predictions in the I markets was significantly higher than the mean figure for the P 
markets. The increased state uncertainty and associated cautious trading behaviour 
ultimately resulted in a lowering of the level o f informational efficiency attained by 
the asset markets. This conclusion is directly in line with the evidence from many 
other experimental studies that incorporate imperfect information structures (for 
example, Plott and Sunder, 1988). Also in support o f earlier findings, the results from 
the P and I markets studied here provided conclusive evidence of a dramatic reduction 
in the level of allocational efficiency observed in imperfect information markets.
In conclusion, the move from a perfect to an imperfect information structure 
reduced the rate o f trade observed over an entire period. The levels o f informational 
and allocational efficiency obtained over an entire period were also significantly 
impaired. The increased uncertainty surrounding the state of nature impeded the 
convergence to FRE equilibrium predictions.
257
9.3.4 The Effect o f  Experience on Market Performance
The experimental design did not permit the effect of increased experience 
levels to be isolated from the effect o f including a pre-trade information auction. For 
this reason it was not possible to decisively tie the increased convergence to FRE 
equilibrium predictions observed in the PM and IM markets with the increased 
experience of the participants in those markets.
It was conjectured, however, that the level of participant experience was the 
important factor in the increased convergence observed. The reasoning was based on 
the fact that the endogenous distribution of private information resulted in 
distributions that would frustrate the convergence to FRE values relative to the 
uniform distribution in the PN and IN markets. The improved convergence observed, 
therefore, could only be the result of the increase in experience levels. The positive 
effect o f experience on observed market behaviour supports the evidence reported in 
numerous other experimental studies (for example, Forsythe and Lundholm, 1990) 
that have designed experiments where the effect of experience is isolated and formally 
tested.
9.4 Discussion and Conclusions
The experience gained from the design and conduct o f eighteen experimental 
financial asset markets provided valuable lessons to be learned regarding best practice 
in experimental methods. The experimental results also permit a number of 
conclusions, which raise important theoretical considerations and that are of 
substantive practical interest. The implications drawn from this study will now be 
discussed.
9.4.1 Experimental M ethod
Firstly, replication is an essential feature of the experimental method. This 
lesson was learned from the results o f the markets studied in Chapter Five. Six 
experimental markets were conducted with only one treatment effect (period duration) 
and three levels (CK, VK and VU). Thus, each of the three cells of the experimental 
design were in fact replicated, resulting in the two groups of markets PN1 and PN2. 
Had this not been the case, with only the PN1 markets conducted, the conclusions 
drawn would have changed dramatically. The results from PN1 markets were directly 
in line with the results reported in Duxbury (1997), however, the PN2 results provided 
limited supportive evidence. This is despite there being no treatment effect change in
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the experimental design between the PN1 and PN2 markets. Experimental replication 
is, therefore, essential if  robust results are to be generated. Connected with this issue 
is Roth's (1994) criticism of the selective reporting of experiments, discussed in 
Chapter Four. Had the results from the PN2 markets not been disclosed the overall 
flavour o f the results would have fundamentally altered. The only acceptable 
practice, therefore, should be the replication of cells of the experimental design and 
the full reporting of all experimental sessions conducted.
Secondly, many previous experimental studies have reported tests of statistical 
significance based on data that is not independently distributed and, therefore, violates 
the assumption o f independent observations required for all statistical tests. This 
research adopted a method of data adjustment, based on a covariate adjustment 
technique, which permits the dependence in the data to be removed. This allows the 
valid use of statistical tests in the evaluation o f stated hypotheses. Future 
experimental studies should endeavour to follow this example so as to ensure that the 
technique becomes accepted in the experimental method.
Finally, the findings in Chapter Seven suggest that the use of information 
purchase price may not be a good proxy for the value of private information. The 
purchase price, whilst showing signs o f declining, did not converge to zero. The 
proxy, therefore, implied that private information retained value. At the same time, 
however, the net profit of the uninformed exceeded that of the informed in the 
majority o f periods. This implies that the purchasers of private information paid more 
for the information than it was actually worth. Thus, the use o f purchase price as a 
proxy for value is biased against the FRE model s prediction o f zero value.
9.4.2 Theoretical Refinement
It is not possible to adequately address the concept of market efficiency using 
conventional empirical techniques based on data generated in the real world. Instead 
the level o f efficiency generated by different trading institutions must be judged by 
theoretical and experimental techniques. The double auction is an exceptionally 
efficient mechanism, but thus far there is no generally accepted model of bid, ask and 
acceptance behaviour. Thus, theory alone is not yet able to provide decisive answers. 
The role for experimental methods is double edged. Experiments provide a means of 
measuring the comparative efficiencies of disparate trading institutions and a means 
o f identifying variables that have important implications for the levels ol market 
efficiency observed. This latter point sums up the central intention o f this research.
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The role o f a predetermined, known period duration was identified as possibly being 
important for the convergence tendency observed in experimental asset markets and 
the few theoretical models developed to date. The significant effect on observed 
market behaviour o f uncertain period durations indicates that knowledge of period 
duration has an important impact on the convergence to FRE equilibrium predictions. 
Uncertain period durations cause traders to adopt more aggressive trading strategies 
and result in a lower level o f informational efficiency obtained. There was no 
significant effect on allocational efficiency, however. These results are the major 
contribution provided by the current research programme.
9.4.3 Electronic Networks and On-Line A actions
Whilst this research focuses solely on the double auction, and more 
specifically on experimental financial asset markets conducted under the rules of the 
double auction, the results will be of interest to those individuals designing and 
implementing on-line auctions for the conduct of trade across electronic networks. 
Many, if not all, o f these on-line auctions are conducted for fixed, known durations. 
The incorporation of uncertain period durations in DA markets resulted in an increase 
in the volume of trade and a reduction in the level o f informational efficiency 
obtained. Therefore, on-line auctions conducted for fixed and known durations will 
result in a more efficient pricing o f the commodity for sale, but will also result in a 
reduced volume o f trade. This conclusion requires that the impact o f uncertain period 
duration generalises across trading institutions. It is not immediately apparent that 
this will indeed be the case, therefore, future experimental work could fruitfully 
investigate the impact of uncertain period duration on observed market performance 
for markets conducted under rules o f exchange other than those o f the DA institution.
In conclusion, this study began by highlighting a scientific mystery and set out 
to shed some light on the convergence tendency observed in double auction markets. 
Whilst it is not possible to proclaim the mystery resolved, the research has indicated 
the importance o f predetermined, known period duration on the convergence tendency 
o f the double auction institution. The future theoretical refinement of models of bid, 
ask and acceptance behaviour must explicitly incorporate known period duration as an 
important variable. Proposed refinements to institutional rules o f exchange must also 
recognise the importance o f known period duration on observed market 
characteristics.
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Appendix One
Instructions for all markets (CK, VK and VU) with no information auction.
Instructions.
Introduction.
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The reward for 
participating is in the form of a £2 participation fee  plus additional money. 
Depending upon your decisions you could make a considerable amount o f  money. 
This will be paid to you in cash immediately after the experiment. It is highly 
unlikely, but possible, that you may have to repay the £2 participation fee. However, 
you will not have to give up money you had prior to the experiment.
We are going to simulate a market where you can buy and sell certificates in a 
sequence o f fifteen  trading periods. The trade of certificates will take place between 
twelve participants, via computer terminals. At the beginning of each trading period 
you will be endowed with two certificates and 50,000 units of an experimental 
currency, EMUS. You are able to make a profit by collecting dividend earnings on all 
the certificates you hold at the end  o f each trading period and/or from buying and 
selling  certificates. The rules governing the trade of the certificates are detailed 
below. The market for the certificates will be conducted over a series of fifteen 
sequential trading periods. [Each period will last for 240 seconds (4 mins.).](CK) 
[Each period will last for a variable length of time. This time will be shown to you 
via a countdown timer on the computer screen.](VK) [Each period can end at any 
time, therefore, the duration o f a period may vary. This time will not be known to 
you. The duration o f each period is randomly drawn from a uniform 
distribution.](VU)
The value o f the dividend payable to you may take any of three equally likely values. 
These values will be given to you at the start of the experiment. This is your own 
private information and must not be revealed to any other person, to do so would be 
detrimental to your ability to earn a profit.
The value payable to you at the end o f each period has been randomly generated via 
computer, thus the value may differ from period to period. If you desire, at the end of 
the experiment you can inspect the values for yourself to ensure that this is indeed the 
case.
Note that the three equally likely dividend values may differ from person to person.
At the end of each period, after the dividends have been paid for certificates held and 
the initial 50,000 EMUS have been deducted, any EMUS you have remaining are 
your trading profit for that period. After payment ol dividends at the end of a period, 
the certificates held expire and so are not carried forward to the next trading period. 
The trading profit you make each period is carried forward to the end o f the 
experiment.
At the beginning of each trading period you will always be given two certificates and
50,000 EMUS with which to trade.
The total profit you earn in EMUS by the end o f  the fifteen trading periods will 
determine your reward fo r  taking part in the experiment. The total profit is the sum o f  
each individual periods trading profit, net o f  any losses. The higher the total profit 
you earn, the higher your reward. A ll EMUS will be converted into £  s a t the end o f
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the experiment and immediately p a id  in cash.
Prior to trade in any particular period clue cards will be distributed to individuals. 
These cards will provide information concerning the value o f  the dividend  payable to 
you at the end of the period. [The cards may contain information which enables you 
to determine your exact payoff at the end of the period or they may provide no 
information about the value of the payoff to you.J(PN) [The cards may contain 
information which enables you to eliminate one o f the three equally likely payoffs you 
will receive for certificates held at the end of the period or they may provide no 
information about the value of the payoff to you.](IN) This is your own private 
information and must not be revealed to any other person, to do so would be 
detrimental to your ability to earn a profit.
1 he type of information you receive in each period has been determined randomly via 
computer. Again you are welcome to observe that this is so at the end of the 
experiment.
Trading Rules.
1. If you wish to enter an offer to buy or sell you must better any outstanding 
offer. That is, enter an offer to buy (bid) at a higher price or sell (ask) at a 
lower price than the outstanding offers.
2. If you wish to buy at a price equal to the latest offer to sell then simply 
enter an offer to buy at that price. If you wish to sell at a price equal to the 
latest offer to buy then simply enter an offer to sell at that price.
3. When the outstanding offers to buy and sell are equal a transaction takes 
place. At this point all previous offers to buy or sell are eliminated and the 
process begins again.
4. All trades are for one certificate at a time only.
5. You are prevented from holding a negative amount of either certificates or 
EMUS.
6. If you hold the outstanding offer to buy/sell you are prevented from 
entering an offer to sell/buy.
Computer Keys.
To enter an offer to buy:
To enter an offer to sell:
Press
Type price 
Press
Press to confirm 
Press
Type price 
Press
Press to confirm
‘b ’
‘xxx’
‘J ’ (Return)
y
‘a ’
‘xxx’
‘J ’ (Return)
y
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Information.
1. A history o f previous transaction prices will be available to you (your own 
trades highlighted in red).
2. Outstanding offers to buy and sell are displayed (your own offers 
highlighted in pale blue).
3. The number o f certificates you own and the amount o f EMUS you possess 
are updated as you trade.
4. [A countdown timer displaying the number of seconds remaining in the 
current trading period.](CK and VK) [Omitted](VU)
5. At the end o f each period you will be told the value of the dividend paid to 
you for any certificates you still hold.
6. The total dividend you are paid at the end o f a period will be added to your 
holding o f EMUS, less the initial loan of 50,000 EMUS. The linal figure 
represents your EMUS profit for the period. The trading profit each period 
is carried forward to the end of the experiment.
Remember, you could make a considerable amount o f  money. The more profit you 
earn during the experiment, the more money you will make. All money will be paid 
in cash immediately after the experiment.
If you are unclear about anything please ask the experimenter.
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Instructions for all markets (CK, VK and VU) with an information auction.
Instructions.
Introduction.
This is an experiment in the economics o f market decision making. The reward for 
participating is in the form o f a £2 participation fee plus additional money.
Depending upon your decisions you could make a considerable amount o f  money.
This will be paid to you in cash immediately after the experiment. It is highly 
unlikely, but possible, that you may have to repay the £2 participation fee. However, 
you will not have to give up money you had prior to the experiment.
We are going to simulate a market where you can buy and sell certificates in a 
sequence o f fifteen trading periods. The trade of certificates will take place between 
twelve participants, via computer terminals. At the beginning o f each trading period 
you will be endowed with two certificates and 50,000 units o f an experimental 
currency, EMUS. You are able to make a profit by collecting dividend earnings on all 
the certificates you hold at the end of each trading period and/or from buying and 
selling  certificates. The rules governing the trade of the certificates are detailed 
below. The market for the certificates will be conducted over a series of fifteen 
sequential trading periods. [Each period will last for 240 seconds (4 mins.).](CK) 
[Each period will last for a variable length of time. This time will be shown to you 
via a countdown timer on the computer screen.](VK) [Each period can end at any 
time, therefore, the duration o f a period may vary. This time will not be known to 
you. The duration o f each period is randomly drawn from a uniform 
distribution.](VU)
The value o f the dividend payable to you may take any of three equally likely values. 
These values will be given to you at the start of the experiment. This is your own 
private information and must not be revealed to any other person, to do so would be 
detrimental to your ability to earn a profit.
The value payable to you at the end of each period has been randomly generated via 
computer, thus the value may differ from period to period. If you desire, at the end of 
the experiment you can inspect the values for yourself to ensure that this is indeed the 
case.
Note that the three equally likely dividend values may differ from person to person.
Prior to trade in any particular period an information auction will take place, in which 
you will be able to bid to purchase information concerning the value o f  the dividend 
payable to you at the end of the period. [The information will enable you to 
determine your exact payoff at the end of the period.](PM) [The information will 
enable you to eliminate one o f the three equally likely payoffs you will receive for 
certificates held at the end of the period.](IM) This is your own private information 
and must not be revealed to any other person, to do so would be detrimental to your 
ability to earn a profit.
The information auction will proceed as follows. All participants will offer a price at 
which they are willing to buy information. The six participants offering to buy at the 
six highest prices will win the information auction and receive the information for that 
period. The cost o f  the information is equal to the seventh highest price offered to buy 
the information and all six purchasers will be charged this amount. [The information 
will be available for display on the computer screen w'hen requested and will take the 
form X, Y, or Z if the state of nature for the forthcoming period is X, Y or Z, 
respectively.|(PM) [The information will be available for display on the computer 
screen when requested and will take the form Not X, Not Y, or Not Z. For example, 
if  the state o f nature for the forthcoming period is X you may receive information
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either Not Y or Not Z.](IM)
The six participants that do not purchase information will not be charged the 
information cost. The information will not be revealed to these six participants and 
the computer screen will simply display the word 'BLANK' when information is 
requested.
After all bids have been received the cost o f information will be calculated and 
revealed to all participants, as will the information for the forthcoming period.
In the event o f  tied bids to buy the information the tie will be resolved by reference to 
the time at which the bid was received. The earliest received bid will be ruled the 
winner. Therefore, if  you enter a price equal to the revealed cost o f information, but 
your information is "BLANK", then your bid was involved in a tie and was not the 
earliest bid received. In this event you will not be charged for information. II you do 
not wish to enter an offer to purchase the information tor a certain price enter the 
price o f zero when your offer is requested.
No other information concerning the state o f nature during the period will be made 
available until the end of the period.
At the end of each period, after the dividends have been paid for certificates held and 
the initial 50,000 EMUS and any information costs have been deducted, any EMUS 
you have remaining are your trading profit for that period. After payment of 
dividends at the end of a period, the certificates held expire and so are not carried 
forward to the next trading period. The trading profit you make each period is carried 
forward to the end o f the experiment.
At the beginning of each trading period you will always be given two certificates and
50,000 EMUS with which to trade.
The total profit you earn in EMUS by the end o f  the fifteen trading periods will 
determine your rew ard for taking part in the experiment. The total profit is the sum o f  
each individual periods ' trading profit, net o f  any losses or information costs. The 
higher the total profit you earn, the higher your reward. All EMUS will be converted 
into £ s at the end o f  the experiment and immediately p a id  in cash.
Trading Rules.
1. If you wish to enter an offer to buy or sell you must better any outstanding 
offer. That is, enter an offer to buy (bid) at a higher price or sell (ask) at a 
lower price than the outstanding offers.
2. If you wish to buy at a price equal to the latest offer to sell then simply 
enter an offer to buy at that price. If you wish to sell at a price equal to the 
latest offer to buy then simply enter an offer to sell at that price.
3. When the outstanding offers to buy and sell are equal a transaction takes 
place. At this point all previous offers to buy or sell are eliminated and the 
process begins again.
4. All trades are for one certificate at a time only.
5. You are prevented from holding a negative amount o f either certificates or 
EMUS.
6. If you hold the outstanding offer to buy/sell you are prevented from 
entering an offer to sell/buy.
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Computer Keys.
To enter a bid for information: Type price ‘xxx’
Press ‘J ’ (Return)
To view information before Press ‘f
the period begins:
To signal you are ready for the Press ‘c ’
period to begin:
To enter an offer to buy: Press ‘b ’
Type price ‘xxx’
Press ‘J ’ (Return)
Press to confirm y
To enter an offer to sell: Press ‘a ’
Type price ‘xxx’
Press ‘J ’ (Return)
Press to confirm y
Information.
1. A history o f previous transaction prices  will be available to you (your own 
trades highlighted in red).
2. Outstanding offers to buy and sell are displayed (your own offers 
highlighted in pale blue).
3. The number o f certificates you own and the amount of EMUS you possess 
are updated as you trade.
4. [A countdown timer displaying the number o f seconds remaining in the 
current trading period.](CK and VK) [OmittedJ(VU)
5. At the end of each period you will be told the value of the dividend paid to 
you for any certificates you still hold.
6. The total dividend you are paid at the end of a period will be added to your 
holding o f EMUS, less the initial loan o f 50,000 EMUS and any 
information costs. The final figure represents your EMUS profit for the 
period. The trading profit each period is carried forward to the end of the 
experiment.
7. The price at which information was purchased for the forthcoming period 
(ie. the seventh highest price offered).
Remember, you could make a considerable amount o f  money. The more profit you 
earn during the experiment, the more money you will make. All money will be paid 
in cash immediately after the experiment.
If you are unclear about anything please ask the experimenter.
Appendix Two
C o m p u t e r  Sc r ee n  I l l u s t r a t io n s
Figure 1 Initial Endowments Screen 
Trader no. 1
275
Assets
Endowment.
2
Emus = 50,000
Profit = 0
Start: |Period no. 1
276
Figure 2 Trading Screen
Trader no. 1 Time = 2.45
Assets
Endowment.
3
Emus = 49,700
Market Floor.
Bid Price Ask Price
200 450
Transaction Prices: 275, 275, 300, 350
Decision.
Bid Price Ask Price
? ?
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Figure 3 State o f Nature Screen
Period no. = 1
State of Nature = X
Figure 4 Financial Position Screen
Trader no. 1 | Encj: [Period no. 1
Financial Position
Assets 3
Dividend 350
1050
Emus 49,700
less loan 50,000
-300
Profit 750
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Figure 5 Closing Financial Position Screen
Trader no. 1
Closing Financial Position
Period no. Profit per Period
1 750
2 300
3 559
4 845
5 503
6 504
7 651
8 -55
9 625
10 750
11 300
12 559
13 605
14 547
15 895
Total Profit 8338
Conversion 0.000667
Profit in £s 5.56
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Figure 6 Information Auction Screen
Trader no. 1 |Period no. 1
Information Auction.
Bid Price 
350
Enter the number of emus you wish to bid or 'O' for no bid.
Outcome
Winning bids at prices greater than or equal to 300
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Figure 7 Financial Position Screen (including Information Auction)
Trader no. 1 End: |Period no. 1
Financial Position
Assets 3
Dividend 350
1050
Emus 49,700
less loan 50,000
less info cost 300
-600
Profit 450
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Appendix Three
Explanation of the FRE and PI M odels’ Equilibrium Predictions
I he IR E  and PI models make equilibrium price predictions that are contingent 
on the parameters chosen for traders’ state contingent dividend distributions. These 
equilibrium price predictions dictate the models’ end of period equilibrium asset 
allocations. Two parameter sets (A and B) were used in the overall experimental 
design. 1 he PI m odel's predictions are further dependent upon the nature of the 
information structure adopted in the experimental design, perfect or imperfect, and the 
distribution o f the private information.
I he FRE model predicts that in equilibrium the state of nature will be revealed 
by the price signal, t hus the model predicts that the equilibrium price will be equal to 
the highest dividend payout given the state o f nature. Those traders in the trader type 
group with this highest dividend are predicted to hold all the assets, irrespective of 
whether they are informed or uninformed. The PI model predicts that traders 
condition their expectations o f  transaction prices based solely on their own private 
information, forming reservation prices computed with reference to their own 
expected dividend value. The equilibrium price is predicted to be equal to the highest 
reservation price, with the assets held by those traders with the highest reservation 
price. The expected dividend values, and so reservation prices, are contingent upon 
traders' private information signals, therefore, the equilibrium allocation prediction 
will not include both informed and uninformed traders from a particular trader type 
group.
The calculations o f the equilibrium predictions for the two models are now 
demonstrated.
PN Markets Perfect information, no information auction 
Table 1 displays the state contingent dividend distributions for the three trader 
types used for all PN markets. Based on these dividend distributions Table 2 
illustrates traders' reservation prices (expected dividend values) based on a perfect 
information structure. The equilibrium price predictions for the FRE and PI models 
are also included.
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Trader
Type
State
X Y Z
I 350 200 200
2 100 300 200
3 300 200 700
Table 1 State Contingent Dividend Distributions - Parameter Set A
Trader State Private Reservation FRE PI
Type Information Price (EV) Price Price
1 X None 250 350 400
1 X 350
2 X None 200
2 X 100
3 X None 400
3 X 300
1 Y None 250 300 400
1 Y 200
2 Y None 200
2 Y 300
3 Y None 400
3 Y 200
1 Z None 250 700 700
1 Z 200
2 Z None 200
2 Z 200
3 Z None 400
3 Z 700
I able 2 Reservation Prices and Equilibrium Predictions - PN Markets
E x a m p l e  A s s u m in g  S t a t e  X
The I R1 price is simply equal to the highest dividend given state X, which is 
350 emus paid to trader type 1 traders. Both informed and uninformed type 1 traders 
are predicted to hold the assets in equilibrium.
The PI price is equal to the highest reservation price given the state contingent 
dividend distributions and the private information, this is 400 emus for uninformed 
type 3 traders. I'he figure o f  400 = 1/3(300+200+700). The type 3 informed traders 
know with certainty that they will receive a dividend o f 300 emus, therefore, they are 
not predicted to hold the assets in the end of period equilibrium.
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IN Markets Imperfect information, no information auction 
1 able 1 displays the state contingent dividend distributions for the three trader 
types used lor all IN markets. Based on these dividend distributions Table 3 
illustrates traders reservation prices (expected dividend values) based on a imperfect 
information structure. Ihe equilibrium price predictions for the FRE and PI models 
are also included.
Trader State Private Reservation FRE PI
Type Information Price (EV) Price Price
1 X None 250 350 500
1 Not Y 275
1 Not Z 275
2 X None 200
2 Not Y 150
2 Not Z 200
3 X None 400
3 Not Y 500
3 Not Z 250
1 Y None 250 300 450
1 Not X 200
1 Not Z 275
2 Y None 200
2 Not X 250
2 Not Z 200
3 Y None 400
3 Not X 450
3 Not Z 250
1 Z None 250 700 500
1 Not X 200
1 Not Y 275
2 Z None 200
2 Not X 250
2 Not Y 150
3 Z None 400
3 Not X 450
3 Not Y 500
Table 3 Reservation Prices and Equilibrium Predictions - IN Markets
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E x a m p l e  A s s u m i n g  S t a t e  X
1 he 1 Kl price is simply equal to the highest dividend given state X, which is
emus paid to trader t\p e  1 traders. Both informed and uninformed type 1 traders
are predicted to hold the assets in equilibrium. Notice that the move from a perfect to
imperiect information structure does not alter the equilibrium predictions of the FRE 
model.
I he PI price is equal to the highest reservation price given the state contingent 
dividend distributions and the private information, this is 500 emus for informed type 
traders receiving the clue ‘Not Y \ The figure o f 500 = !/2(300+700). The type 3 
informed traders receiving the clue 'N ot Z ’ do not have as high an expected value 
reservation price and thus are not predicted to hold the assets in equilibrium.
I M Markets Perfect information, with information auction
Trader
Type
State
X Y Z
1 250 300 350
2 200 350 950
3 200 400 600
I able 4 State Contingent Dividend Distributions - Parameter Set B 
I able 4 displays the state contingent dividend distributions for the three trader 
types used lor all PM markets. Based on these dividend distributions Table 5 
illustrates traders reservation prices (expected dividend values) based on a perfect 
information structure. The equilibrium price predictions for the FRE and PI models, 
assuming uniform distribution ol private information across trader types, are also 
included.
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Trader State Private Reservation FRE Price PI Price
Type Information Price (EV)
1 X None 300 250 500
1 X 250
2 X None 500
2 X 200
3 X None 400
3 X 200
1 Y None 300 400 500
1 Y 300
2 Y None 500
2 Y 350
3 Y None 400
3 Y 400
1 Z None 300 950 950
1 Z 350
2 Z None 500
2 Z 950
3 Z None 400
3 Z 600
T able 5 Reservation Prices and Equilibrium Predictions - PM Markets
E x a m p l e  A s s u m i n g  S t a t e  X
Once more the FRE price is simply equal to the highest dividend given state 
X, which is 250 emus paid to trader type 1 traders. Both informed and uninformed 
type 1 traders are predicted to hold the assets in equilibrium.
The PI price is equal to the highest reservation price given the state contingent 
dividend distributions and the assumed uniform distribution o f private information, 
this is 500 emus for uninformed type 2 traders. The figure o f 500 = 
1*4(200+350+950). The type 2 inform ed traders know with certainty that they will 
receive a dividend o f  200 emus, therefore, they are not predicted to hold the assets in 
the end o f period equilibrium.
IM Markets Imperfect information, with information auction
Table 4 displays the state contingent dividend distributions for the three trader 
types used for all PM markets. Based on these dividend distributions Table 6 
illustrates traders' reservation prices (expected dividend values) based on an imperfect 
information structure. The equilibrium price predictions for the FRE and PI models, 
assuming uniform distribution of private information across trader types, are also 
included.
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Trader State Private Reservation FRE Price PI Price
Type Information Price (EV)
1 X None 300 250 575
1 Not Y 300
1 Not Z 275
X None 500
2 Not Y 575
2 Not Z 275
3 X None 400
3 Not Y 400
3 Not Z 300
1 Y None 300 400 650
1 Not X 325
1 Not Z 275
2 Y None 500
2 Not X 650
2 Not Z 275
3 Y None 400
3 Not X 500
3 Not Z 300
1 Z None 300 950 650
1 Not X 325
1 Not Y 300
2 Z None 500
2 Not X 650
2 Not Y 575
3 Z None 400
3 Not X 500
3 Not Y 400
I able 6 Reservation Prices and Equilibrium Predictions - IM Markets
E x a m p l e -: A s s u m i n g  S t a t e  X
I he I RE price is simply equal to the highest dividend given state X, which is 
250 emus paid to trader type 1 traders. Both informed and uninformed type 1 traders 
are predicted to hold the assets in equilibrium. Notice that the move from a perfect to 
imperfect information structure does not alter the equilibrium predictions o f the FRE 
model.
I he PI price is equal to the highest reservation price given the state contingent 
dividend distributions and the assumed uniform distribution o f private information, 
this is 575 emus for informed type 2 traders receiving the clue ‘Not Y \ The figure of 
575 l/:(200f950). The type 2 informed traders receiving the clue ‘Not Z ’ do not 
have as high an expected value reservation price and thus are not predicted to hold the 
assets in equilibrium.
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Information Auction Markets
I he assumption of uniform distribution o f private information among trader 
types is necessary ol the PI model s equilibrium predictions. In those experimental 
markets where no information auction is present the exogenous determination of the 
identity ol informed traders ensures that a uniform distribution is obtained. The 
endogenous determination ol informed traders in those experimental markets where 
an information auction is present does not guarantee a uniform distribution of private 
information among trader types. If the private information was not distributed to 
traders in the trader t\pe identified above as having the highest reservation price, then 
the PI equilibrium price prediction may well change.
I x a m im .i A s s u m i n g  S t a t e  Z  a n d  P e r f e c t  In f o r m a t i o n
Assume all four type 1 traders and two type 3 traders receive the perfect 
private information. I he PI price is equal to the highest reservation price given the 
state contingent dividend distributions and the assumed distribution of private 
information, this is 600 emus for informed type 3 traders.
1 he above example illustrates how the PI model's equilibrium predictions are 
contingent upon the distribution of the private information, because of the 
implications for traders* reservation prices (expected dividend values).
